Goodrich v. RL DRESSER, INC.

Decision Date02 December 2003
Docket NumberNo. COA02-1584.,COA02-1584.
Citation588 S.E.2d 511
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesJames and Mae GOODRICH, Parents, Constance C. Goodrich, Wife, Danielle Rohde, Andrew Hanner and Allen Hanner, Minor Stepchildren, by their Guardian Ad Litem Gale Edwards, of Douglas A. Goodrich, Deceased, Employee, Plaintiffs, v. R.L. DRESSER, INC., Employer, Key Risk Insurance Company, Carrier; Defendants.

Michael A. Ellis, for plaintiff-appellant Constance C. Goodrich.

Patterson, Dilthey, Clay, Bryson & Anderson, L.L.P., by Justin D. Robertson and Hedrick & Morton, L.L.P., by Jerry L. Wilkins, Jr., Wilmington, for plaintiff-appellants James and Mae Goodrich.

Whitley, Jenkins & Riddle, by J. Christopher Brantley and Gene A. Riddle, Goldsboro, for plaintiff-appellees Danielle Rohde, Andrew Hanner and Allen Hanner.

Lewis & Roberts, P.L.L.C., by Richard M. Lewis and Jeffery A. Misenheimer, Raleigh, for defendant-appellants.

HUDSON, Judge.

Plaintiffs James and Mae Goodrich, plaintiff Constance C. Goodrich and defendants R.L. Dresser, Inc., and Key Risk Insurance Co., appeal an opinion and award entered 27 June 2002 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission that awarded death benefits to the minor stepchildren of decedent-employee Douglas A. Goodrich and denied any benefits to decedent's widow or his parents. For the reasons discussed below, we remand to the Full Commission for additional findings and conclusions, and revision of the award.

BACKGROUND

Douglas A. Goodrich ("decedent"), an employee of defendant R.L. Dresser, Inc., suffered an admittedly compensable injury arising out of his employment, resulting in his death on 9 November 1999. At the time of his death, decedent was married to Constance C. Goodrich ("Ms.Goodrich"), and was the step-father of Ms. Goodrich's three biological children from previous marriages, Danielle Rohde, Andrew Hanner and Allen Hanner ("the step-children"). James and Mae Goodrich ("the parents") were the decedent's parents. Ms. Goodrich and the step-children were living apart from decedent at the time of his death, and decedent had filed for divorce from Ms. Goodrich a few days before his death. These plaintiffs disagreed over which of them were entitled to the death benefits.

Deputy Commissioner Morgan S. Chapman heard the case 2 November 2000. Defendant-employer did not contest causation or compensability. Rather, the issue in this "dependency" hearing was to whom benefits would be paid. Decedent's parents claimed the benefits as next of kin, asserting that Ms. Goodrich did not qualify as a "widow" under N.C. Gen Stat. § 97-39, and that the stepchildren were not "children" because they were not substantially dependent on decedent, as required by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97-38. Deputy Commissioner Chapman issued an opinion and award 22 March 2001 in which she found that neither the wife nor the stepchildren were dependent on decedent for support. Finding no persons wholly or partially dependent on decedent, the deputy commissioner awarded the benefits to decedent's parents as next-of-kin, under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97-38. Ms. Goodrich and the stepchildren gave notice of appeal to the Full Commission.

In an opinion and award filed 27 June 2002, the Full Commission affirmed the opinion and award denying benefits to Ms. Goodrich, but reversed as to the step-children, concluding that they qualified as "children" because they were substantially dependent on decedent and awarding them the benefits, to the exclusion of decedent's parents. Below are some of the findings of fact by the Full Commission, which have not been challenged on appeal:

2. On 22 April 1995 decedent married Ms. Constance Carver Hanner, thereafter Constance C. Goodrich. At the time of the marriage, Ms. Constance C. Goodrich had three children from previous relationships. Each of the children's fathers is no longer living, and Ms. Constance C. Goodrich was receiving social security benefits from the fathers' accounts for the support of the children. No children were born to the marriage between Ms. Constance C. Goodrich and decedent, and decedent had no natural children of his own.
3. Ms. Constance C. Goodrich and decedent were separated in August 1999. Also in August 1999 Ms. Constance C. Goodrich began an adulterous relationship with Mr. Steve Herring, who had performed work at the residence where she and decedent lived. Evidence supports a finding that there was an altercation between decedent and Ms. Constance C. Goodrich following his discovery of her affair. Thereafter, decedent moved out of the family residence, leaving Ms. Constance C. Goodrich and decedent's three stepchildren remaining. The title of the mobile home was in decedent's name.
4. Following the couple's separation, and prior to decedent's death, the [monthly] household expenses for his three minor stepchildren totaled approximately $1,890.53. This total consisted of the following: house payment, $432.00; land payment, $163.53; car payment, $420.00; phone bill, $50.00; electric bill, $150.00; water bill, $25.00; groceries, $500.00; and gasoline, $100.00. The credible evidence of record supports a finding that during this period, decedent paid for all of these household expenses for the residence of his three stepchildren. Additionally, during this period, decedent provided funds for the purchase of his three stepchildren's' [sic] clothes, school fees, and vacations. Furthermore, decedent also funded expenses associated with a credit card and made furniture payments for the residence of his three stepchildren.
5. There is no evidence of record that any of decedent's three minor stepchildren earned any income of their own.
6. Ms. Constance C. Goodrich's income for 1998 was $667.00, and for 1999 was $1,730.00. Ms. Constance C. Goodrich also received social security payments as the result of the deceased father of each of the stepchildren. For Andrew Hanner and Allen Hanner, she received $116.00 per month for each child. For Daniel [sic] Rohde, she received $532.00. The total social security benefits received by Ms. Constance C. Goodrich each month was $764.00.
7. Total household expenses for the residence of the three stepchildren prior to decedent's death, and following his separation from Ms. Constance C. Goodrich were approximately $31,000.00. When this total is divided by four, represented by Ms. Constance C. Goodrich and the three stepchildren, $7,758.00 per year is allocated for each of the minor stepchildren.
* * *
12. Constance Goodrich does not qualify as a widow under the Worker's Compensation Act in that she was not living with decedent at the time of his injury, she was not living apart from him for justifiable cause, and she was not dependent upon him for support.

Following additional detailed findings about the decedent's contributions to the household expenses of the stepchildren, the Commission concluded that all three minor stepchildren were substantially dependent on decedent and thus conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent on him at the time of his death under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97-38. The Commission further concluded that Ms. Goodrich was not a widow under the terms of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97-2 because she was not living with him, was not living apart from him for justifiable cause, and was not dependent upon decedent for support.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The scope of our review of a decision of the Industrial Commission has been clearly delineated by our Supreme Court: "(1) the full Commission is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, and (2) appellate courts reviewing Commission decisions are limited to reviewing whether any competent evidence supports the Commission's findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission's conclusions of law." Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). Further, in our review we "do not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court's duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding," without regard to whether there was evidence that would have supported contrary findings. Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted), reh'g denied, 350 N.C. 108, 532 S.E.2d 522 (1999). In doing so, we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.

ANALYSIS

The Deputy Commissioner and Full Commission faced the task of determining who was statutorily entitled to receive compensation under the terms of the Workers Compensation Act following decedent's death. The Act specifies that widow and children, as defined, are conclusively presumed to have been wholly dependent on decedent. N.C. Gen Stat. § 97-39. The essential provisions of the Act read as follows:

A widow, a widower and/or a child shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee.... If there is more than one person wholly dependent, the death benefit shall be divided among them, the persons partly dependent, if any, shall receive no part thereof. If there is no one wholly dependent, and more than one person partially dependent, the death benefit shall be divided among them according to the relative extent of their dependency.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97-39 (1999). The Act also defines the terms "widow" and "child:"

(12) Child, Grandchild, Brother, Sister.— The term "child" shall include a posthumous child, a child legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee, and a stepchild or acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased, but does not include married children unless wholly dependent upon him.... "Child," "grandchild," "brother," and "sister" include only persons who at the time of the death of the deceased employee are under 18 years of age.
(14) Widow.—The term "widow" includes only the decedent's wife living with or dependent for
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