Goodman v. State, 684
| Decision Date | 25 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 684,684 |
| Citation | 479 N.E.2d 513 |
| Parties | Gregory Allen GOODMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. S 213. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Geoffrey A. Rivers, Muncie, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Richard Albert Alford, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant-Appellant Gregory Allen Goodman was found guilty by a jury in the Delaware Superior Court of the crime of criminal deviate conduct, a class B felony. He subsequently was sentenced by the trial judge to a term of twelve years imprisonment. Five issues are alleged and presented for our consideration in this direct appeal as follows:
1. overruling of Defendant's objection to a leading question;
2. overruling of Defendant's objection to interrogation of witness Schlegel on redirect examination;
3. denial of Defendant's motion for mistrial;
4. improper argument of prosecutor on final argument; and
5. sufficiency of the evidence.
L.C. testified during Defendant's trial that on November 28, 1982, at about 10:00 p.m., she left a friend's house on 12th Street in Muncie, Indiana, and began walking home. A dark, rusty brown car pulled up beside her and a man inside opened the door of the car, grabbed her arm and asked her if she needed a ride. He then pulled L.C. into the automobile and told her to shut the door which she did. They drove around for some time during which L.C. asked the man to take her home but he ignored her requests. The man later identified by L.C. as being Defendant Goodman then started making sexual advances toward her. When she tried to beep the horn of the car to attract the attention of other persons, he told her he had a knife and would kill her if she tried to do that again. Eventually the man took out his penis and forced her to perform fellatio on him. L.C. finally was able to escape by pinching his leg and opening the car door and rolling out of the car. She ran to a nearby residence and called the police.
Defendant first claims the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the victim to answer a certain question on direct examination over Defendant's objection that the question was leading. The victim testified as to conversations she had with Defendant as they drove around. Specifically, she said she asked him questions about his personal life, such as his age and where he went to school, and also made suggestions to him as to where he should take her and how he should release her. During these conversations, the victim testified that Defendant made sexual advances to her and she tried to explain to Defendant that she was not the kind of girl who would welcome such advances. Eventually, L.C. suggested that he take her out to the reservoir. There followed questions by the prosecutor about L.C.'s reasons for making this suggestion. L.C. responded by stating that she was trying to stall for time and an opportunity for escape by her continued conversations. She also stated that she had been instructed in school as to this procedure for situations such as the one in which she found herself. During additional questions regarding this subject, L.C. was asked: "Did you rely upon other things that you learned in school in determining what you should do?" The trial court permitted L.C. to answer the question and she stated that she had been taught in school to try to reach the perpetrator by calm conversation and to await a chance for escape. Defendant objected that this question was leading but the trial court overruled this objection and permitted the answer. Defendant still claims this question was leading but also claims we should find it to be reversible error because the topic sought to be covered by the question was immaterial, irrelevant and a prejudicial, hearsay, evidentiary harpoon which assumed a sex crime or an attempted sex crime.
A defendant may not state one reason for an objection at trial and then rely upon another on appeal. When a defendant does not properly bring an objection to the trial court's attention so that the trial court may rule on it at the appropriate time, then he is deemed to have waived that possible error. Phelan v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 542, 406 N.E.2d 237. Moreover, grounds for objection must be specific and any grounds not raised in the trial court are not available on appeal. Brown v. State, (1981) 275 Ind. 441, 417 N.E.2d 333. The only question preserved by Defendant, therefore, is whether or not the question asked of L.C. was improper as a leading question. A leading question is one that suggests to the witness the answer desired. It is one which embodies a material fact and admits of a conclusive answer in the form of a simple "yes" or "no". The mere mention of a subject to which a witness is desired to direct his or her attention, however, is not considered to be a suggestion of an answer. DeHaven et al. v. DeHaven et al., (1881) 77 Ind. 236. Although this question did not take the form of an assertion of fact which the witness could verify by a yes or no, it inquired into the subject of L.C.'s reaction to Defendant which was pertinent to the charges and also showed that she resisted his advances. Starks v. State, (1975) 163 Ind.App. 639, 325 N.E.2d 855, trans. denied. The trial court did not err in permitting the answer to the question.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to questions asked by the State on redirect examination of witness Schlegel. In his testimony, Police Officer Schlegel discussed what the victim told him about the incident involved. During Defendant's cross-examination, Defendant asked questions of Schlegel with regard to the victim's identity of Defendant. As a part of that cross-examination, Schlegel was asked whether he made a police report of what the victim had told him and, when he indicated that he had, Schlegel was asked to read a portion of that police report regarding the victim's description of her assailant. On redirect examination the State inquired of Schlegel about the description the victim had given him regarding the car that Defendant had been driving. Defendant objected to this question, claiming that it was outside the subject matter covered on cross-examination.
This Court has held:
Kalady v. State, (1984) Ind., 462 N.E.2d 1299, 1309. In the instant case, both the cross-examination and redirect examination of Schlegel regarded Schlegel's testimony about descriptions of things that the victim had made to him and which he included in his police report. The...
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Kindred v. State
...during the latter's closing argument. United States v. Robinson (1988), 485 U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23; Goodman v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 513. We find no error on this Defendant also objected to the prosecutor's comment that the judge was very lenient in allowing defend......
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...grounds on appeal. A defendant may not state one reason for an objection at trial and then rely upon another on appeal. Goodman v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 513; Phelan v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 542, 406 N.E.2d 237. When a defendant does not properly bring an objection to the trial cou......
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Bowley v. Warden, Cause No. IP 98-0089-C H/K (S.D. Ind. 8/11/2003)
...(Ind. 1989) ("A defendant may not state one reason for an objection at trial and then rely upon another on appeal."); Goodman v. State, 479 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Ind. 1985) (same); Phelan v. State, 406 N.E.2d 237, 239 (Ind. 1980) (same). The Indiana Supreme Court insists that grounds for objecti......