Goodwin v. Boston & M. R. R.

• Decision Date: 21 January 1892
• Citation: 24 A. 816,84 Me. 203
• Parties: GOODWIN v. BOSTON & M. R. R.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

24 A. 816

84 Me. 203

GOODWIN

v. BOSTON & M. R. R.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 21, 1892.

(Official.)

Exceptions from supreme judicial court, York county.

Trespass on the case, by Morris Goodwin, administrator of Daniel Goodwin, deceased, against the Boston & Maine Railroad. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant moved to set the same aside as against the law and evidence. Motion sustained.

Samuel W. Emery and H. H. Burbank, for plaintiff.

G. C. Yeaton, for defendant.

EMERY, J. This was an action on the case, the declaration alleging that the defendant company, by its negligence in running one of its trains, injured the plaintiff's intestate, a passenger on the train. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, which verdict the defendant has moved us to set aside as against law and evidence.

Reading the evidence as favorably for the plaintiff as can reasonably be done, the jury might have found the following facts: The defendant company, August 22, 1889, owned and operated a branch railroad from York Beach to its main line between Portland and Boston. On that day it ran an excursion train from Portsmouth to York Beach and return. In the afternoon, this train left York Beach on its return trip, with a baggage car next the locomotive, and three ordinary passenger cars following, one empty passenger car having been left at York Beach. The day was hot, and the cars were uncomfortably crowded. The seats were all occupied, either with passengers or baggage, and many passengers were standing in the aisles, or sitting on the arras of the seats. There was unquestionably, however, standing room in the cars for several dozen more passengers. Each car had ample standing space for several extra passengers.

The plaintiff's intestate, Daniel Goodwin, 30 years old, in possession of all his senses, and having the proper ticket, got on the rear platform of the first passenger car from the baggage car, and there stood leaning against the end window of the car, and facing to the rear. He did not enter any of the cars, or inquire for any seat, but remained standing on the platform as described, after the train started and was under full headway. The conductor took up his ticket on the platform, but did not direct him to a seat, nor caution him against standing on the platform. There was the usual notice on the car doors forbidding passengers standing on the platform, but there was no direct evidence that Goodwin saw this sign.

The train was running at speed variously estimated from 30 to 40 miles an hour, and, in going round a five-degree curve without slackening speed, Goodwin was shaken or thrown from the platform, and suffered severe injuries, of which he after wards died. As the train went round the curve, the speed caused violent concussion of the car wheels against the rails, so that there was considerable lurching of the cars. Some standing passengers were thrown against the seats, and some sitting passengers against their neighbors. The end window behind Goodwin was broken. Nothing else gave way, however, and no one else was hurt.

The jury, by their verdict, must have found that the above-described conduct of the defendant company was negligent, and that the conduct of Goodwin, above detailed, was free from that fault. The plaintiff's counsel urges that the jury was the legal tribunal, not only to determine all the facts and circumstances, but also to adjudicate whether the acts or omissions of the parties were prudent or negligent. This is true; we have repeatedly so held. The whole subject of negligence, of the power and province of the court and jury in ascertaining the facts, and drawing inferences from them, has been so fully and lately considered, there can be no need to even restate here the propositions established. York v. Railroad Co., 84 Me. 117, 24 Atl. Rep. 790; Lasky v. Railway Co., 83 Me. 461, 22 Atl. Rep....