Gooding v. Ott
| Citation | 87 S.E. 862,77 W.Va. 487 |
| Decision Date | 25 January 1916 |
| Docket Number | 3050. |
| Parties | GOODING v. OTT, STATE COMPENSATION COM'R. |
| Court | Supreme Court of West Virginia |
Submitted January 12, 1916.
Syllabus by the Court.
Where a coal company of this state, with principal offices and tipple and main entrance and the principal part of its mine located in this state, has qualified under the provisions of section 9 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state (Laws 1913, c. 10; Code 1913, c. 15p, § 9 [sec. 665]), as amended by the Acts of the Legislature of 1915, c. 9, by paying the premiums of liability and by giving notice to miners employed in its mine, etc., as required by said act, the widow of a miner residing in this state and so employed therein, unless employed wholly without the state, and whose injuries resulting in his death were sustained in the course of and resulting from his employment, while temporarily at work in that part of the mine located in an adjoining state, is entitled to participate in the Workmen's Compensation fund created by said act, notwithstanding the language of section twenty five thereof, authorizing disbursements of such fund to employees who "shall have received injuries in this state."
The relation of employer and employee, under said act, being voluntary and not compulsory, is contractual, the statute becoming an integral part of the contract, and limiting the rights and liabilities of employer and employee, binding upon the parties, and enforceable in other jurisdictions, unless opposed to the public policy thereof, and as all other foreign contracts are enforceable therein.
Appeal from State Compensation Commissioner.
Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Daisy Gooding to obtain compensation for the death of her husband while employed by the Davis Coal & Coke Company. Compensation was denied by Lee Ott, the State Compensation Commissioner, and the petitioner appeals. Reversed and remanded.
E. A Bowers, of Elkins, for appellant.
Frank Lively, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Petitioner widow, complains of the order of defendant denying her right of participation in the Workmen's Compensation Fund, on account of the death of her husband, Clyde F. Gooding, a miner, killed by coming in contact with a trolley wire, while employed in the mine of the Davis Coal & Coke Company.
The record shows that the tipple and main works of the Davis Coal & Coke Company are located in Grant County, West Virginia, where deceased resided and was employed to work as a miner, but that at the instant of his death he was operating a motor in a part of the mine which laid in Maryland, and at a point about four hundred feet from the dividing line between the two states.
It is conceded that the Davis Coal & Coke Company, a West Virginia corporation, with tipple and works and main offices so located in West Virginia, is of the class of "persons, firms, associations and corporations regularly employing other persons for profit, or for the purpose of carrying on any form of industry or business in this state," as provided by section 9, of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended by chapter 9, of the Acts of the Legislature, 1915, entitled to the benefits and protection of said act, and that deceased was at the time of his injury and death in the service of said company and employed by it "for the purpose of carrying on" its "industry or business," within the provisions of said act, and not of the excepted class, those "who are employed wholly without this state," as provided by said section.
It is conceded also that the Davis Coal & Coke Company had fully complied with all the requirements of the said chapter, and the rules of the Commissioner promulgated in relation thereto, for the month preceding the injuries and death of decedent, and had paid into the Workmen's Compensation Fund, established under the provisions of said act, "the premiums of liability" prescribed thereby, being the "prescribed percentage of the total earnings of all employees subject to this act for such preceding month," including the earnings of said decedent, as required by section 24 of said act, and that ten per cent. whereof was deducted from the pay of said employees including that of decedent, as likewise provided in said section, and had in all other respec ts complied with the requirements of said act.
That the petitioner, the widow of deceased, is one of the beneficiaries or dependents of deceased, entitled to share in the distribution of said compensation fund, is conceded, unless denied that right by some other provision of the law. The reasons assigned by the defendant for rejecting her claim are, first, that by section twenty five of said act he is authorized to disburse said Workmen's Compensation Fund only to employees, or their dependents, who "shall have received injuries in this state in the course of and resulting from their employment"; second, that this act can have no extra territorial force or effect, and as the deceased sustained his injuries resulting in his death, within the boundary of the State of Maryland, petitioner is not entitled to participate in said fund, wherefore her claim was denied.
It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that this construction of section twenty five of the statute is too narrow, and is not in harmony with other provisions of the act, or with the humanitarian objects and purposes thereof to relieve classes of employers and employees falling within its provisions. It is conceded by the Attorney General, arguendo, that under the original act of 1913, there could have been no doubt of petitioner's right to participate in the fund, because by section eighteen, it was specifically provided that "a mine worker shall be deemed to be wholly employed in the state in which the tipple or principal mine entrance of the mine in or about which he works is situate"; but that the omission of this provision in the amendment of 1915 evidenced an intention on the part of the legislature to deny to an employee, though not wholly employed but injured outside of the state, all relief or benefits of the fund to which he and his employer contributed and are required to contribute, not upon a proportion of his wages, but upon the whole amount of the wages earned by him.
Considering the objects and purposes of the statute, already indicated, and all the terms and provisions thereof, we think the Commissioner has given too narrow a construction to section twenty five of the act. True, this section does apparently limit the right to such persons "as shall have received injuries in this state," and true it is that the amendment of section eighteen, in 1915, defining a mine worker, was wholly omitted; but it is also true that the provision of section 9, of the act of 1913, admitting employees to the benefits of the fund unless "employed wholly without this state," remains in this section, as amended in 1915. Besides by the amendment of said section eighteen there was omitted that other provision of the original act, authorizing the employer, where an employee was employed partly within and partly without the state, to apportion the pay of such employee earned within and without the state in ascertaining the percentage of wages to be paid into the compensation fund. By the amendment, omitting this provision, an employer can not now, on penalty of losing the entire benefit of the act, deduct any proportion of the wages of an employee earned without the state.
The question is presented, what did the legislature intend by these amendments? Was it intended to deprive both employer and employee of the protection provided by the act when the injuries of the employee should occur just across the line in another state, and where, as in this case, the tipple and principal works are all located within this state? We can not think so. So construed the statute would impose unequal burdens upon and give unequal protection to mine owner and miner from whom premiums are exacted. They would both be liable for benefits not received. We think it quite clear that the amendments must have had some other purpose. We...
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