Goodykoontz v. Olsen

• Decision Date: 21 June 1880
• Citation: 6 N.W. 263,54 Iowa 174
• Parties: GOODYKOONTZ ET AL. v. OLSEN ET AL
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

6 N.W. 263

54 Iowa 174

GOODYKOONTZ ET AL. v. OLSEN ET AL

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

June 21, 1880

Appeal from Winnebago Circuit Court.

ACTION to quiet title to eighty acres of land. The plaintiffs claim to own the same by virtue of a tax deed dated January 25 1869, and filed for record the same day. The deed purports to have been acknowledged before Samuel Tennis, clerk of the board of supervisors. The defendants, while not denying that Tennis was clerk of the board of supervisors, aver that the deed was not acknowledged before a person authorized to take acknowledgments, and that the deed for that reason was not legally executed, and that the plaintiffs acquired no interest thereunder.

The plaintiffs demurred to the answer, and the demurrer was overruled. Judgment being rendered for the defendants the plaintiffs appeal.

AFFIRMED.

F. M Goodykoontz and R. Wilbur, for appellants.

W. A Burnap and Miller & Cliggitt, for appellees.

OPINION

ADAMS, CH. J.

A tax deed conveys nothing unless acknowledged. Revision, § 784. It is not claimed that the clerk of the board of supervisors had authority by virtue of his office, as such, to take acknowledgments of deeds, but it is claimed that Samuel Tennis, before whom the deed purports to be acknowledged, was county judge; that as such officer he was authorized to take acknowledgments, and so the defect in this case, if any, is a mere defect in the certificate, which should not have the effect to invalidate the deed.

It appears that Tennis had been elected and qualified judge of the county court, and had served as such during the year 1868. Before the acknowledgment, however, of the deed in question, the county court was abolished, and the office of county auditor was created, and each county judge was made ex officio county auditor from January 1, 1869, and required to perform the duties of county auditor and act as clerk of the board of supervisors until the office of county auditor should be filled by election.

Now although Tennis held the office of county auditor, and performed the duties of clerk of the board of supervisors, by virtue of his having been elected and qualified judge of the county court, yet when the court was abolished he ceased to be judge of the court, and he did not, we think, carry forward any of the powers which he exercised simply as judge. It follows that, in our opinion, at the date of the deed in question he...