Goodloe v. United States
| Docket Number | 3:22-CV-0005-G (BH) |
| Decision Date | 21 June 2023 |
| Parties | MICHAEL ANTHONY GOODLOE, JR. Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the plaintiff's request for expungement of his federal criminal case and his claims for monetary damages against the United States, the Bureau of Prisons, and any federal individual defendant in an official capacity should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and his remaining claims should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.
In 2011, Michael Anthony Goodloe, Jr., (Plaintiff)-a former federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil action-was arrested in the Northern District of Texas for violating the terms of his pretrial release in a criminal case pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana (EDLA). See generally United States v. Goodloe Jr., 3:11-mj-00013-BF, (N.D. Tex. 2011). Following a hearing in this district, he was detained and transferred to the EDLA, where he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud. (See crim doc. 5; doc. 7 at 2.)[2] He was released from BOP custody in 2016 and then served a term of supervised release in the Eastern District of Texas. https://www.bop.gov (search for Plaintiff); (see also doc. 11 at 2.) His claims here stem from the 2011 hearing in this district and his subsequent guilty plea in the EDLA. He seeks monetary damages against the United States of America and its “agents” and the overturning and expungement of his EDLA criminal conviction. (See doc. 8 at 1; doc. 11 at 2, 6.)
Plaintiff claims that an unidentified Northern District of Texas pretrial services officer (Officer) “used fear, coercion, and duress” to convince him to plead guilty. (doc. 7 at 1; doc. 11 at 5.) Officer told him “a story of a woman who was doing a job at a mortgage company and got 10 year [sic] for faxing a piece of paper,” which persuaded him to plead guilty. (See id.) Officer allegedly falsely testified at the detention hearing that Plaintiff missed “50% of [his] meetings.” (doc. 11 at 5.) Although Plaintiff also references his court-appointed counsel (Counsel) for his criminal proceedings in this district, the United States Magistrate Judge (Judge) that presided over the detention hearing, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), he includes no specific allegations against them. (Id. at 1.) He claims that the “charging instrument used to convict” him contained false and misleading statements and that handwriting tests and fingerprint analysis show that he never forged checks, and that the “principle provided false and misleading statements” to the court in the EDLA. (doc. 3 at 1.) He purports to assert causes of action for “malfeasance, conspiracy against rights while acting under color of law, deprivation of rights while acting under the color of law, misprison felony, extortion, false and misleading evidence, fraud by confession, knowledge and failed [sic] to correct a wrong, ransom money collected.” (doc. 11 at 1.)
Because Plaintiff has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), his complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute provides for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Courts follow the same analysis in determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Neither mere “labels and conclusions” nor “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” suffice to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from the United States and its “agents.” (See doc. 8 at 1; doc. 11 at 6.)[3] “It is axiomatic that the United States [and its agencies] may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite to jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). “A waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)). “[T]he United States may not be sued except to the extent that it has consented to suit by statute,” and “[w]here the United States has not consented to suit or the plaintiff has not met the terms of the statute the court lacks jurisdiction and the action must be dismissed.” Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Tex. v. United States, 757 F.3d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Koehler v. United States, 153 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 1998)). “[A] waiver of the Government's sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).
Plaintiff has not identified any waiver to sovereign immunity, and none is apparent from the nature of his claims. His claims for monetary damages against the United States should be dismissed without prejudice based on sovereign immunity. To the extent that Plaintiff is suing the BOP or any federal official such as Judge or Officer in his or her official capacity for monetary damages, sovereign immunity likewise bars these claims because the immunity extends to federal agencies, and official-capacity claims against federal officials are treated like claims against the United States. See, e.g., Pinson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 647 Fed.Appx. 375, 376 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Carvajal v. United States, No. 3:20-cv-567-S-BK, 2021 WL 2814883, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2021), rec. accepted 2021 WL 2808966, 2021 WL 2808966 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2021) (citation omitted) (“Likewise, [the plaintiff's] official capacity claims against Morris are barred by sovereign immunity because Morris' actions in his official capacity are considered those of his federal agency employer (the U.S. probation office).”) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985)).
To the extent that Plaintiff is suing Judge or Officer in their individual capacities for money damages based on alleged constitutional violations, his claims arise under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that the violation of a person's constitutional rights by a federal official may give rise to an action for monetary damages in federal court. Bivens mirrors but is not “‘the substantial equivalent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'” Ziglar v. Abbasi,__U.S.__, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1855, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017) (citation omitted).[4]
Plaintiff alleges that Officer coerced his guilty plea and gave false testimony at his detention hearing. Recently, the Supreme Court reiterated that expanding Bivens cases of action is “a ‘disfavored' judicial activity.” Egbert v. Boule, __U.S.__, 142 S.Ct. 1793, 1803, 213 L.Ed.2d 54 (2022) (quoting Ziglar, 137 S.Ct. at 1857). “‘[S]eparation-of-powers principles are.. .central to the analysis” of Bivens expansion, and the question is whether Congress or the courts should decide to authorize a damages suit.” Davis v. BOP, No. 3:22-cv-2395-M-BK, 2023 WL 3395139, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2023), rec. accepted 2023 WL 3591679 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 2023) (citing Ziglar, 137 S.Ct. at 1857).
The Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test to determine whether a Bivens claim may proceed. Egbert, 142 S.Ct. at 1803. First, a court must ask whether the plaintiff's claim “presents ‘a new Bivens context'-i.e., is it ‘meaningful[ly]' different from the three cases in which the Court has implied a damages action.” Id.; see also Davis, 2023 WL 3395139, at *2. Second, if the claim presents a new context, the court asks whether there are “special factors counseling hesitation” in expanding the Bivens remedy. Ziglar, 137 S.Ct. at 1857-60. These two steps “often resolve to a single question: whether there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.” Egbert, 142 S.Ct. at 1803. “If there is even a single ‘reason to pause before applying Bivens in a new context,' a court may not recognize a Bivens remedy.” Id. (citation omitted).
“The Supreme Court has extended Bivens claims to only those arising from three specific factual scenarios.” Davis, 2023 WL 3395139, at *3. These include:
(1) manacling the plaintiff in front of his family in his home and strip-searching him in violation of the Fourth Amendment, see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389-90, 91 S.Ct. 1999; (2) discrimination on the basis of sex by a congressman against a staff person in violation of the Fifth Amendment, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979); and (3) failure to provide medical attention to an asthmatic prisoner in federal custody in violation of the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980).
Oliva v. Nivar, 973 F.3d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 2020). “Virtually everything else is a ...
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