Goodson v. State, 15055

• Decision Date: 07 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 15055,15055
• Citation: 232 Conn. 175,653 A.2d 177
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Steven GOODSON et al. v. STATE of Connecticut.

Page 177

653 A.2d 177

232 Conn. 175

Steven GOODSON et al. v. STATE of Connecticut.

No. 15055.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 29, 1994.

Decided Feb. 7, 1995.

Thadd A. Gnocchi, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., and Charles A. Overend, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant (state).

Bruce M. Grimm, Glastonbury, with whom, on the brief, were Albert J. McGrail, Hartford, and Robert McNamee, Legal Intern, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Before CALLAHAN, NORCOTT, PALMER, FRANCIS X. HENNESSEY and MARY R. HENNESSEY, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to have considered a petition, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-422 of chapter 909, entitled "Arbitration Proceedings," ¹ requesting an order reinstating the named plaintiff, Steven Goodson, to his position as a state correction officer pending the resolution of the grievance procedure established by a collective bargaining agreement for terminated employees. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to have considered the petition.

The facts are undisputed. On May 12, 1992, the defendant, the state of Connecticut, terminated Goodson from his employment as a correction officer at the John R. Manson Youth Institution, a state correctional facility. Goodson and his collective bargaining agent, the plaintiff American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local No. 387 (union), challenged the termination by filing a grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement then in effect between the union and the defendant. ²

On July 9, 1992, the plaintiffs brought a petition in the trial court, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-422, seeking an order reinstating Goodson as an employee pending the disposition of the grievance. At the time the plaintiffs brought their petition, the parties were awaiting a conference with the director of personnel and labor relations provided for by Step III of the grievance procedure; see footnote 2; which was scheduled for August 18, 1992. The parties had not yet begun arbitration, which was to be the next phase of the grievance procedure. See footnote 2. On August 6, 1992, after a hearing on the plaintiffs' petition, the trial court ordered that Goodson be reinstated temporarily until September 3, 1992, and rendered judgment accordingly.

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court's order was contrary to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and to the language and purpose of § 52-422. While the appeal was pending, the Appellate Court ordered the parties to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final judgment, mootness and the defendant's failure to comply with Practice Book §§ 4049 and 4053. Thereafter, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal without articulating the grounds therefor, and this court granted the state's petition for certification to review that dismissal. Goodson v. State, 224 Conn. 926, 619 A.2d 850 (1993). We reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court, concluding that: (1) the trial court's order was a final judgment; (2) because the issue was capable of repetition, the controversy was not moot; and (3) the defendant was not required to seek review under §§ 4049 and 4053. We thereafter remanded the case to the Appellate Court for consideration of the defendant's original claims. Goodson v. State, 228 Conn. 106, 118, 635 A.2d 285 (1993). While the remand was pending, however, we transferred the appeal back to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c).

In addition to its original claims that the trial court's order was contrary to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and § 52-422, the defendant now contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to have considered the plaintiffs' petition. Although this claim was raised by the defendant for the first time just prior to oral argument before this court, a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any time. Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 294, 533 A.2d 208 (1987). Because the jurisdictional issue had to be resolved before a decision on the merits could be rendered; Galland v. Bronson, 204 Conn. 330, 333, 527 A.2d 1192 (1987); we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs to aid us in deciding the question of jurisdiction. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to have considered the plaintiffs' petition and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant claims that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to have considered the plaintiffs' petition requesting an order reinstating Goodson pursuant to § 52-422 because the statute by its express terms applies only to parties to an arbitration. See footnote 1. The defendant claims that because on August 6, 1992, the date the trial court conducted its hearing and entered its order, Goodson had not filed for arbitration, Goodson could not have been a "party to an arbitration," and thus the trial court had no authority to act under the statute. We agree.

An application for an order pendente lite pursuant to § 52-422 is a special statutory proceeding. "The statute confers a definite jurisdiction upon a judge and it defines the conditions under which such relief may be given.... In such a situation jurisdiction is only acquired if the essential conditions prescribed by statute are met. If they are not met, the lack of jurisdiction is over the subject-matter and not over the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Guilford Yacht Club Assn., Inc. v. Northeast Dredging, Inc., 192 Conn. 10, 13, 468 A.2d 1235 (1984); see also Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 433-34, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988); Dugan v. Milledge, 196 Conn. 591, 595, 494 A.2d 1203...