Goodson v. McCrory
| Decision Date | 29 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 116,669 |
| Parties | Kaci Susanne GOODSON, an individual, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Sherry Doris MCCRORY, an individual, Defendant/Appellant, and Joey Pepper and Bill Pepper, individuals, Defendants. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
Kendall W. Johnson, Molly A. Sullivan, SAVAGE, O'DONNELL, AFFELDT, WEINTRAUB & JOHNSON, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee
Robert V. Seacat, THE SEACAT LAW FIRM, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellant
¶ 1 In a deed signed and filed in 2001 (the 2001 Deed), Plaintiff Kaci Susanne Goodson, along with three other individuals—Patricia Lynn Farquhar, Mary Beth Guzman, and Defendant Sherry Doris McCrory—were granted property located in Tulsa County (the Property) "in equal shares in their individual capacities, as joint tenants, and not as tenants in common, on the death of" the grantor. The grantor—who was the mother of Farquhar, Guzman, and McCrory, and the grandmother of Goodson—passed away in 2011.
¶ 2 Goodson filed the petition in this case in February 2017 for quiet title, declaratory relief, and/or a determination of rights relating to her interest in the Property. Goodson contests the validity of the purported conveyance of her interest in the Property to McCrory set forth in a deed signed and filed in 2002 (the 2002 Deed). The 2002 Deed states that Goodson, along with Farquhar and Guzman, "in consideration of the sum of [$10.00] and other good and valuable consideration ..., grant, bargain, sell and convey" their interests in the Property to McCrory. Although Goodson contests the validity of the conveyance of her interest, she asserts in her petition that she "does not contest the validity of the conveyance [in the 2002 Deed] by the other joint tenants[.]"
¶ 3 Goodson subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in which she asserts she did not sign the 2002 Deed. Attached to Goodson's motion is a copy of the 2002 Deed, and Goodson points out in her motion that both her typed name and written signature on the 2002 Deed are misspelled as Kaci Susanne "Goodman," not Kaci Susanne "Goodson." Also attached to Goodson's motion is a partial transcript of the deposition of McCrory in which McCrory agrees that "this is not [Goodson's] signature on [the 2002] [D]eed[.]" However, Goodson asserts in her motion, as she similarly does in her petition, that it is undisputed that "[n]o person questions that the rights of the remaining Joint tenants, [Farquhar] and [Guzman], have been terminated by the signing of the [2002 Deed]." Goodson requests that, as a result of these undisputed facts, an order be entered determining that McCrory and Goodson own the property as joint tenants.
¶ 4 No response was filed to Goodson's motion for summary judgment. In a judgment filed in October 2017, the trial court stated, In particular, the trial court set forth the undisputed facts that the 2002 Deed is effective as to Farquhar and Guzman as "joint tenants relinquishing their interest to the real property ..., but is ineffective as to [Goodson]."1 Based on these undisputed facts, the court concluded the Property "vest[s] in Joint Tenancy, with Right of Survivorship, to [Goodson] and [McCrory][.]"
¶ 5 McCrory then filed a "Motion for New Trial" within ten days2 in which she admits the 2002 Deed is ineffective as to Goodson but nevertheless contests the trial court's legal conclusion. That is, McCrory asserts the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding, based on the undisputed facts, that Goodson and McCrory own the Property as joint tenants. McCrory asserts, instead, that the joint tenancy was "severed" upon Farquhar and Guzman conveying their interests in the 2002 Deed to McCrory, and that "the correct state of the title is [Goodson] owning [25%] of the property and McCrory owning [75%]" as tenants in common.
¶ 6 The trial court denied McCrory's motion for new trial in its order filed in December 2017, and McCrory appeals.
¶ 7 "A trial court's denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion," but "[w]here, as here, our assessment of the trial court's exercise of discretion in denying defendants a new trial rests on the propriety of the underlying grant of summary judgment, the abuse-of-discretion question is settled by our de novo review of the summary adjudication's correctness." Reeds v. Walker , 2006 OK 43, ¶ 9, 157 P.3d 100 (footnotes omitted). "The standard for appellate review of a summary judgment is de novo and an appellate court makes an independent and nondeferential review[.]" Nelson v. Enid Med. Assocs., Inc. , 2016 OK 69, ¶ 7, 376 P.3d 212.
¶ 8 Regarding McCrory's failure to file a response to the motion for summary judgment, a separate division of this Court has explained as follows:
Ordinarily, the failure to file a response to a motion for summary judgment "results ... in the admission for purpose of summary judgment [of] ‘[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement of the movant which are supported by admissible evidence.’ " Spirgis v. Circle K Stores, Inc. , 1987 OK CIV APP 45, ¶ 9, 743 P.2d 682, 684 (Approved for Publication by Supreme Court). However, "[e]ven when no counterstatement has been filed, it is still incumbent upon the trial court to insure that the motion is meritorious." Spirgis , 1987 OK CIV APP 45, ¶ 10, 743 P.2d at 685.
First Pryority Bank v. Moon , 2014 OK CIV APP 21, ¶ 35, 326 P.3d 528.
¶ 9 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has explained:
A joint tenancy is created only when unities of time, title, interest, and possession are present; unity of time requires interests of joint tenants to vest at the same time; unity of title requires parties to take their interests by the same instrument; unity of interest requires estates of same type and duration; and unity of possession requires joint tenants to have undivided interests in the whole, not undivided interests in the several parts. Alteration of any required unity will destroy the joint tenancy.
Am. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of Shawnee v. McGinnis , 1977 OK 47, ¶ 3, 571 P.2d 1198 (citations omitted). Thus, not unreasonably, McCrory argues that the effective conveyance by Farquhar and Guzman of their interests in the Property destroyed the joint tenancy. Indeed, this argument is consistent with the McGinnis Court's explanation that, "[f]or example, if A and B hold as joint tenants and B, with or without the permission of A, conveys to C, the joint tenancy is destroyed because unity of interest is eliminated; the result is A and C hold as tenants in common, each having an estate of a whole undivided half interest." Id. Complete termination of joint tenancy also occurs where there are several joint tenants and all but one of them convey their interests. See, e.g. , 20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 22 ().
¶ 10 However, the scenario presented by the undisputed facts of the present case is distinguishable from these scenarios because, although two joint tenants (Farquhar and Guzman) conveyed their interests in the 2002 Deed, the other two joint tenants (McCrory and Goodson) did not. The Oklahoma Supreme Court explained in McGinnis that under circumstances in which at least two joint tenants do not convey their interests , a conveyance by other joint tenants does not destroy the continuance of the joint tenancy among the remaining joint tenants, though it does destroy the joint tenancy as to the conveyed interests. The McGinnis Court explained as follows: McGinnis , ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
¶ 11 The explanation of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in McGinnis is consistent with the common law. See, e.g. , 64 A.L.R.2d 918 (Originally published in 1959) ...
To continue reading
Request your trial