Goodwin v. Nat'l Elec. Annuity Plan

• Decision Date: 26 August 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action 20-cv-01044-WJM-STV
• Parties: DANIEL R. GOODWIN, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL ELECTRICAL ANNUITY PLAN, CAROL SMITH CHAMBERS, QUINN ELIZABETH GOODWIN, Defendants. And NATIONAL ELECTRICAL ANNUITY PLAN, Crossclaim Plaintiff, v. QUINN ELIZABETH GOODWIN Crossclaim Defendant. And CAROL SMITH CHAMBERS, Counterclaim Plaintiff, v. DANIEL R. GOODWIN, Counterclaim Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

DANIEL R. GOODWIN, Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONAL ELECTRICAL ANNUITY PLAN, CAROL SMITH CHAMBERS, QUINN ELIZABETH GOODWIN, Defendants.

And NATIONAL ELECTRICAL ANNUITY PLAN, Crossclaim Plaintiff,
v.
QUINN ELIZABETH GOODWIN Crossclaim Defendant.

And

CAROL SMITH CHAMBERS, Counterclaim Plaintiff,
v.
DANIEL R. GOODWIN, Counterclaim Defendant.

Civil Action No. 20-cv-01044-WJM-STV

United States District Court, D. Colorado

August 26, 2021

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

SCOTT T. VARHOLAK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

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This matter comes before the Court on eight motions: Defendant National Electrical Annuity Plan's (“NEAP”) Motion for Default Judgment as to Crossclaim Defendant Goodwin [#69], Defendant NEAP's Motion for Summary Judgment [#70], Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant Carol Smith Chambers [#92], Defendant Carol Smith Chambers' Motion for Summary Judgment [#93], Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim One [#98], Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Counter Claim [#117], Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [#145], and Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment After the Pleadings [#147]. These motions have been referred to this Court for recommendation. [##71, 95, 99, 119, 142, 146, 148] This Court has carefully considered the motions and related briefing, the entire case file, and the applicable case law, and has determined that oral argument would not materially assist in the disposition of the motions. For the following reasons, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim One [#98] be GRANTED and the remaining motions be DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action was commenced on April 13, 2020, by pro se^[1] Plaintiff Daniel R. Goodwin to recover retirement funds distributed to Defendant Quinn Goodwin by Defendant NEAP (Claims One and Three)^[2] and recover funds from Defendant Carol

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Smith Chambers (“Ms. Chambers”) associated with the transfer of vehicle titles (Claim Two).^[3] [##1, 6] In response to the Complaint, Defendant NEAP filed a cross claim against Ms. Goodwin for the amount of the retirement funds [#43] and Ms. Chambers filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff to recover moneys owed to her under a loan agreement. [#27]

On February 5, 2021, Defendant NEAP filed a Motion for Entry of Default and a Motion for Default Judgment as to Crossclaim Defendant Goodwin. [##68, 69] Ms. Goodwin has not responded to the motions. On February 10, 2021, the Clerk of the Court entered default as to Ms. Goodwin on NEAP's crossclaim.^[4] [#72] Also on February 5, 2021, NEAP filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim One. [#70] Plaintiff filed a response to the motion and NEAP filed a reply. [##125, 126] Plaintiff filed a cross Motion for Summary Judgment as to Claim One against Defendant NEAP [#98], and a response and reply to that motion have been filed [##108, 125].

On April 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim Two against Ms. Chambers and Ms. Chambers has filed a response. [##92, 120] On April 21, 2021, Ms. Chambers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to Claim Two; Plaintiff did not file a response. [#93] On May 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss Defendant Chambers' counterclaim, which this Court construed as a motion for summary judgment. [##117, 121] Defendant Chambers filed a response. [#141] Finally, on August 16 and 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed two motions for judgment on the pleadings. [##145, 147]

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The Court will address the Motions pertinent to each of Plaintiff's claims and the associated cross- or counter-claims in turn.

II. Legal Standards

A. Motions for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). “Cross-motions for summary judgment are to be treated separately; the denial of one does not require the grant of another.” Buell Cabinet Co., Inc. v. Sudduth, 608 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). When reviewing a cross-motion, the Court must “construe all inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made.” Pirkheim v. First Unum Life Insurance, 229 F.3d 1008, 1010 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Andersen v. Chrysler Corp., 99 F.3d 846, 856 (7th Cir. 1996)).

The movant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie demonstration of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, which the movant may do “simply by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence . . . on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim” when the movant does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10th Cir. 1998). If the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, “the moving party must establish, as a matter of law, all essential elements of the [claim or affirmative defense on which summary judgment is sought] before the nonmoving party can be obligated to bring forward any specific facts alleged to rebut the movant's case.” Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir. 2008). In other words, the

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moving party “must support its motion with credible evidence showing that, if uncontroverted, the moving party would be entitled to a directed verdict.” Rodell v. Objective Interface Sys., Inc., No. 14-CV-01667-MSK-MJW, 2015 WL 5728770, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2015) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331). If the movant carries its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant “to go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial.” Adler, 144 F.3d at 671 (quotation omitted).

“[A] ‘judge's function' at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49; Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2000); Carey v. U.S. Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987). Evidence, including testimony, offered in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise. Bones v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004). A fact is “material” if it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

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574, 587 (1986) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).

B. Motions for Default Judgment

Default may be entered against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Before entering default judgment, the Court must first consider whether it has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the absent party. See Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 772 (10th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Life Sav. and Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 1986). The Court must further consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate basis for the entry of default judgment. Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 762 (10th Cir. 2010); Malibu Media, LLC v. Ling, 80 F.Supp.3d 1231, 1239 (D. Colo. 2015).

In determining whether a claim for relief has been established, the well-pleaded facts of the complaint are deemed true. See United States v. Craighead, 176 Fed.Appx. 922, 924 (10th Cir. 2006); Malibu Media, 80 F.Supp.3d at 1239. Undisputed facts set forth in any affidavits and exhibits are also accepted as true. See Reg'l Dist. Council v. Mile High Rodbusters, Inc., 82 F.Supp.3d 1235, 1242-43 (D. Colo. 2015).

III. CLAIM ONE

Defendant NEAP and Plaintiff have filed cross motions for summary judgment on Claim One. [##70, 98] Claim One alleges that NEAP engaged in the “[u]nauthorized release of [Plaintiff's] pension and annuity.” [#6 at 6]

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A. Factual Background^[5] Defendant NEAP is a multiemployer employee benefit plan as defined by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). [#70 at 2; #98 at 2] NEAP is funded by employer contributions, which are held in individual accounts for the benefit of covered employees. [Id.] NEAP's rules for the payment of benefits are detailed in the NEAP Plan of Benefits and Summary Plan Description. [Id.; ##59-5; 59-6] Plaintiff is a participant in a NEAP plan and, in July 2019, had a NEAP account valued at approximately $548, 000. [##70 at 3; 98 at 2] On March 26, 2019, NEAP received an executed power of attorney form (“POA”) from Plaintiff. [##70 at 3; 59-2 at 11-14; #98 at 2] The POA designated Plaintiff's daughter, Ms. Goodwin, as Plaintiff's agent and granted Ms. Goodwin “General Authority, ” including over Plaintiff's retirement plans. [Id.] The POA also contained “Special Instructions” stating:

The Document is Authorize National Electrical Annuity Plan to Withdraw and Deposit in the Authority of Quinn Elizabeth Goodwin the Sum of 50, 000.00 in the Bank of Quinn E Goodwin's Choice . . . Funds to be used on Legal Expen[s]es[.] Further Contributions to Quinn E Goodwin will be A[u]thorized in writing by Daniel R Goodwin or Full Balance Distributed

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