Goodyear v. Davis

• Decision Date: 10 November 1923
• Docket Number: 24,503
• Citation: 114 Kan. 557,220 P. 282
• Parties: LOUISA GOODYEAR, as Administratrix of the Estate of LEWIS GOODYEAR, Deceased, Appellant, v. JAMES C. DAVIS, Director General of Railroads, Appellee
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

220 P. 282

114 Kan. 557

LOUISA GOODYEAR, as Administratrix of the Estate of LEWIS GOODYEAR, Deceased, Appellant, v. JAMES C. DAVIS, Director General of Railroads, Appellee

No. 24,503

Supreme Court of Kansas

November 10, 1923

Decided July, 1923.

Appeal from Republic district court; JOHN C. HOGIN, judge.

Cause reversed and remanded.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT--Two Distinct and Separate Rights of Action Created--One in the Injured Employee--One in His Personal Representative. The Federal Employers' Liability Act (35 U.S. Stat. ch. 149, as amended by 36 U.S. Stat. ch. 143) creates a right of action in the injured employee for his suffering and loss resulting from the injury and also creates a distinct and independent right of action in the personal representative of the deceased employee in the event death results from the injury for the benefit of certain designated dependents.

2. SAME--Settlement by Injured Employee--No Bar to Action by His Personal Representative. A settlement made by the injured employee after the injury and prior to his death, for his suffering and loss, is not a bar to the action by the personal representative for the benefit of dependents for the death, if it resulted from the injury.

3. SAME--Settlement by Injured Employee in Presence of Wife--Wife Not Estopped from Seeking to Set Aside Settlement. In an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act by the personal representative for damages to the injured employee and for the death, the widow of the employee having been appointed administratrix, the fact that as the wife of the injured employee she was present at the time an agent of defendant made a settlement with him for his injuries would not estop her, as personal representative of his estate, from seeking to set aside the release because of his mental incapacity to execute it.

N. J Ward, and John F. McClure, both of Belleville, for the appellant.

Luther Burns, J. E. DuMars, both of Topeka, and W. D. Vance, of Belleville, for the appellee.

OPINION

HARVEY, J.:

This is an action by an administratrix for damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for (a) the wrongful death of Lewis Goodyear, and (b) for the personal injuries sustained by him. The answer, among other things, plead a settlement made with Goodyear after the injury, and a release executed by him of all damages resulting to him therefrom. The reply sought to avoid the release (a) for fraud, (b) because of mental incapacity of Goodyear to execute it, and (c) for mutual mistake. There was a trial to a jury which made special findings of fact and returned a general verdict for defendant, and plaintiff has appealed.

For many years Lewis Goodyear was employed by the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company as car inspector at Belleville, a division point, and continued his employment under the director general when the railroads passed under federal control. It was his duty to inspect trains, while they were at the station, for hot boxes, loose or damaged connections, etc. He worked seven days a week, earned about $ 160 per month, was sixty-four years old, and enjoyed fairly good health. On July 31, 1919, a truck had been left, by some other employee of the defendant, so near the track that it was struck by an incoming train and thrown against Goodyear, who was attending to his duties. In the accident he sustained two fractured ribs and serious bruises about the head, body and knee. He was taken home and treated by a physician employed by defendant, who had also been the physician for the Goodyear family. The fractured ribs healed in three or four weeks, and he was apparently recovered from the injury, except his knee, which continued to trouble him for several months. With the aid of a cane he went to the doctor's office and about town, but there was some stiffness in the knee and he thought it unsafe to undertake his regular work. The physician continued to treat the knee, by electric applications, and otherwise, and finally, near the close of the year, had him wear an especially prepared elastic stocking, and the knee seemed to get all right. Goodyear thought he could go to work and set March 1, 1920, as the date, but did not do so. On March 12, Goodyear met defendant's claim agent, a Mr. Stiers, about the depot and told him he planned to go to work and wanted to settle with defendant. After a little talk a settlement was agreed upon, by which defendant was to pay him $ 1,135 and pay his doctor bills. Mr. Stiers stated that he would have to get authority to issue the draft in payment; that he would do so and return to Belleville and make payment in a few days. He did return March 16, went to Goodyear's home, delivered the draft to him, and Goodyear executed a full and complete release and satisfaction of all damages resulting to him from the accident and injuries of July 31, 1919. On May 4, 1920, Mr. Goodyear died. Thereafter his widow was appointed administratrix of his estate and brought this action. It was one of the claims of the defendant that his death was not the result of the injuries received in the accident of July 31 but resulted from other causes. Much evidence was presented on this branch of the case, and it is possible the jury found for the defendant on that theory. But whether that be true is immaterial on this appeal, for, under the record as here presented, this appeal must be determined upon the instructions pertaining to the release. In answer to a special question the jury found that no fraud was practiced by any agent or employee of the defendant in obtaining the release, and no complaint is made of the instructions of the court on that question.

Appellant complains of the 12th instruction, which reads:

"One of the grounds alleged in plaintiff's petition for setting aside the release is that Lewis Goodyear was not in possession of his mental faculties at the time of the execution of the release, and that thereby he was rendered incompetent in law to transact business. You are instructed that if the plaintiff herein, wife of the deceased Lewis Goodyear, was present at the time of the settlement and knew of his mental condition and made no protest to the agent of defendant against such settlement and did not inform the agent of said Goodyear's mental condition, then she as plaintiff in this action will not be permitted to complain of the settlement having been made, but will be considered as having acquiesced in and agreed to the said settlement by her silence. But on the contrary if you find from the evidence that she was not present at the time of the settlement or that she did not know of Lewis Goodyear's alleged mental condition, or that she did protest to the agent against such settlement, then she would not be estopped from setting up such defense to said release."

We think this is an erroneous statement of the law, first, because the silence of the wife could not estop dependent children for whose benefit, in part, the action was brought, and second, the action is maintained, not by the widow, but by the personal representative of the deceased. This might be some one other than the widow, even a corporation, as it was in Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Fontron Loan & Trust Co., 89 Okla. 87, 214 P. 172 (Okla.).

The appellee argues that any error in instruction No. 12 was cured by instruction No. 13, which reads as follows:

"If you find from the evidence and by evidence which is clear, decided and satisfactory, that at the time Lewis Goodyear executed the release in question here he was not mentally capable of executing the same then you would be justified in holding said release null and void."

But it is difficult to see how it could have that effect. Reading the two instructions together, plaintiff would be estopped from maintaining the action if the conditions existed as set out in instruction No. 12 and if the jury should find they did not exist then under instruction No. 13 they would be required to find mental incapacity by evidence which is clear, decided and satisfactory. There is no claim here that Louisa Goodyear was paid anything at the time of that settlement for damages resulting in the death of her husband and her presence at that time would not estop a personal representative of deceased from maintaining an action for the benefit of dependents.

Appellant complains of instruction No. 19, which reads:

"You are instructed that the law favors a compromise and settlement of disputes, and when parties in good faith enter into an agreement based on good consideration, neither is afterwards permitted to deny it."

When we consider the dual nature of the relief sought; the triple nature of the attack made upon the release, together with questions which necessarily arise in an action of this character, it is apparent the court could not state everything in one instruction. It was proper for the court to inform the jury of the general principles of law applicable to the case and their specific application to the case on trial. This instruction is a statement of a general principle of law which has been frequently announced by this and other courts. (Lewis v. Kimball, 103 Kan. 173, 173 P 279; Roy v. Kirn, 208 Mich. 571, 175 N.W. 475; Kilby v. Charles City W. R. Co., 191 Iowa 926, 183 N.W. 371.) It requires that the settlement be made in good faith, which means without fraud, duress, concealment, and assumes a lack of mental incapacity or mutual mistake, and upon good consideration. The court gave other instructions on fraud, mental capacity, mutual mistake, and specifically told the jury that the instructions must be considered as a whole. While it might have been stated with more specific detail of wording, we do not...