Goodrich v. Industrial Commission
| Decision Date | 15 January 1970 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 1,CA-CIV,s. 1 |
| Parties | Earl C. GOODRICH, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Bruce C. Thoeny, Chairman, Frank C. Murphy, Member, Richard E. Bailey, Member, John L. Ahearn, Member, Robert W. Knox, Member; and MEVA CORPORATION and Argonaut Insurance Company, Real-Parties in Interest, Respondents. Lindley R. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Bruce C. Thoeny, Chairman, Frank C. Murphy, Member, Richard E. Bailey, Member, John L. Ahearn, Member, Robert W. Knox, Member; and MEVA CORPORATION and Argonaut Insurance Company, Real-Parties in Interest, Respondents. 1262, 1 1263. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Stephen L. Weiss, Dushoff, Sacks & Corcoran, Phoenix, for Earl C. Goodrich.
Jack Levine, Langerman, Begam & Lewis, Phoenix, for Lindley R. Johnson.
William C. Wahl, Jr., Phoenix, for Industrial Commission of Arizona, et al.
J. Michael Moeller, Robertson & Fickett, Tucson, for Meva Corp. and Argonaut Ins. Co.
The petitioners in these two substantially identical cases seek issuance by this Court of original writs of mandamus directed to the Industrial Commission to compel the Commission to consider certain stipulations and other documents filed with it which, if considered and approved by the Commission, would result in lump-sum settlements for the allegedly industrially-injured petitioners in an amount in excess of the $6,500 'conversion' limit fixed by A.R.S. Section 23--1067.
The stipulations and other documents in question were presented to the Commission by petitioners and the respondent employer and compensation carrier in the course of regular proceedings instituted by petitioners for awards of compensation. There have not yet been adjudications by the Commission that petitioners are entitled to compensation in any amount. The Commission deemed itself without jurisdiction to consider the documents by reason of the $6,500 limitation in Section 23--1067, and entered 'orders' denying approval of the proposed settlements. Thereafter, and prior to coming here, petitioners, applied to the Supreme Court for writs of mandamus to compel the Commission to consider and pass upon the proposed settlements. The Supreme Court denied these applications without specification of grounds or other comment.
It is unnecessary for us to state the various substantive contentions advanced by petitioners, because it is clear to us that in these matters there is no jurisdictional basis for this Court to issue writs of mandamus to the Industrial Commission.
Our Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue '* * * mandamus * * * and other extraordinary writs to state officers.' Article 6, Section 5(1), Constitution of Arizona, A.R.S. By statute, also, the Supreme and Superior Courts are vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to inferior tribunals and boards, including state officers. A.R.S. Section 12--2021. This Court, which is a court of statutory creation with jurisdiction defined by statute, see Article 6, Section 9, Constitution of Arizona, and Morrison v. Superior Court, 10 Ariz.App. 601, 461 P.2d 170 (1969), has not been granted a similar general power. This Court's jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs is confined to issuance of writs of certiorari to review Awards of the Industrial Commission, and to issuance of writs '* * * necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.' A.R.S. Section 12--120.21, subsec. A, pars. 2 and 3, as amended in 1969; and see Morrison v. Superior Court, supra.
It is urged that jurisdiction exists in this Court by reason of A.R.S. Section 23--948, which reads, as amended in 1968, as follows:
' § 23--948. Jurisdiction of actions concerning orders or petitions for writ of mandamus; right of appeal
No court of this state, except the superior court, the court of appeals and the supreme court on appeal shall have jurisdiction to review, vacate, set aside, reverse, revise, correct, amend or annul any order of the commission or to suspend or delay the execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or interfere with the commission in the performance of its duties, But a writ of mandamus may issue from the supreme court to the commission in proper cases, and an appeal may be taken from the superior court to the supreme court in all cases.' (Emphasis ours)
It will suffice to say that this statute does not contain any affirmative grant of original jurisdiction to this Court. Indeed, in the clause which we have italicized, it appears to recognize the power which the Supreme Court has, and which this Court does not have, to issue writs of mandamus to state officers.
It is also urged by petitioners that if they do have a remedy in the Superior Court by reason of the provisions of A.R.S. Section 23--946, this Court has an ultimate potential appellate jurisdiction over the issue and therefore a present power to issue writs of mandamus pursuant to Section 12--120.21, subsec. A, par. 3, as amended. Subsection A of Section 23--946 reads as follows:
* * *'
We will hereafter allude to the question of whether or not petitioners have a remedy under Section 23--946. If they do, that circumstance would not bestow upon this Court a present jurisdiction to issue the requested writs. While this Court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in an action commenced pursuant to Section 23--946, see Industrial Commission v. Harbor Insurance Company, 101 Ariz. 578, 422 P.2d 694 (1967), this Court held in the Morrison case that it could only grant extraordinary relief where there is a direct chain of appeal to this Court. An action commenced pursuant to Section 23--946 '* * * is not an appeal in any sense of the word but is an original proceeding filed in the Superior Court * * *.' O'Neill v. Martori, 69 Ariz. 270, 275, 212 P.2d 994, 997 (1949). This Court has no direct appellate jurisdiction over the orders of the Industrial Commission, which is where petitioners' matters rest now.
Finally, it is urged by one of the petitioners in his brief that this Court has jurisdiction by reason of Section 12--2021, referred to above, which grants the Supreme Court and the Superior Court the power to issue mandamus. We pointed out in Morrison that this statute and similar enactments regarding the issuance of certiorari and quo warranto (A.R.S. Sections 12--2001 et seq. and 12--2041 et seq.) were in existence at the time of the creation of the Court of Appeals but were not amended to include the Court of Appeals. We held, distinguishing the situations in which the legislature had failed to amend statutes providing for an ordinary appeal to the Supreme Court, 1 that in view of our status as a court of statutory jurisdictional limitation the legislature's failure to amend these statutes to include this Court precluded their use by us as a basis for jurisdiction. 2 We adhere to that position. In advancing their arguments that this Court has...
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