Goodwin v. Oklahoma City
| Decision Date | 24 June 1947 |
| Docket Number | 31569. |
| Citation | 182 P.2d 762,199 Okla. 26,1947 OK 200 |
| Parties | GOODWIN v. OKLAHOMA CITY et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; Lucius Babcock, Judge.
Mandamus proceeding by Frank J. Goodwin against the City of Oklahoma City a municipal corporation, and others, to compel plaintiff's reinstatement as a member of the police force. From the judgment, the plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Provisions of a city charter, adopted and approved in accordance with constitutional provision, supersede all laws of the state in conflict therewith in so far as such laws relate to merely municipal matters.
2. Pursuant to authority granted by the city charter, the city manager discharged a police officer because, in his judgment certain acts of such officer were detrimental to the best interests of the city service so required. Held: such action did not deprive the discharged officer of constitutional rights, and was not prohibited by 11 O.S.1941 §§ 577 or 541s.
Gomer Smith, Jean P. Day and Harry Neuffer, all of Oklahoma City for plaintiff in error.
A. L Jeffrey, Municipal Counselor, and Leon Shipp, Ass't Municipal Counselor, both of Oklahoma City, for defendants in error.
This is an appeal from the action of the district court of Oklahoma county in sustaining defendants' objection to the introduction of evidence by plaintiff, and rendering judgment dismissing plaintiff's petition, in an action brought by plaintiff for writ of mandamus.
Plaintiff brought this action against the City of Oklahoma City, the Mayor, City Manager, and city councilmen seeking a writ of mandamus to compel his reinstatement as a member of the police force. The petition alleged plaintiff's appointment as a police officer in 1934, upon the basis of a civil service examination; that on August 20, 1936, he was wounded in line of duty and upon recovery was employed as police department radio dispatcher; that he was discharged by the City Manager on April 14, 1943, by reason of his refusal to resign his membership in an organization known as Fraternal Order of Police; that his dismissal was in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and of Section 3 of Article 2 of the State Constitution, and certain sections of our statutes, 11 O.S.1941 §§ 541, 542 authorizing cities to set up a system of police pensions and retirements; that plaintiff had acquired a valuable right in such benefits authorized by statute, which further provided that an officer could not be discharged without cause.
Plaintiff further alleged that the provisions of the Oklahoma City charter, purporting to empower the City Manager to appoint and discharge officers, were void because under the Constitution and laws of the state such powers are conferred upon the Mayor, and they are in conflict with the city charter which makes the Mayor the chief executive officer. Plaintiff then alleged that his discharge was arbitrary and capricious and without cause, that he had no adequate remedy at law, and so sought writ of mandamus requiring reinstatement to his position.
An alternative writ of mandamus was issued, to which defendant made return and filed answer, denying that plaintiff's discharge was an arbitrary act, but was within power of City Manager, whose decision was final; that under the general law (regardless of the city charter) the power of appointment carries with it the right to discharge without cause; that where determination of the sufficiency of the cause for discharge is placed within discretion of the appointing power (City Manager) his judgment as to sufficiency of cause is not reviewable.
When the case was called for hearing defendants objected to the introduction of evidence for the reason plaintiff had failed to state facts sufficient to constitute gounds for issuance of a writ of mandamus. The trial court took the matter under advisement and thereafter sustained defendants' objections and rendered judgment against plaintiff dismissing the petition.
The contentions made by plaintiff in seeking reversal of this judgment are best considered under the arguments advanced by plaintiff as follows:
(1) Even though the City Manager had the right to discharge plaintiff for cause, to discharge him for membership in this organization (Fraternal Order of Police) was violative of plaintiff's rights under the Federal and State Constitutions.
(2) Police departments are matters of general state concern, and protected by general state laws, and under the general statutes (dealing with such matters) plaintiff could not be discharged without cause.
(3) As an appointee under civil service provisions of the city charter the City Manager could not discharge plaintiff without cause.
Under the first argument plaintiff asserts that discharging him for his refusal to cease his activities with the Fraternal Order of Police denied him the rights of assembly and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution, and by Section 3, Article 2, Constitution of State of Oklahoma.
It is not explained how plaintiff's discharge constituted a denial of his rights to petition or assemble. Plaintiff was an appointive employee. Employment was not for a specified period. The city as his employer, acting by and through the City Manager, was informed that plaintiff was an active member of a certain organization. Investigation of the purposes and activities thereof led his employer to believe that such functions were inimical to the employer's interests and to plaintiff's abilities to perform his duties. The employer called upon plaintiff to choose between continuing his membership in the organization and forfeiting his employment, or resigning from such organization and continuing in his position.
In Bemis v. State, 12 Okl.Cr. 114, 152 P. 456, it was...
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