Goodman v. State
| Decision Date | 13 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | NO. CR 11-109,CR 11-109 |
| Citation | 2011 Ark. 438 |
| Parties | CHARLES GOODMAN, JR. APPELLANT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE SALINE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, CR
2008-363, HON. GRISHAM A.
AFFIRMED.
In 2009, appellant Charles Goodman, Jr., was found guilty by a jury of two counts of rape and sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Goodman v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 140.
In 2010, appellant timely filed in the trial court a pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2009). The petition was denied, and appellant brings this appeal. We find no error and affirm the trial court's order.
This court does not reverse a denial of postconviction relief unless the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. Payton v. State, 2011 Ark. 217 (per curiam). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id.
In an appeal from a trial court's denial of postconviction relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the sole question presented is whether, based on a totality of theevidence, under the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsel's performance was not ineffective. Mingboupha v. State, 2011 Ark. 219 (per curiam). Under the two-pronged Strickland test, a petitioner raising a claim of ineffective assistance must first show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. As to the second prong of Strickland, the claimant must demonstrate that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense to such an extent that the petitioner was deprived of a fair trial. See id. Such a showing requires that the petitioner demonstrate a reasonable probability that the fact-finder's decision would have been different absent counsel's errors. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id.
In his petition, appellant set forth several bases for postconviction relief, including six claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. He asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) subpoena five key witnesses; (2) prepare him for trial; (3) present video evidence to contradict the testimony of the State's witnesses; (4) move for or otherwise request medical records; (5) object to mention of a photograph that was not introduced into evidence and that was prejudicial; (6) spend adequate time with him to build a proper defense. In addition, appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to the State's failure to prove that the offenses occurred within the county of trial, and that the trial judge engaged in ex parte communication with the jury.
With respect to appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, he merely listed a series of allegations that were entirely conclusory in nature with no factual substantiation to demonstrate how trial counsel's conduct specifically prejudiced the defense. Appellant did not identify the five witnesses that trial counsel failed to subpoena, nor did he provide a summary of what their testimony would have been. He did not...
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