Goodman v. City of Brooklyn Center, No. A06-202 (Minn. App. 1/9/2007)
| Decision Date | 09 January 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. A06-202.,A06-202. |
| Parties | Laura L. Goodman, Relator, v. City of Brooklyn Center, Respondent, Department of Employment and Economic Development, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Department of Employment and Economic Development, File No. 13410 05.
Elizabeth Melton, Foley & Mansfield, P.L.L.P., (for relator)
John M. LeFevre Jr., Kennedy and Graven, (for respondent City of Brooklyn Center)
Linda A. Holmes, Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development, (for respondent Department)
Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge; Wright, Judge; and Huspeni, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Relator appeals by writ of certiorari from the decision of the unemployment-law judge that relator quit her employment without good reason caused by her employer and that, consequently, she is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. We affirm.
Relator Laura Goodman was hired on September 8, 2003, as the deputy police chief for respondent City of Brooklyn Center. According to the position description, the deputy police chief "[p]erforms administrative and responsible managerial police work . . . under the general or administrative supervision of the police chief." Goodman testified that, among her duties, she was "hired . . . to supervise, oversee, guide, advise, etc. the lieutenants."
During Goodman's March 2005 performance review, the police chief told Goodman that she needed to improve her relationships with staff. While this was the third conversation between Goodman and the chief on the subject, Goodman told the chief for the first time that she thought that his criticism was motivated by Goodman's gender. Goodman testified that later the chief met with Goodman and the city's human-resources director, and during the meeting the chief told Goodman that they were "no longer in sync" and gave her the choice of resigning or being given a negative performance review and being placed on a work plan. Goodman testified that before March 2005 she had a good working relationship with the chief.
On May 23, 2005, Goodman wrote to the city manager, stating that she believed that "the perception that [she is] unfriendly is an issue that would not have arisen if [she were] a man and that the recent negative performance evaluation was precipitated by [her] expressing this concern to the chief." Goodman's letter concluded with an offer to retire if certain of her demands were met. The city manager replied that he was satisfied that the chief was "proceeding in a fashion designed to have [Goodman's position] succeed."
The chief placed Goodman on a 90-day work plan, commencing on May 31, 2005, during which Goodman was to have weekly evaluation meetings with the chief. The work plan identified five skills for improvement, but Goodman testified that before instituting the work plan, the chief had focused only on staff relationships and had not discussed the other skills with Goodman. Goodman signed the work plan, although she testified that she "had no choice but to sign the document" or be fired.
Despite the work plan, Goodman continued to have difficulties, which eventually resulted in her resignation. Goodman testified that the chief would unexpectedly change the agenda at their meetings, which left her unprepared; that the chief increased her job responsibilities; and that the chief, despite an earlier oral agreement to the contrary, refused to give her permission to attend a conference in London, England. Goodman testified that the "last straw" was the chief's decision to move her from the administrative division to supervise a five-person detective unit. Because of this change, the lieutenants, who had been reporting to Goodman, now reported directly to the chief. Although acknowledging that historically the detectives had been managed by a high-ranking officer, Goodman testified that this change "seal[ed] [her] fate" because she was "taken out of the information flow." On August 18, 2005, Goodman resigned from the police department.
Respondent Department of Employment and Economic Development determined that relator was disqualified from receiving benefits. Goodman appealed, and an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) affirmed, finding that Goodman quit without good reason caused by her employer. While the ULJ found that Goodman was not discriminated against because of her gender, the ULJ made no findings on Goodman's retaliation claim. The ULJ also made no findings on Goodman's claim that the work plan was designed to force her resignation. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the ULJ affirmed her earlier decision, and this certiorari appeal follows.
Goodman argues that she had good reason caused by her employer to quit and is, therefore, qualified to receive unemployment benefits. Upon review of a ULJ's decision, this court may affirm, remand for further proceedings, reverse, or modify the decision. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (Supp. 2005). This court will affirm unless, in relevant part, the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record or the decision was affected by error of law. Id. Review of a ULJ's decision involves mixed questions of law and fact. See Colburn v. Pine Portage Madden Bros., 346 N.W.2d 159, 161 (Minn. 1984). Whether an employee had good reason caused by an employer to quit is a question of law, which we review de novo. Rootes v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 669 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Minn. App. 2003). But this court will defer to the ULJ's findings of fact. See Skarhus v. Davanni's Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006).
There is no dispute that Goodman quit her employment. Under Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(1) (2004), an employee who voluntarily quits her employment is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits unless the employee had "good reason caused by the employer" to quit. An employee has a "good reason" if the employer is responsible for an action that (1) is directly related to the employment, (2) is adverse to the employee, and (3) would "compel" an average, reasonable employee "to quit and become unemployed" rather than to continue working. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a) (Supp. 2005). But notification of future discharge is not a good reason to quit. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(e) (Supp. 2005).
Goodman proffers three bases for concluding that the actions of the city gave her good reason to quit. First, Goodman argues that the evidence supports a finding that the city retaliated against her because of her complaint of gender discrimination. An employer that violates the law in its treatment of its employees is "per se guilty of employer misconduct," and the employee has good reason to quit. Hawthorne v. Universal Studios, Inc., 432 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Minn. App. 1988) (quotation omitted). Both federal law and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) prohibit retaliating against employees for exercising their rights under the law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000); Minn. Stat. § 363A.15 (2004); see also Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortgage Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 548 (Minn. 2001) (). Thus, if the city retaliated against Goodman because of her discrimination complaint, she had good reason to quit.
Goodman cites no authority in support of her retaliation claim, but we nevertheless choose to address it. To make out a claim under either the federal or the state statute, an employee must establish that there is a causal connection between the employee's statutorily protected conduct and the employer's alleged adverse employment action. Clark v. Johanns, 460 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2006) ();Kuechle v. Life's Companion P.C.A., Inc., 653 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. App. 2002) (). Goodman's formal complaint by letter to the city is statutorily protected conduct. See Potter v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 622 N.W.2d 141, 145 (Minn. App. 2001) ().
But Goodman has not established an adverse employment action. In construing the MHRA, Minnesota courts may look to federal caselaw interpreting federal retaliation claims for guidance.Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999). Recently, the Supreme Court clarified federal caselaw on what constitutes an adverse employment action for the purpose of a retaliation action, adopting the interpretation of the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits. Specifically, the Court held that for challenged conduct to be actionable, the plaintiff must establish that a "reasonable employee would have found the challenged conduct materially adverse." See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006). The Supreme Court has instructed co...
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