Goodman v. People

• Decision Date: 19 June 1907
• Citation: 81 N.E. 830,228 Ill. 154
• Parties: GOODMAN v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

228 Ill. 154

81 N.E. 830

GOODMAN

v.PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 19, 1907.

Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; W. M. McEwen, Judge.

Edward Goodman was convicted of uttering a forged instrument, and brings error. Reversed and remanded.Frank H. Bowen (Francis A. Riddle, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., and John J. Healy, State's Atty. (Fletcher Dobyns, of counsel), for the People.

Edward Goodman, plaintiff in error, was indicted, jointly with Harry Young and William Shepherd, in the criminal court of Cook county, for forgery and for uttering as true and genuine a false and forged railroad pass. A motion to quash the indictment was sustained as to the first count, which charged forgery, and was overruled as to the second, which charged the uttering of the forged instrument. A nolle prosequi was entered as to Young, and the jury acquitted Shepherd and found Goodman guilty under the second count of the indictment. The plaintiff in error insists that the court erred in overruling the motion to quash the second count of the indictment. The substance of that count is as follows: That Edward Goodman, Harry Young, and William Shepherd, on the 10th of January, in the year 1905, did feloniously and falsely pass as true and genuine a certain false, forged, and counterfeit transportation ticket, commonly called ‘time pass,’ for the passage of certain persons, to wit, a foreman and 12 men, upon the railroad of the Chicago Great Western Railway Company, a corporation, which said false, forged, and counterfeit transportation ticket, commonly called time pass,' for the passage of certain persons, to wit, foreman and 12 men, upon the railroad of the Chicago Great Western Railway Company, a corporation, so passed as true and genuine as aforesaid, is in words and figures following, to wit: ‘Chicago Great Western Railway Employee's Time Pass. No. B5384.-Pass foreman and twelve (12) men upon conditions on back hereof. Between all stations. Occupation, Thos. Phee & Co.'s contract, until December 31, 1904. Sam. E. Stickney, General Manager.’ That on the back of said time pass appeared the words and figures as follows, to wit: ‘Not good on limited trains 1 and 2. Not good unless countersigned by C. A. Engquist.’ Countersigned: C. A. Engquist.' ‘The person accepting this pass expressly agrees that the Chicago Great Western Railway Company shall not be liable for any injury to his person or property except in case of gross negligence, and that in no case shall the liability of the company exceed the sum of $1,000. This pass is not transferable, and if presented by any other than the person named hereon, or if any alteration or erasure is made, the conductor will take up this pass and collect fare. Good until January 31, 1905. Sam. E. Stickney, General Manager.’ That they, the said Edward Goodman, said Harry Young, and said William Shepherd, otherwise called ‘Billy,’ then and there well knew the same to be false, forged, and counterfeited, and with intent then and there to prejudice, damage, and defraud the Chicago Great Western Railway Company, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Illinois; and the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do say that by reason of the premises aforesaid the said Edward Goodman and Harry Young and William Shepherd, otherwise called ‘Billy,’ are deemed guilty of forgery, contrary to the statute and against the peace and dignity of the same people of the state of Illinois.

VICKERS, J. (after stating the facts).

The first and most important question relates to the sufficiency of the second count in the indictment. The obligation urged to the indictment is that the writing set out is not such an instrument as the court can see, from an inspection, would have a tendency to defraud, and that there is no averment of extrinsic facts to aid the court to determine its fraudulent tendency. Forgery has been variously defined. Blackstone defines forgery to be the fraudulent making or altering of a writing to the prejudice of another's rights. 4 Blackstone's Com. 247. Wharton defines forgery to be the fraudulent falsifying of an instrument to another's prejudice. 1 Wharton on Crim. Law (8th Ed.) § 653. Bishop's definition is as follows: ‘Forgery is the fraudulent making of a false writing, which, if genuine, would be apparently of some legal efficacy.’ 2 Bishop on Crim. Law, § 523. Clark & Marshall, in their late work on the Law of Crimes (section 392), define forgery as the false making, with intent to defraud, of any writing which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy or the foundation of a legal liability. From these definitions of the offense it follows that three essential elements must exist to constitute the offense; (1) There must be a false writing or alteration of an instrument. (2) The instrument as made must be apparently capable of defrauding. (3) There must be an intent to defraud. Unless the alleged instrument shows on its face that it is capable of defrauding, or such character is given it by extrinsic averments, forgery cannot be predicated upon it.

Bonds, notes, checks, and other instruments for the payment of money or the creation of duties or obligations are familiar illustrations of writings which usually show on inspection that when forged they are capable of being used to defraud. Many cases are to be found in this and other courts in which convictions for forgery have been upheld where the indictment simply charged the forgery in proper language and set out a copy of the forged instrument, without any extrinsic averments. Indeed, in the greater number of forgery cases, no necessity exists for such extrinsic matter. While this is the general rule, applicable to most cases, yet cases not infrequently arise where the fraudulent character of the alleged forged writing can only be made to appear by innuendoes, introducing extraneous facts and circumstances which show that the writing possessed a fraudulent character not discernible, except when read in the light of such facts and circumstances. An instrument that is void or without apparent legal efficacy on its face, or which is not shown by averment of extrinsic facts to be capable of affecting the rights of another, cannot be the subject of forgery. Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209;People v. Drayton, 168 N. Y. 10, 60 N. E. 1048. The indictment in this case contains no averments of extrinsic facts, and it is contended none are required. In this view we cannot concur. In order that the time pass in question should be used to defraud the Chicago Great Western Railway Company, it is necessary that said pass should bear a similitude to a true and genuine pass. This similitude need only be such that the court can say that a reasonable and ordinary person might be deceived into accepting the same as true and genuine. It need not be so skillfully executed that it requires an expert to detect it. Garmire v. State, 104 Ind. 444, 4 N. E. 54;Barnes v. Commonwealth, 101 Ky. 556, 41 S. W. 772; Clark & Marshall on the Law of Crimes, p. 586.

The first matter requiring the aid of extrinsic averments in the case at bar is with respect to the use to which the writing in question is to be put. The writing recites: ‘Pass foreman and 12 men upon conditions on back hereof. Betweenall stations.’ Pass them how and over what? If the company had no lines of railroad or street railway lines, or other means of transporting persons from one place to another, then, manifestly, it could not be defrauded by persons offering the pass for transportation. It therefore becomes material and necessary to know the extrinsic fact whether the company owned or operated lines of railroad or other means of carrying passengers, and hence arises the necessity for the averments of the facts, so that relevant and proper testimony to prove them could be introduced on the trial. In the case of Klawanski v. People, 218 Ill. 481, 75 N. E. 1028, which was an indictment for forging and uttering as true and genuine a false and forged complimentary theater ticket, we held that an indictment that failed to charge that an...