Goodwin v. Boggus

Decision Date14 October 1932
Docket NumberNo. 998.,998.
PartiesGOODWIN v. BOGGUS et al.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Appeal from Palo Pinto County Court; J. W. Birdwell, Judge.

Suit by Frank Goodwin against Will Boggus and another. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

J. T. Ranspot, of Mineral Wells, for appellant.

W. J. Oxford and J. A. Johnson, both of Stephenville, for appellees.

FUNDERBURK, J.

Frank Goodwin was tried for lunacy under the provisions of R. S. 1925, title 92, arts. 5550 to 5561. The jury answered the first statutory issue "Yes," and the second "No"; that is to say, they answered that Frank Goodwin was of unsound mind, but that it was not necessary that he be placed under restraint. It was further found that the defendant was 59 years of age, and was the owner of property of the value of $9,000. Upon these findings the county court, on December 10, 1930, adjudged the said Frank Goodwin to be of unsound mind, and awarded against him recovery of the costs of the proceeding. This proceeding was styled The State of Texas v. Frank Goodwin, Defendant, No. 18, and may be referred to as "the lunacy proceeding."

On the same day, in a different proceeding, entitled "In re Guardianship of Frank Goodwin, Non Compos Mentis, No. 1872," which may hereafter be referred to as "the guardianship proceeding," Will Boggus filed an application to be appointed guardian of the person and estate of said Frank Goodwin. In the application it was alleged, among other things: "That the said Frank Goodwin was, on the 10th day of December, 1930, brought before this honorable court by a warrant issued out of said court under article 4267, charging that the said Frank Goodwin was of unsound mind, and a jury was impanelled to try said Frank Goodwin as provided for in articles 4270-4272, R. S. 1925, and the jury after having been duly qualified under the law to try the said Frank Goodwin, has found by its verdict that he was and is a person of unsound mind, as shown by the verdict of said jury and the judgment of the court rendered therein." The preceding quotation clearly refers to the lunacy proceeding. On the same day the court granted the application, fixed the bond, and appointed appraisers of the estate. The order shows that the appointment of Boggus was as "temporary guardian." It recited a finding that Goodwin was a person of unsound mind, as previously adjudged upon a verdict of a jury. (This also referring to the lunacy proceeding.) The order further recited that the appointment of the temporary guardian was without citation, but it was directed that "due notice of said application be given as is now required by law, and that said Frank Goodwin shall be personally served with citation to appear and answer such application at the next regular term of this court, or at such a time as is required by law for notice of this proceeding to be given," etc. It further provided that: "Such appointment of guardianship, unless contested at the time said notice shall be made returnable, whether the trial be at the next term of court or at a time designated in said notice for the hearing of said application, after service of citation has been made, as provided by law, shall be made permanent." The order named "said Frank Denton" as the temporary guardian, but we think it clear that the name was used inadvertently for that of Will Boggus. The citation commanded service by posting. It recited that Will Boggus had filed an application for letters of temporary guardianship, and had been appointed temporary guardian, and that the guardianship would be made permanent, unless same was contested "on the fourth Monday in December, 1930, the same being the 22nd day of December, A. D., 1930 * * * at which time all persons interested in the welfare of said person and state may appear and contest such appointment, if they so desire."

The instant suit was brought by Goodwin against Will Boggus and Victor Bouldin, directly attacking the judgment in the lunacy proceeding No. 18, and the judgment in the guardianship proceeding, No. 1872, and seeking to have said judgments and proceedings declared void and to recover possession of his property from the guardian. The defendants answered, pleading, among other things, the good faith of the said Will Boggus in his appointment and service as guardian, and his payment of claims for necessaries, and prayed that, in the event his appointment was not regular, he be declared a trustee and his acts inquired into and approved by the court. The answer further set up that Goodwin was not of sound mind; that he had an estate and required the appointment of a guardian, and pleaded the former adjudication of his mental unsoundness, and prayed for the appointment of a guardian.

The court, in a nonjury trial, adjudged the temporary guardianship proceeding to be void, and removed the said Will Boggus as guardian, but decreed the judgment in the lunacy proceeding to be valid and confirmed the same. Upon the basis of the last-named adjudication and the finding of facts showing the necessity for the appointment of a guardian, the court appointed C. A. Maddox guardian of the person and estate of the said Goodwin. Goodwin has appealed.

The first question presented is whether the judgment in the lunacy proceeding, adjudging Goodwin to be of unsound mind, was void. The proceeding authorized by R. S. 1925, title 92, has for its sole purpose the determination of the necessity for...

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2 cases
  • Mast v. Orum
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 28 Diciembre 1937
    ...of his proposition Damron v. Rankin, Tex.Civ.App., 34 S.W.2d 360; Pure Oil Co. v. Clark, Tex.Civ.App., 35 S.W.2d 838; and Goodwin v. Boggus, Tex.Civ.App., 53 S.W.2d 646. These cases support the proposition as against a direct attack, but the case at bar is a collateral and not a direct By h......
  • Hatton v. State Board of Control
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • 5 Agosto 1947
    ...And unless both propositions are established by the verdict, the accused must be discharged. Art. 5553, R.S.1925; Goodwin v. Boggus et al., Tex. Civ.App., 53 S.W.2d 646. If the patient can be lawfully committed to a hospital indefinitely only when those two facts exist, it follows that he c......

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