Goodner v. State

• Citation: 714 N.E.2d 638
• Decision Date: 23 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. 49S00-9708-CR-469.,49S00-9708-CR-469.
• Parties: Gary GOODNER, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

714 N.E.2d 638

Gary GOODNER, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 49S00-9708-CR-469.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 23, 1999.

David M. Henn, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Preston W. Black, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.

BOEHM, Justice.

Gary Goodner was convicted of the murder of Robert Clark and was sentenced to sixty-five years imprisonment. In this direct appeal, Goodner raises three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting Goodner's statement to the police in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights; (2) whether Goodner was denied a fair trial because the prosecution did not timely inform defense counsel of favorable arrangements made with a State's witness in exchange for testimony against Goodner; and (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a prior consistent statement of a State's witness. Although we find the belated disclosure of dealings with witnesses to be highly problematic, under the circumstances of this case reversal is not appropriate. We affirm the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

In late 1994, Goodner owed Clark money and Clark had threatened Goodner's mother and also had beaten Goodner over the debts. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on Christmas Eve of that year, Clark and Steven Mayes picked up Eva Jackson from a Christmas party. The three drove back to their apartment complex, where they lived in different apartments. As the three sat in the car, Goodner approached wielding a sawed-off shotgun and began arguing with Clark. Mayes and Jackson fled from the car. As Clark attempted to get out of the driver's seat, Goodner shot him in the groin with the shotgun. Clark fell to the ground and pleaded with Goodner not to shoot him again. Goodner then shot Clark once more and sped away in a waiting van. Clark bled to death from a severed femoral artery. Jackson later testified that she heard Goodner shoot Clark, and Mayes testified that he witnessed the shooting.

Goodner was arrested that night and charged with murder. After his arrest, Goodner gave a taped statement to Indianapolis police officer Jesse Beavers. During the interrogation, Officer Beavers and Goodner engaged in the dialogue quoted below before Goodner ultimately confessed to the killing. At trial, Goodner moved to suppress his statement to the police as obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The trial court disagreed and admitted the statement.

On the second day of the trial, and after Mayes had concluded his testimony, the prosecutor revealed to defense counsel that he had offered to recommend a bond reduction for Mayes on an unrelated charge if Mayes would testify against Goodner. Mayes was then recalled, and on cross-examination by Goodner, Mayes denied the deal with the prosecutor. However, on re-direct examination Mayes admitted that such an arrangement was made. After Mayes was excused from the witness stand, the prosecution offered into evidence a prior statement that Mayes had given to police the night of the murder. The statement was consistent with Mayes' trial testimony, but only Officer Beavers was cross-examined concerning the statement.

The jury convicted Goodner of murder, and the trial court sentenced Goodner to sixty-five years.

I. Admissibility of Statements to the Police

Goodner contends that his rights under the federal and state constitutions were violated when police continued to question him after he was interrogated by Officer Beavers as follows:

Beavers: * * * * You have also the right to stop answering questioning at anytime until you talk to a lawyer. Gary, do you understand those rights?

Goodner: Yes sir. But how can I get a lawyer, I can't get none this fast.

* * * *

Beavers: Well Gary you have to make a decision, either you want to talk to me now or you want to wait and talk to a lawyer and then talk to me. Regardless, Gary, you have been charged with the charge of murder. Now do you understand that?

Goodner: I understand that.

Beavers: Do you want to talk to me before you talk to a lawyer, Gary? That is your right to talk to a lawyer first.

* * * *

Goodner: I don't have too much to lose then, either way it goes.

Beavers: Well Gary, you, from my point of view you got to answer to me, do you want to talk to me or not?

Goodner: Yeah, I want to talk, but I do want do right on both things too, but I mean I want to talk to you too, but man, I know what I want to talk to you but then I don't know if I do talk to you then if I don't talk to you, then shit. Man it's kind of, I don't know man.

Beavers: Gary, I can't tell you what to do here in this situation * * * * But Gary you have a right to talk to a lawyer before you talk to me. I can only tell you that you have that right. You have to decide if [you] want to tell me your side of the story or not before you talk to a lawyer, I can't tell you that.

At the outset of the interrogation, Goodner had signed a written waiver of rights form and orally acknowledged that he had been advised of his rights and had agreed to waive them. The issue turns on whether, after the waiver, Goodner asserted his right to consult counsel under the federal or state constitution to require suppression of his later statements.

Review of the denial of a motion to suppress is similar to other sufficiency matters. The record must disclose substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court's decision. We do not reweigh the evidence and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. See Taylor v. State, 689 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind.1997)

; see also Wilcoxen v. State, 619 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind.1993); Warner v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1307, 1309 (Ind.1991).

A. Federal Constitutional Claim

Goodner first argues that his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) were violated when police continued to question him after he made the quoted statements. Assertion of this right is governed by the objective standard set by the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). Davis held that the invocation of the Miranda right "requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney." Id. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (citation omitted). The level of clarity required to meet the standard must be that "a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." Id. In Davis, the defendant's statement "maybe I should talk to a lawyer" was held not to be a request for counsel. Id. at 462, 114 S.Ct. 2350. Here, the officer was very clear that if Goodner wished to talk to a lawyer, further interrogation would stop until the lawyer was consulted. Goodner did no more than express indecision followed by his continued dialogue with the officer.

As we held in Taylor, an expression of indecision is not enough if the interrogation makes clear that the questioning will stop and a lawyer will be furnished if requested. 689 N.E.2d at 703. The quoted exchange between Goodner and Officer Beavers is substantially identical to the facts in Taylor. For the reasons given in Taylor, Sleek v. State, 499 N.E.2d 751 (Ind.1986), is not controlling, and for the reasons explained in Taylor, Davis holds that no federal constitutional violation occurs under these circumstances. The interrogating officer had no duty to stop questioning, and any statements Goodner later made were admissible.

B. Indiana Constitutional Claim

Goodner next claims that the same interrogation violated his rights under the Indiana Constitution. He argues that Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution requires the State to prove by the "heavy burden" of beyond a reasonable doubt that the waiver of self-incrimination occurred before Goodner's statement may be admitted into evidence. Goodner does not rely on Article I, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution guaranteeing that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to be heard by himself and counsel."

Generally, Indiana "cases establish that there is a right not to be forced to speak, but there is no right to bar a confession freely given after appropriate warnings and waivers" under the self-incrimination provision of the Indiana Constitution. Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 930 (Ind.1998). Goodner argues that the forgoing dialogue left it unclear whether he wanted an attorney before proceeding. This was undoubtedly correct at some points in the exchange. But ultimately, and before proceeding, the officer made clear that Goodner had a right to a lawyer and, if a request was made, the interrogation would stop and a lawyer would be provided. Goodner chose to proceed. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any other coercion, a subsequent confession is voluntary as that term is used in the Indiana jurisprudence cited by Goodner.

II. Failure to Disclose Arrangement With Witness

Goodner next contends that the prosecution's failure to disclose its deal with Mayes constituted prosecutorial misconduct and greatly prejudiced Goodner because Mayes was the only witness who actually saw Goodner shoot Clark.

Generally speaking, the "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Even where no specific request was made by a defendant, suppression of material evidence by the prosecutor may violate a defendant's due process rights. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)....