Goodwin v. Goodwin
| Decision Date | 16 January 1953 |
| Citation | 260 S.W.2d 186,36 Tenn.App. 630 |
| Parties | GOODWIN v. GOODWIN et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
K. Harlan Dodson, Jr., Nashville, and George Yost, Springfield, for appellant.
James L. Bass, of Nashville, for appellees.
In 1949, S. H. Goodwin owned a tract of 38 acres of land, on which he and his wife, Pearly E. Goodwin, were living. He was 77, she 68 years of age, and he had become unable to work. By deed dated August 27, 1949, they conveyed the remainder interest in this land, subject to a life estate reserved for each of them, to his son, O. B. Goodwin, and the latter's wife, Nettie Wade Goodwin, for a recited consideration of $3,000 paid and an agreement by the grantees to support the grantors the rest of their lives, should they become unable to support themselves.
On September 23, 1949, the grantors and the grantees made a mortgage trust deed to W. H. Haynes, Trustee, to secure a loan of $3,750 made by the Third National Company to O. B. Goodwin and his wife, Nettie Wade Goodwin, and evidenced by a note signed by these two for that amount. The proceeds of this loan were used, under supervision of the trustee, to finish the house on the land and make it habitable for this aged couple.
When the deed was made O. B. Goodwin took charge of the farm, managed it, rented the land, and collected the income therefrom. With this income, supplemented by funds of his own, he provided for the support and maintenance of S. H. Goodwin and Pearly E. Goodwin until S. H. Goodwin died on April 15, 1951. Mrs. Pearly E. Goodwin then went to Simpson County, Kentucky, to live with one of her daughters.
She later filed the bill herein and alleged that as life tenant of the land she was entitled to the possession of it and to the rents and profits received by O. B. Goodwin after April 15, 1951; that O. B. Goodwin and Nettie Goodwin had breached their contract to support her and were liable to her for $100 per month, or $400 accrued, and $12,000 to accrue according to her life expectancy of ten years; that she was entitled to recover a refrigerator, a farm truck, and some chickens, or $450 as the reasonable value thereof.
She accordingly prayed for a decree for the immediate and exclusive possession of the land, for a recovery of the amounts above stated, and that such recovery be declared a lien on the remainder interest in the 38 acres and that if not paid said land be sold and the proceeds applied to payment of same.
The mortgagee and the trustee filed a formal answer. O. B. Goodwin and Nettie Goodwin filed answers denying the material averments of the bill; and O. B. Goodwin averred that under the deed the contract of the grantees was to support complainant on the land and out of its proceeds, just as they had done during the lifetime of S. H. Goodwin; that they were willing to keep on doing this and had offered to maintain a home and support complainant on the land but that she had refused their offer.
The cause was heard before the Honorable Albert W. Stockell, Special Chancellor, according to the forms of chancery upon the testimony of witnesses introduced in open court. He filed an opinion setting forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law. He found that complainant was not entitled to recover the truck, refrigerator, or the chickens.
He further found that it was contemplated by the parties to the deed that the duty of the grantees to support S. H. Goodwin and his wife would be discharged on the farm, through the operation of the farm; that the money borrowed on the farm was for that purpose; that if not permitted to operate the farm O. B. Goodwin could not repay the loan or discharge this duty of support.
And on the authority of Conner v. Marshall, 58 Tenn. 706, he held that the grantees owed no duty to support complainant elsewhere than on the farm by operation of it, as they had been supporting her; that the grantees had not breached their contract; but that complainant had, without just cause, refused their offer to continue to support her on the farm; that she thus violated the maxim, 'He who seeks equity must do equity'; and the court should not grant her any relief. He accordingly entered a decree dismissing her bill.
Complainant appealed and insists that the deed vested her with a life estate in the land and she was therefore entitled to the immediate and exclusive possession of it; that the grantees were bound by a contract to furnish her the necessities of life and she was entitled to a money judgment for their breach of this obligation; and that she was entitled to recover the truck, refrigerator, and chickens, or the reasonable value of them.
There is little or no dispute as to the facts. As stated, S. H. Goodwin owned this small tract of land and lived thereon. He was married twice. His first wife, mother of his son, O. B. Goodwin, had died some years before. She was a sister of complainant, who had eight children by her first marriage, and her husband had died. She and S. H. Goodwin were married in July, 1949, about a month before they made the deed to O. B. Goodwin and his wife.
They were both old and he had become unable to support her or himself. He had been unable to finish the house and it needed additions or repairs to make it so that they could live in it in comfort. So they agreed to deed the land, subject to a life estate reserved for each of them, to O. B. Goodwin and his wife Nettie Wade Goodwin; that he would borrow $3,750 to repair and finish the house, and all of them would join in a mortgage on the land to secure the loan; and that O. B. Goodwin would take charge of the land and operate is and thereby support his father and stepmother.
That this was the agreement and family arrangement was shown by the testimony of complainant herself. After being asked about the conversations they had about deeding the land to O. B. Goodwin and his wife, complainant testified as follows:
The deed did not contain the whole of this agreement, but such agreement rested in parol. The deed recited a consideration of $3,000 paid by the grantees and a further consideration that they would support the grantors for life should the grantors become unable to support themselves. It was shown without dispute that the recited consideration of $3,000 was not paid, and that the real consideration was this parol agreement above stated, no part of which was put into the deed except the stipulation that the grantees would support the grantors.
The deed was in usual form of a warranty deed and conveyed the remainder interest in the land, subject to a life estate reserved for the grantors. It also conveyed to the grantees 'all right, title, and interest that said grantors have in and to the farming equipment and tools on the premises.'
Pursuant to the oral agreement above stated, O. B. Goodwin obtained a loan of $3,750, and he and his wife signed a note therefor; and all the parties, grantors and grantees, joined in a mortgage trust deed conveying the land to secure this loan. The proceeds of this loan were spent in repairing and improving the house in which the grantors were living.
O. B. Goodwin took charge of the land and managed it, having it cultivated or renting it to tenants...
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Snow v. Owens
...their will. An implied provision as to the place of performance is also effective. . . .' 50 Am.Jur., p. 878. In Goodwin v. Goodwin, 36 Tenn.App. 630, 260 S.W.2d 186 (1953), Mr. and Mrs. S. H. Goodwin conveyed a remainder interest in Mr. Goodwin's farm to Mr. Goodwin's son, O. B., and wife,......