Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 27A02–1407–CT–526.,27A02–1407–CT–526.
• Citation: 28 N.E.3d 310
• Parties: April GOODWIN, Tiffany Randolph, and Javon Washington, Appellants–Plaintiffs, v. YEAKLE'S SPORTS BAR AND GRILL, INC., Appellee–Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

28 N.E.3d 310

April GOODWIN, Tiffany Randolph, and Javon Washington, Appellants–Plaintiffs

v.YEAKLE'S SPORTS BAR AND GRILL, INC., Appellee–Defendant.

No. 27A02–1407–CT–526.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

March 25, 2015.

Rehearing Denied June 25, 2015.

Joe Keith Lewis, Marion, IN, Attorney for Appellants.

James J. Shea, Sr., Timothy W. DeGroote, Andrew S. Williams, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

NAJAM, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] This case presents yet another opportunity for Indiana's appellate courts to clarify the Indiana test for determining whether a duty exists in a negligence action, an issue that has created confusion at every level of our judiciary. There are two tests in Indiana. First, if a duty is well-established in our case law, and the case before the court is substantially similar to that case law, then that duty applies. If, on the other hand, the case before the court presents facts and circumstances that have not been addressed in prior decisions of Indiana's appellate courts, then in determining whether a duty exists, we must balance the three factors articulated in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind.1991), including the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured.

[2] Here, April Goodwin, Tiffany Randolph, and Javon Washington (collectively “the Appellants”) filed a complaint against Yeakle's Sports Bar and Grill, Inc. (“the Bar”) alleging that the Bar was negligent when it failed to protect them from criminal acts committed by Rodney Carter on the Bar's premises. The Bar moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted that motion following a hearing. On appeal, the Appellants raise a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of the Bar.

[3] The parties dispute whether a duty existed concerning whether the Bar could have reasonably foreseen Carter's criminal acts. But the facts demonstrate that this is a straight-forward premises liability case, and the duty in such cases is well-established in our case law. As such, reasonable foreseeability is not part of the analysis with respect to the Bar's duty. As this was the only argument raised to the trial court and was the basis of the court's entry of summary judgment for the Bar, the trial court's entry of summary judgment was erroneous as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] During the early morning hours of August 28, 2010, Goodwin, Randolph, and Washington were socializing with friends at Yeakle's, a small bar in Marion. Carter and his wife were also there, and they were positioned near Washington and the others. At some point, Carter thought he heard Washington make a derogatory remark about Carter's wife, and Carter shot Washington.¹ Carter separately, and accidentally, shot Goodwin and Randolph.²

[5] The Appellants filed a complaint against the Bar alleging that it

was negligent in providing a safe place for their patrons to socialize as follows:

a. By negligently failing to provide security for its patrons;

b. By negligently failing to search Rodney Carter for weapons;

c. By otherwise negligently failing to warn plaintiffs that Rodney Carter was armed and dangerous.

Appellants' App. at 15. The Bar filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that Carter's criminal acts were unforeseeable as a matter of law and, therefore, that it did not have a duty to protect the Appellants from being shot. Following a hearing, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Bar. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] The Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of the Bar. In particular, the Appellants maintain that Carter's criminal acts were foreseeable and the trial court erred when it concluded that the Bar owed them no duty to protect them from being shot. We hold that the Bar had a duty to protect the Appellants from harm, but we do not address the foreseeability of Carter's criminal acts in resolving this issue. Instead, a determination of whether the shootings were reasonably foreseeable goes to the issue of whether the Bar breached its duty, an issue which was not raised on summary judgment.

[7] Our standard of review is well-settled.

We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of ... the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind.2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C) ). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties' differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to “demonstrate[ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue,” at which point the burden shifts to the non-movant to “come forward with contrary evidence” showing an issue for the trier of fact. Id. at 761–62 (internal quotation marks and substitution omitted). And “[a]lthough the non-moving party has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his day in court.” McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 916 N.E.2d 906, 909–10 (Ind.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind.2014) (alterations original to Hughley ).

[8] We emphasize that summary judgment is a “high bar” for the moving party to clear in Indiana. Id. at 1004. “In particular, while federal practice permits the moving party to merely show that the party carrying the burden of proof [at trial] lacks evidence on a necessary element, we impose a more onerous burden: to affirmatively ‘negate an opponent's claim.’ ” Id. at 1003 (quoting Jarboe v. Landmark Comm. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind.1994) ).

[9] The issue of a landowner's duty to protect an invitee from the criminal acts of a third party has been addressed by our courts in numerous significant cases. Our supreme court recently set out the general law underlying the question of duty in negligence actions as follows:

The essential elements for a negligence action are “(1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, (2) a breach of the duty, and (3) an injury proximately caused by the breach of duty.” Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind.2011) (citing Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Kephart, 934 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind.2010) ). Where there is no duty, there can be no breach, and thus the party cannot be found negligent. Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 398. Whether a duty exists is generally a question of law for the court. Id. In making this determination, “a three-part balancing test developed by this Court ‘can be a useful tool.’ ” Id. (quoting Kephart, 934 N.E.2d at 1123 ) (citing N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Sharp, 790 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind.2003) ) (referencing the factors enunciated in Webb : “(1) the relationship between the parties, (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and (3) public policy concerns”). However, this test is only needed “in those instances where the element of duty has not already been declared or otherwise articulated.” Sharp, 790 N.E.2d at 465 ; see also Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d 1048, 1053 (Ind.2003) (“Where, as in this case, the alleged duty is well-established, there is no need for a new judicial redetermination of duty.”).

Yost v. Wabash College, 3 N.E.3d 509, 515 (Ind.2014) (emphasis added). Relevant to the instant appeal, our supreme court has declared that the Webb balancing test is unnecessary where a particular duty is well-established. Id. But our courts have not consistently followed this rule since Sharp and Bartolini were handed down in 2003.

[10] Here, for instance, in concluding that the Bar did not owe a duty to the Appellants to protect them from the shootings, the trial court relied on this court's opinion in Merchants National Bank v. Simrell's Sports Bar and Grill, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 383 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), which pre-dated Sharp and Bartolini. In Simrell's, which also involved a shooting at a bar, another panel of this court relied on a trilogy of opinions by our supreme court that had held that the determination of whether a landowner owes an invitee a duty to take reasonable care to protect the invitee against a third party criminal attack requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the criminal act was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 387 (citing Delta Tau Delta v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968, 973 (Ind.1999) ; Vernon v. Kroger Co., 712 N.E.2d 976, 979 (Ind.1999) ; L.W. v. Western Golf Ass'n, 712 N.E.2d 983, 984–985 (Ind.1999) ). The Simrell's court held that, because the shooting was not reasonably foreseeable, the bar did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care to protect him from being shot.

[11] However, only four years after the Delta Tau Delta trilogy, our supreme court rejected application of the Webb balancing test where the existence of a duty is already “well-established.” Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d at 1053. In Bartolini, the plaintiff, who was a patron of the defendant's pub, was assaulted by other patrons in the parking lot. In addressing the issue of whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to protect him from the criminal acts of third parties, our supreme court explained in relevant part as follows:

Landowners have a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect their invitees from foreseeable criminal attacks. Delta Tau Delta . In

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