Goodyear Park Co. v. City of Holyoke

• Citation: 11 N.E.2d 439,298 Mass. 510
• Parties: GOODYEAR PARK CO. v. CITY OF HOLYOKE.
• Decision Date: 02 December 1937
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

298 Mass. 510

11 N.E.2d 439

GOODYEAR PARK CO.

v.CITY OF HOLYOKE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Dec. 2, 1937.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Hampden County; Burns, Judge.

Proceeding by the Goodyear Park Company against the City of Holyoke for the assessment of damages. Verdict for the petitioner in the sum of $5,000, and the petitioner brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.J. M. Healy, of Springfield, and F. E. Button, of Holyoke, for petitioner.

P. J. Garvey and J. F. Hartnett, both of Holyoke, for respondent.

LUMMUS, Justice.

Land of the petitioner in Holyoke was taken on September 9, 1935, by the defendant for the protection of its water supply system. A jury awarded the petitioner damages of $5,000, with which it is dissatisfied. Its exceptions bring the case here.

The petitioner excepted to the exclusion of its letter to the water board of the respondent on October 2, 1930, offering certain land at a price of $28,000; a vote of the water board of October 8, 1930, to purchase land from the petitioner for the sum of $25,000; and a vote of the water board of April 27, 1932, ratifying the earlier vote, and accepting a deed which had been delivered by the petitioner to the respondent, subject to an examination of the title. The present petition is not based upon that deed and those votes, for the petitioner failed in its attempt to force the respondent specifically to perform those votes. Goodyear Park Co. v. Holyoke, 291 Mass. 11, 195 N.E. 766. The present petition is based upon the taking of September 9, 1935. The damage to the petitioner resulting from the earlier negotiations and agreements is not proper for consideration upon this petition. The votes of the water board which failed to bind the respondent as contracts were equally ineffective as admissions by the respondent as to the value of the land.

The petitioner excepted to the exclusion of the testimony of its treasurer that before the taking it had expended $20,000 in grading, road building, engineering and development upon the tract of which the land taken formed part. What is material in assessing damages is the injury caused to the entire tract by the taking, and that may comprise the value of the land taken and the diminution in value of the remaining land. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 79, § 12; Beale v. Boston, 166 Mass. 53, 55, 56, 43 N.E. 1029.Baker v. Arlington, 271 Mass. 415, 420, 171 N.E. 462.Trustees of Boston University v. Commonwealth, 286 Mass. 57, 64, 190 N.E. 29. The amount spent in improving the land is a very inconclusive test of its value, and the judge was not required to allow it to be shown, even though he might have done so. Patch v. Boston, 146 Mass. 52, 56,14 N.E. 770.Levenson v. Boston Elevated Railway, 191 Mass. 75, 77 N.E. 635;Vineyard Grove Co. v. Oak Bluffs, 265 Mass. 270, 276, 277, 163 N.E. 888. The respondent, it is true, had already shown on cross-examination that the lost of the engineering work was $2,500; but that fact did not entitle the petitioner to show the cost of the entire improvement. A party cannot gain an absolute right to introduce evidence of facts not otherwise admissible, by permitting his opponent to introduce evidence of part of them, or evidence of similar facts. A trial judge cannot thus be deprived of his discretion and compelled to listen to the trial of immaterial issues which in his judgment would prolong the trial, confuse the jury, and make likely an unjust result. The settled rule is that ‘the introduction or exclusion of immaterial evidence to meet immaterial evidence is within the discretion of the court.’ Theat v. Curtis, 124 Mass. 348, 352;Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 2 Allen 297;Mowry v. Smith, 9 Allen 67;Parker v. Dudley, 118 Mass. 602, 605;Commonwealth v. Matthews, 129 Mass. 485, 487;Bennett v. Susser, 191 Mass. 329, 330, 77 N.E. 884;Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 575, 576, 120 N.E. 209;Mahan v. Perkins, 274 Mass. 176, 181, 182, 174 N.E. 275; Wigmore, Evidence (2d Ed.) § 15.

The witness Dibble was properly allowed to testify for the respondent as an expert on value. He showed wide experience with real estate in Holyoke. He had no experience in developing tracts for house lots, and no great experience with vacant land. But the qualifications of an expert are commonly for the decision of the trial...