Goodsell v. Noland
Decision Date | 27 February 2018 |
Docket Number | WD 80408 |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Parties | Meagan E. GOODSELL, Individually and as Next Friend for K.G., a Minor Child & K.G., a Minor Child, Respondent, v. Shane NOLAND, Appellant, State of Missouri ex rel. Department of Social Services, Family Support Division, Respondent. |
Ralph A Monaco, Brett Shirk, Kansas City, MO, Counsel for Respondent
Nancy A. Garris, Blue Springs, MO Counsel for Respondent
Before Division Two: James Edward Welsh, Presiding Judge, Alok Ahuja, Judge, Anthony Rex Gabbert, Judge
Shane Noland (Father) appeals the circuit court's Judgment and Order of Paternity, Custody and Child Support. He asserts four points on appeal. First, he contends that the circuit court misapplied the law in awarding him only supervised parenting time. Second, he contends that the circuit court's Parenting Plan is deficient and provides him inadequate parenting time. Third, he argues that the court abused its discretion in striking his pleadings and allowing him to present no evidence. Fourth, he contends that the court erred in its award of child support. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On November 27, 2015, twin boys were born to Meagan Goodsell (Mother). Mother and Father were unmarried. Mother had two children from a previous relationship. Father had one child from a previous relationship, and another child born to that same relationship after the birth of the twins. Mother informed Father of the pregnancy as soon as she learned of it. Father provided no support to Mother during the pendency of her pregnancy, and no support to the children after their birth. The twins were nearly eleven months old at the time of trial. Although Father had been given the opportunity to visit the twins, Father had never met the children at the time of trial.
On February 18, 2016, Mother filed a "Petition for the Declaration of the Existence or Nonexistence of the Father Child Relationship Under the Missouri Uniform Parentage Act and Order of Support." The State of Missouri, Family Support Division, was named a third party respondent. On March 18, 2016, both the Family Support Division and Father filed answers to the petition. Father's answer denied paternity. DNA testing was ordered by the court and completed. Father stipulated to paternity at trial on October 14, 2016. On November 21, 2016, the court entered its Judgment of Paternity. Father filed a motion for new trial on December 20, 2016. The court denied that motion on January 13, 2017. The court also entered a Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc on January 13, 2017.1 On January 23, 2017, Father filed an amended motion for new trial which was denied on March 6, 2017. Father appeals the court's Judgment of Paternity.
Additional procedural and factual information will be discussed below as applicable to Father's points on appeal.
Our standard of review is set forth in Murphy v. Carron , 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). Schollmeyer v. Schollmeyer , 393 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Mo. App. 2013). We will affirm the circuit court's judgment unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Id. at 122-123. We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the court's judgment. Id. at 123. We assume that the trial court was motivated by the child's best interests in custody decisions, and we defer to its credibility determinations. O'Connell v. Horton , 313 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Mo. App. 2010). The party challenging the judgment has the burden of proving error. Beckham v. Beckham , 41 S.W.3d 908, 911 (Mo. App. 2001). "We review questions of law de novo. " In Interest of J.L.H. , 488 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Mo. App. 2016).
In Father's first point on appeal, he contends that the court misapplied Section 452.4002 in ordering supervised visitation because there is no evidence that he presents a danger to the children's physical health or emotional development. He contends that the court's reasoning for ordering supervised visitation—that the children are of "tender years" and because Father had never met the children—was insufficient under Missouri law to justify supervised visitation. He argues that the court could not "restrict" his visitation without evidence of past physical or emotional abuse or that his visitation would adversely impact the children. We find no error.
Our Missouri Supreme Court made clear in Turley v. Turley , 5 S.W.3d 162, 165 (Mo. banc 1999), that "[e]very visitation agreement confines and limits the visitation of each parent within certain bounds," and that the requirements of Section 452.400.2 discussing the "restriction" of visitation is limited to instances where the court is modifying an existing order.3 Here, we have an initial award of sole legal and sole physical custody to Mother, with a grant of visitation to Father. Consequently, the trial court's determination regarding Father's visitation was governed by Section 452.400.1(1) which states: "A parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger the child's physical health or impair his or her emotional development." Courtney v. Roggy , 302 S.W.3d 141, 151 (Mo. App. 2009) ( ). Father was awarded visitation. Had he been awarded no visitation, a finding of danger to the physical health or emotional development of the children would have been required under Section 452.400.1(1). As Father was awarded visitation, the question here is whether the court's visitation award was reasonable. The court ordered the following:
The court awarded Mother all holidays, as well as the children's birthdays. Father was awarded supervised parenting time on Father's Day. The court ordered that Father may have additional parenting time on Father's birthday and during the summer if he has complied with the provisions set forth in the parenting plan regarding supervised visitation, and the parties agreed in writing as to the conditions of the summer parenting time.
Father contends on appeal that, under the facts of his case, the law does not allow for an order of supervised visitation. He argues that, because the legislature commands that he is entitled to substantial, meaningful, and continuing contact with his children, the children's "tender years" and Father's prior lack of contact with the children was insufficient to support an order of supervised visitation. We disagree.
First, Father erroneously argues that the court relied on a "tender years" presumption in determining that Father's visitation be supervised. Father references a statement made by the court as to "the tender age of these children" in an oral declaration of judgment; nowhere does this language appear in the court's written Judgment. In civil cases, "[c]ourts typically disregard a trial court's oral statements made in a ruling on an issue because such statements are not part of the trial court's order or...
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