Goodner v. Ultimate Tower Serv. Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-4081-BH |
| Parties | RALPH GOODNER, Individually and as representative of the Estate of Matthew Goodner, and MARY YETMAR, Individually and as representative of the Estate of Matthew Goodner, Plaintiffs, v. ULTIMATE TOWER SERVICE INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Consent Case
Pursuant to the consent of the parties and the order of transfer dated April 25, 2014, this matter has been transferred for the conduct of all further proceedings and the entry of judgment. (doc. 26.) Before the Court is Defendant Ultimate Tower Service, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support, filed May 31, 2016 (doc. 63). Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the motion is DENIED.
On October 9, 2013, Ralph Goodner and Mary Yetmar, individually and as representatives of the Estate of Matthew Goodner (collectively Plaintiffs), filed suit against Ultimate Tower Services, Inc. (Defendant) alleging negligence and gross negligence that resulted in fatal injuries to their son, Matthew Goodner. (doc. 1 at 5.)1 The parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs are residents of Iowa, their son was a resident of Iowa, and Defendant is a corporate citizen of Texas. (See doc. 63 at 9 n. 1, 2, 4; doc. 64 at 4 (citing doc. 1), 19.)
On March 26, 2004, Defendant entered into a staff leasing agreement with AMS Staff Leasing (AMS). (doc. 64-2 at 47-51; doc. 72 at 26-30.) The agreement provided that AMS would furnish staffing for Defendant's regular business operations, process the payroll for the staffing it provided, pay all taxes on the labor furnished, and obtain Workers' Compensation and/or Employers Liability Insurance. (doc. 64-2 at 47; doc. 72 at 26.) Defendant agreed to provide all hiring paperwork. (Id.) AMS shared a right of direction and control over leased employees assigned to Defendant; a right to hire, fire, discipline and reassign leased employees; and right of direction and control over the adoption of employment and safety policies. (doc. 64-2 at 49; doc. 72 at 28.) It assumed responsibility for payment of wages to leased employees and collection and payment of payroll taxes. (Id.) Defendant retained full responsibility for direction and control of leased employees as necessary to conduct its business. (Id.)
AMS obtained a Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Policy from Dallas National Insurance Company or the period of June 20, 2011 to June 20, 2012. (See doc. 64 at 21-80; doc. 64-1; doc. 64-2 at 1-46.) The policy and its endorsements expressly listed only AMS as the insured. (See doc. 64 at 21; doc. 64-1 at 21, 25, 36-38, 41, 53, 63, 67-72, 77-80; doc. 64-2 at 1-2, 5, 8, 10, 12-13, 21, 24-25, 28-29, 42, 44.)
Plaintiff's son was working at VeraSun through a temporary agency called Manpower when he met the "tower people" around 2006, and he decided to go start climbing towers and traveling with them. (doc. 64-2 at 75-76, 80-81.) His mother is not sure if Manpower placed him with Defendant, but she thought Defendant asked him. (Id. at 76.) He was laid off from the tower business in 2010 and 2011. (Id. at 79-80.)
On June 9, 2011, Plaintiffs' son signed an employment application with AMS. (doc. 64 at19; doc. 64-2 at 52; doc. 72 at 24.) The top of the application identified the "Client Company" as Defendant, and contained the notation "Re-hire." (Id.) On the application, he initialed a statement that he understood he would be an employee of AMS working for one of its clients. (doc. 64-2 at 52; doc. 72 at 24.) He also completed a federal Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification. (doc. 64-2 at 53; doc. 72 at 36.) The Form I-9 was signed by Suzanne Lee, Office Manager for Defendant. (Id.)
Plaintiffs' son fell to his death while working on a tower at Defendant's job site in Newton, Massachusetts, on October 12, 2011. (See doc. 64-2 at 54; doc. 72 at 32.) AMS' report of his death to the Iowa Industrial Commission listed AMS as the employer. (Id.) A letter from the Iowa Workforce Development to AMS' worker's compensation carrier concerning the death listed AMS as the employer. (See doc. 64-2 at 55; doc. 72 at 34.) AMS' worker's compensation carrier concluded that Plaintiffs' son "was a leased employee co-employed by AMS" and Defendant. (doc. 64 at 19.)
On May 31, 2016, Defendant moved for summary judgment. (doc. 63.) Plaintiffs filed a response, and Defendant filed a reply. (docs. 71, 76.) The motion is now ripe for consideration.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on grounds that if a conflict of laws exists, the applicable law is the law of Iowa, or in the alternative, the law of Texas. (doc. 63 at 11-14.)
After Defendant filed its summary judgment motion, the Court ruled on Defendant's motion to dismiss and found that a conflict of laws exists, and that Iowa law applies to this case. (See doc. 69.) Despite its initial arguments in both of its dispositive motions that Iowa law applies, Defendant's reply seeks reconsideration of that finding, without explanation, and argues for theapplication of Texas law. (See doc. 76 at 2.) Defendant's reply also argues that it is entitled to immunity under Iowa law. (See id.)2
As noted by the Fifth Circuit, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "do not recognize a 'motion for reconsideration' in haec verba.". Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir.1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1076 n. 14 (5th Cir.1994). Where a motion for reconsideration challenges a final judgment, it is treated either as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), or as a motion seeking relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Id. Where a motion challenges an interlocutory order, it is considered under Rule 54(b). Contango Operators, Inc. v. U.S., 965 F. Supp. 2d 791, 800 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
Rule 54(b) provides that "any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties ... may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities." A ruling should only be reconsidered where the moving party presents substantial reasons for requesting reconsideration. Baustian v. Louisiana, 929 F.Supp. 980, 981 (E .D. La.1996); Louisiana v. Sprint Communications Co., 899 F.Supp. 282, 284 (M.D.La.1995). In determining a motion under Rule 54(b), some courts have looked to the standards of Rule 59(e),including whether reconsideration is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact, to present new evidence, to prevent manifest injustice, or because of an intervening change in law. SGC Land, LLC v. Louisiana Mistream Gas Serv., 939 F. Supp. 2d 612 (W.D. La. 2013). Whether to grant a motion to reconsider rests within the discretion of the court. Dos Santos v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. Dist, 651 F.Supp.2d 550, 553 (N.D.Tex. 2009).
Here, Defendant has articulated no basis, including any of the bases set out in Rule 59(e), for reconsideration of the previous findings in relation to its motion to dismiss that a conflict of laws exists, and that Iowa law applies in this case. It has not explained why reconsideration of a finding that it expressly requested in two dispositive motions is warranted. It merely relies on its arguments in its summary judgment motion, which are essentially identical to the arguments it made in its motion to dismiss and that have already been rejected. Defendant's motion for reconsideration is denied.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on grounds that compensation through the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act is the Plaintiffs' exclusive remedy. (doc. 63 at 21-22.)
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and evidence on file show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. The movant makes a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact by informing the courtof the basis of its motion and by identifying the portions of the record that reveal there are no genuine material fact issues. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Once the movant makes this showing, the non-movant must then direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 324. To carry this burden, the non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The non-movant must show that the evidence is sufficient to support a resolution of the factual issue in her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
"The parties may satisfy their respective burdens by 'citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.' " Rooters v. State Farm Lloyds, 428 F. App'x 441, 445 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (1)). While all of the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the motion's opponent, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)), neither conclusory allegations nor unsubstantiated assertions satisfy the non-movant's summary judgment burden, Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th...
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