Goodman v. State

• Decision Date: 03 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. S13A0571.,S13A0571.
• Parties: GOODMAN v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

293 Ga. 80
742 S.E.2d 719

GOODMAN
v.
The STATE.

No. S13A0571.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 6, 2013.
Reconsideration Denied June 3, 2013.

[742 S.E.2d 720]

John Walter Donnelly, Athens, for appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Clint Christopher Malcolm, Asst. Atty. Gen., Fredric Daniel Bright, Dist. Atty., Alison Teresa Burleson, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

HINES, Justice.

[293 Ga. 80]Lori Ann Goodman appeals her convictions and sentences for malice murder and theft by taking in connection with the death of Debra Dressler. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.¹

[742 S.E.2d 721]

Construed to support the verdicts, the evidence showed that Goodman, Dressler, and Rose Richardson became acquainted in a homeless shelter in Virginia. The home of Dressler's husband was near, and Dressler wanted to collect her dentures and a checkbook from there, so the three women drove there in Dressler's car. An argument ensued at the husband's home and “Mr. Dressler was killed.” ²

The three women fled in Dressler's vehicle; they acquired beer and crack cocaine. They traveled south, and during the journey, Richardson and Goodman became aggravated by Dressler's behavior; at one point, Dressler was to have sex with a truck driver in exchange for money, but came back from the truck driver's vehicle with only hamburgers from a fast food restaurant. At a motel in South Carolina, Goodman said to Richardson: “we need to get rid of her.” Goodman and Richardson recognized that if they merely left Dressler somewhere, she could connect them to the killing of Dressler's husband, and Dressler told them she would do that if left. Goodman and Richardson resolved to kill Dressler by poisoning her with prescription pills, aspirin, and alcohol; they agreed to work in concert on the theory that neither could then implicate the other. Richardson placed pills in Goodman's hand, who put them in a large bottle [293 Ga. 81]containing a cocktail and gave it to Dressler, who drank it. As Richardson drove along an interstate highway, Goodman repeatedly queried why Dressler had not fallen asleep. In Morgan County, Georgia, Richardson exited the highway and drove the vehicle next to a dumpster. Richardson and Goodman looked at each other, and Goodman, seated behind Dressler, removed her belt and began to choke Dressler with it; Richardson tried to put a ball of yarn over Dressler's mouth and nose and then put a pillow over Dressler's face. Dressler struggled and inquired why Goodman and Richardson were doing this; Richardson told her that she was “no good to us.” After some minutes, the two women became tired and stopped; they could not determine if Dressler still lived. After resting, Goodman again choked Dressler, this time with a bandana, and Richardson again placed a pillow over Dressler's face. Richardson removed Dressler from the car and Goodman retrieved a pair of 24–inch bolt cutters from the trunk; Goodman struck Dressler three times on the head with the bolt cutters, and Richardson took them and did the same. Goodman covered Dressler with a blanket, and the two women drove away in Dressler's car. Goodman and Richardson were apprehended in Louisiana.

Richardson pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and testified at Goodman's trial. Forensic evidence showed that Dressler died of ligature strangulation.

1. The evidence authorized the jury to find Goodman guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which she was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. At the time of trial, the Morgan County courthouse was under renovation, so Goodman's trial could not be held there; it was held at the former Morgan County Senior Center. OCGA § 15–6–18, as in effect at the time of trial, and specifically OCGA § 15–6–18(c)(1),³ required essentially two

[742 S.E.2d 722]

things for a criminal trial in a county the size [293 Ga. 82]of Morgan County to be held in a location other than the County Courthouse: provision for such a location by the proper governing authority of the county, and the consent of the accused. It is uncontroverted that the Morgan County Board of Commissioners properly designated the former Morgan County Senior Center as a place in which the superior court could conduct trials, but at no time did the [293 Ga. 83]trial court, or the parties, address any question of Goodman's consent to conducting the trial in the designated location.

Holding the trial at a location other than the county courthouse without Goodman's consent violated then OCGA § 15–6–18(c)(1). Purvis v. State, 288 Ga. 865, 869–870(2), 708 S.E.2d 283 (2011). The mere absence of objection is insufficient to show proper compliance with then OCGA § 15–6–18(c)(1); “an accused's consent to having his or her criminal jury trial conducted in an alternate or additional facility must be established by the record.” Id. at 870, n. 9, 708 S.E.2d 283. Although it was error to conduct the trial without securing Goodman's consent, that alone does not require reversal of the judgment below. “In order to have reversible error, there must be harm as well as error. [Cit.]” Inman v. State, 281 Ga. 67, 73(5), 635 S.E.2d 125 (2006). And, Goodman fails to allege harm, or attempt to support a finding of such by evidence. Accordingly, the failure to comply with then OCGA § 15–6–18(c)(1) does not constitute reversible error. This Court's opinion in Purvis, supra, does not require a different conclusion. In Division 1 of that opinion, this Court determined that

[742 S.E.2d 723]

the defendant's right to a public trial had been violated, and the decision of the Court of Appeals was therefore reversed with the direction that the case be remanded to the trial court for a new trial. Id. at 865–869(1), 708 S.E.2d 283. Thus, Purvis addressed the additional issue of the application of then OCGA § 15–6–18(c)(1) because the opinion of the Court of Appeals was in error on that point, and the error could recur on retrial. Id. at 869–870(2), 708 S.E.2d 283. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Smith, 289 Ga. 903, 907(2), 717 S.E.2d 209 (2011). However, this posture meant that Purvis did not need to address the implication of the found error under then OCGA § 15–6–18(c)(1), and thus Purvis made no pronouncement about the applicability of harmless error analysis to such an error.

3. A police detective from Virginia testified regarding the murder of Dressler's husband, and the State elicited testimony that Dressler, Richardson, and Goodman were suspected of having committed that crime. Goodman argues that this introduced evidence of a connected transaction without compliance with the notice and hearing requirements of Uniform Superior Court Rules (“USCR”) 31.1 and 31.3. First, Goodman did not make any objection on such grounds at trial, and has waived review of the failure to comply with USCR 31.1 and 31.3. Anderson v. State, 286 Ga. 57, 58(3), 685 S.E.2d 716 (2009).

Second, even though the notice requirements of USCR 31.1 and 31.3 were not met,

[i]t is well established that “[o]n the trial of one charged with murder, evidence of the defendant's motive for the homicide is always relevant.” [293 Ga. 84]Boone v. State, 145 Ga. 37, 39(1), 88 S.E. 558 (1916). See also OCGA § 24–2–1 (evidence is relevant and, therefore, admissible if it bears on a material issue in the case); Wall v. State, 153 Ga. 309(1), 112 S.E. 142 (1922) (evidence tending to show motive is always relevant and admissible).

Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. 447, 451(3), 651 S.E.2d 66 (2007). The State asserted that the independent crime against Dressler's husband, and Goodman's fear of being held culpable for it, provided her motive for killing Dressler. See Young v. State, 281 Ga. 750, 751–752, 642 S.E.2d 806 (2007). “As the evidence complained of was evidence of [Goodman]'s motive, notice and a hearing under USCR 31.1 and 31.3 were not necessary.” Cummings v. State, 273 Ga. 547, 548(2), 544 S.E.2d 429 (2001). Nor does the fact that Goodman was characterized as a “suspect” render the evidence inadmissible. “ ‘Evidence of the defendant's motive is relevant, even though it may incidentally place the defendant's character in evidence....’ [Cit.]” Fulton v. State, 278 Ga. 58, 60(3), 597 S.E.2d 396 (2004).

Goodman also notes that the State was allowed to ask Richardson whether she had “made statements in the past” regarding Goodman's involvement in the murder of Dressler's husband. Goodman objected and, after discussion, the court instructed the jury on the law regarding similar or connected offenses and transactions; the original question was never answered. Although Goodman asserts that the question itself created a negative impression in the jury's eyes regarding her character, Goodman did not request that the jury be instructed to disregard the question.⁴ And, evidence about Goodman's involvement in the murder of Dressler's husband was relevant in her trial for the murder of Dressler. Lindsey, supra;Young, supra;Fulton, supra.

4. Crosby, a crime scene specialist with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, testified that DNA from yarn found on Dressler's body matched Dressler, but that no other match was made. Goodman now contends it was error to allow such evidence as Crosby had not been qualified as an expert witness in this area and testified as to matters outside his knowledge. However, no such objections were raised below, and Goodman has waived review of this asserted error. See

[742 S.E.2d 724]

Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 355–356(1), 689 S.E.2d 280 (2010); Boring v. State, 303 Ga.App. 576, 579(1), 694 S.E.2d 157 (2010).

[293 Ga. 85]5. Goodman contends that Richardson was improperly allowed to testify regarding Goodman's exercise of her right to a jury trial, and to comment on the ultimate issue of guilt, when Richardson said that Goodman should “admit her guilt” and accept the consequences, as Richardson testified she had done....