Goodman v. Christensen, 6797.

• Decision Date: 29 October 1941
• Docket Number: No. 6797.,6797.
• Citation: 300 N.W. 460,71 N.D. 306
• Parties: GOODMAN et al. v. CHRISTENSEN et al.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

71 N.D. 306

300 N.W. 460

GOODMAN et al.

v.CHRISTENSEN et al.

No. 6797.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Oct. 17, 1941.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 29, 1941.

On Petition for Rehearing.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Under the provisions of sections 86 and 87 of the State Constitution and section 7339, Comp.Laws N.D.1913, the Supreme Court has superintending control over all inferior courts and in the exercise thereof has power to issue such original writs as may be necessary.

2. The provision in section 10 of chapter 269, Session Laws N.D.1941, to the effect that decisions of the district court under that chapter are final, does not deprive the Supreme Court of superintending control over the district court or restrict its power and authority to exercise its superintending jurisdiction.

3. The provision in section 10, chapter 269, Session Laws N.D.1941, directing the district court to determine appeals under that chapter before the first day of October does not deprive that court of power to enter judgment after October 1st in a case wherein it has acquired jurisdiction pursuant to the statute nor is the Supreme Court without authority to direct the district court to proceed in such a case after the date prescribed by statute has passed.

4. No relief from alleged excessive assessments can be granted under chapter 269, Session Laws N.D.1941, to petitioners who have not presented their complaints to local boards of review in organized territory or to the board of county commissioners acting as a local board of review if the property involved is taxable in unorganized territory.

5. If a bill, containing an emergency clause, passed by the legislature and approved by the governor, failed to receive a favorable vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting in either house the bill becomes a law on July 1st after the close of the legislative session.

6. For reasons stated in the opinion, it is held that the provisions of Chapter 269, Session Laws N.D.1941, affording relief from excessive tax assessments are wholly prospective and do not apply to 1941 assessments.

Original proceeding in the Supreme Court by David W. Goodman and others, petitioners, against Fred Christensen, Ben Koester, and James Kennelly, the Board of County Commissioners and Board of Equalization in and for the county of Kidder, in the State of North Dakota, for a supervisory writ to direct the district court to proceed to hear an appeal to the district court from denial by county board of applications for redetermination of valuations for tax purposes of lands owned by the petitioners. On the hearing in the Supreme Court to determine whether the writ should issue, the State's attorney of Kidder county, representing the county commissioners, moved to quash the proceedings.

Writ denied.

R. L. Phelps, of Steele, and Knauf & Knauf, of Jamestown, for petitioners.

Arne Vinje, State's Atty., of Steele, and T. A. Thompson, of Bismarck, for respondents.

Roy K. Redetzke, of Fargo, amicus curiæ.

MORRIS, Judge.

This is an original proceeding in the Supreme Court. The petitioners seek a supervisory writ directing the district court to take certain proceedings and determine certain issues under the provisions of chapter 269, Session Laws N.D.1941. On July 9, 1941, the petitioners presented to the Board of County Commissioners of Kidder County their respective petitions as individuals wherein they sought the redetermination of valuations for tax purposes of lands owned by the various petitioners. The applications were denied by the county board, whereupon an appeal was taken to the district court. Upon that appeal, the proceedings initiated by the separate petitions were consolidated into one action. The case was heard by the district court on September 22, 1941.

When the petitioners called their first witness, the Board of County Commissioners of Kidder County made a motion for dismissal of the proceedings upon various grounds including the following: “That the petition filed herein does not state facts sufficient to justify the Court in assuming jurisdiction of this case or granting any relief to petitioners or any of them because the petition is based on the 1941 tax assessment and levy. The 1941 assessment was completed by the local assessors and by the local boards before July 1, 1941. The emergency clause set forth in the printed bill was defeated in the House, and Senate Bill No. 195, printed as chapter 269, Laws of 1941, did not become effective until July 1, 1941. It expressly provides that it shall not be retroactive, but is prospective only, so that the law could not and does not apply to 1941 assessments as made by assessors and local boards who had met and acted prior to July 1, 1941.”

In addition to the foregoing grounds for the motion for dismissal the respondents urged various constitutional objections to the validity of Chapter 269.

The trial judge granted the motion and in the order for dismissal states that, “the Petition herein does not state facts sufficient to justify the Court in assuming jurisdiction of this case or granting any relief to Petitioners or any of them, because the Petition is based upon the 1941 tax assessment and levy; and that the 1941 assessment was completed by the local assessors and by the local boards of review prior to July 1st, 1941; that Chapter 269 of the laws of 1941, upon which the cause of action of the Petitioners is founded did not become operative and did not take effect until July 1st, 1941.”

The petitioners now seek in this court a supervisory writ directing the trial court to proceed to hear the appeal upon its merits and determine the full and true value of the various tracts of property involved. Upon a hearing in this court to determine whether such writ should issue, the State's Attorney of Kidder County, representing the County Commissioners, moved to quash the proceedings in this court. Among the grounds urged are, “That by the express terms of Chapter 269, Session Laws N.D.1941, the holding of a District Court under said act is not subject to review” and “That for this Court, now, to disturb the Order of the District Court would be an idle act, because under the express terms of Chapter 269, Laws of 1941, no judgment or Order disturbing an assessment for 1941 after October first, 1941, could be made.”

[1][2][3] Section 10 of the act in question provides, “That every decision of the district judge rendered pursuant to the provisions of this Act shall be final and shall not be subject to review by appeal.” It was evidently the intention of the legislature to make the decision of the district judge final as to those matters that he was required to determine under the provisions of Chapter 269. It is urged by the petitioners that the trial court in dismissing the proceedings and failing to grant judgment did not comply with the statute nor perform his duty under it. Section 86 of the North Dakota Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court general superintending control over all inferior courts under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by the legislature. Section 7339, Comp.Laws N.D.1913, authorizes the Supreme Court to issue such original and remedial writs as may be necessary to exercise its superintending control over inferior courts. State ex rel. Jacobson v. District Court, 68 N.D. 211, 277 N.W. 843;State ex rel. Shafer v. Lowe, 54 N.D. 637, 210 N.W. 501. Section 87 of the Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue certain prerogative writs. If, as charged by the petitioners, the district court has failed to perform his duty as district judge under the statute, this court is not deprived of superintending control by the provision in Chapter 269 making the decision of the district judge final.

Section 10 of Chapter 269 also provides that the district judge, designated to preside at the hearing of appeals from Boards of County Commissioners, “shall hear, try and determine all issues of fact and law presented by such appeals de novo, and shall decide all appeals pending in said court for determination before the first day of October.” It is urged by the State's Attorney of Kidder County in support of his motion to dismiss these proceedings that after the 1st day of October the district court is without power to enter any judgment disturbing the assessments involved in the appeals, and that this court may not now order the district court to proceed to judgment in this proceeding because the date upon which any judgment may be entered herein by the district court has passed.

[4] The record discloses that the court proceeded to a hearing on September 22 and made the determination contained in his order of dismissal on September 30. If that order was made without authority and in contravention of his duty under the statute, this court may order him to proceed even though the proceeding may result in a judgment entered after October 1st. It is the duty of the court to comply with the statute and to make his determination as directed therein. The statute however does not go so far as to deprive him of jurisdiction if he fails to comply with the statutory direction as to time. That the court had jurisdiction in the first instance to hear the appeal is not questioned. Should it now become proper to direct the district court to proceed, this court may do so. The time set by the statute neither deprives the trial court nor this court of the power to proceed to hear and determine the questions in this litigation in a speedy and orderly manner. The motion to quash is denied.

We will now consider whether the action of the trial court in dismissing the proceedings was a violation of his duty under the statute as urged by the petitioners. The basic question with reference to this point is whether Chapter 269 is applicable to tax assessments made during the year 1941. If it is not applicable, the district court properly dismissed the proceedings.

In this...