Goodwin v. State, A93A0094
Citation | 431 S.E.2d 473,208 Ga.App. 707 |
Decision Date | 25 May 1993 |
Docket Number | No. A93A0094,A93A0094 |
Parties | GOODWIN v. The STATE. |
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Anna Blitz, Atlanta, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Leonora Grant, Carla Young, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.
The defendant, Lincoln Goodwin, was indicted for one count of aggravated assault, one count of kidnapping and one count of burglary. Following a trial by jury, he was convicted of aggravated assault with the intent to rape, false imprisonment, and criminal trespass, and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment to serve 10 on the aggravated assault charge, 10 years to serve concurrently on the false imprisonment charge, and 12 months to serve concurrently on the criminal trespass charge. His motion for new trial was overruled by the trial court, and this appeal followed.
1. In his first two enumerations of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by not allowing him an opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine the victim regarding her prior cocaine use in order to impeach her testimony. As a result of the limitations placed upon his cross-examination of the victim, the defendant contends that the trial court violated his right to present a defense. We disagree.
The state moved in limine to "[p]rohibit the defendant and defendant's attorney from asking any questions regarding the victim's (Carolyn Jefferson) alleged use of illegal drugs or purchase of illegal drugs including cocaine or crack prior to or after the incident for which the defendant is on trial in the instant case." The state further moved to "[p]rohibit the defendant, defense attorney and all witnesses from making any statements, inferences or gestures regarding Carolyn Jefferson's alleged use of illegal drugs or purchase of illegal drugs including cocaine or crack prior to or after the incident for which the defendant is on trial in the instant case." In granting the state's motion in limine, the trial court concluded that the victim's past cocaine use was irrelevant, and, therefore, prohibited the defendant and his counsel's discussion of the victim's past use of illegal drugs. However, the defendant and his counsel were allowed to discuss any arrangement that the victim had made with the defendant in exchange for sex and question the victim as to her use of drugs on the night in question.
Harris v. State, 196 Ga.App. 304, 306(3), 396 S.E.2d 288 (1990). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in prohibiting any discussion of the victim's prior drug use.
2. The defendant further contends that the trial court erred when it prohibited the impeachment of the victim by the use of a business record. In an offer of proof, defense counsel stated in her place that the director of the clinical laboratory at Grady would testify that the urine sample received from the victim shortly after the incident in question tested positive for cocaine. The director would further testify that urine samples are taken in the regular course of business and routinely done on pregnant women such as the victim. However, the director would not have been able to establish a chain of custody because the director did not have any personal knowledge of the person that received the sample from the victim or the person that analyzed the sample. The trial judge excluded the testimony of the director as well as the hospital report, based upon the defect in the chain of custody and the lack of relevance of the victim's cocaine use to the offenses charged to the defendant. The defendant contends that credibility was a factor, and if admitted, the jury could have inferred from the document that the victim was the initial aggressor.
Under OCGA § 24-3-14(b), "[a]ny writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event shall be admissible in evidence in proof of the act, transaction, occurrence, or event ... [if] it was the regular...
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