Gooley v. Jefferson Beach Marina, Inc., MARINE-BLUE

• Decision Date: 26 June 1989
• Docket Number: MARINE-BLUE,Docket No. 105069
• Citation: 177 Mich.App. 26,441 N.W.2d 21
• Parties: Donald K. GOOLEY, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant, v. JEFFERSON BEACH MARINA, INC., a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Counter-Plaintiff, Third Party Plaintiff-Appellee, v. POMPANOLAGOON, INC., a foreign corporation, Third Party Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 21

441 N.W.2d 21

177 Mich.App. 26

Donald K. GOOLEY, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant, v. JEFFERSON BEACH MARINA, INC., a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Counter-Plaintiff, Third Party Plaintiff-Appellee, v. POMPANO MARINE-BLUE LAGOON, INC., a foreign corporation,

Third Party Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 105069.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Dec. 12, 1988.

Decided May 2, 1989.

Released for Publication June 26, 1989.

Peterson, Hay & Comsa, P.C. by Mark S. Mackley, Mt. Clemens, for Pompano Marine-Blue Lagoon, Inc.

Before SHEPHERD, P.J., and MURPHY and GILLESPIE, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This case comes to us on remand from our Supreme Court for consideration as on leave granted. 429 Mich. 879, 415 N.W.2d 653 (1987). The sole issue concerns whether the trial court erred in denying third-party defendant Pompano Marine-Blue Lagoon, Inc.'s, motion to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction.

A motion for summary disposition based on a lack of personal jurisdiction is resolved based on the pleadings and the evidential support submitted by the parties. MCR 2.116(C)(1) and (G)(5). The burden of establishing jurisdictional facts is on the plaintiff. Gardner v. McDonagh, 124 Mich.App. 253, 333 N.W.2d 568 (1983); Avery v. American Honda Motor Car Co., 120 Mich.App. 222, 225, 327 N.W.2d 447 (1982), lv. den. 417 Mich. 1100.49 (1983).

Here, both Blue Lagoon and third-party plaintiff Jefferson Beach Marina, Inc., submitted affidavits in support of their respective positions on the motion. Taken with the pleadings, this record demonstrates that the cause of action arose from the sale of a boat in July, 1986, in Michigan. Plaintiff Donald Gooley was the purchaser, Jefferson Beach Marina was the seller, and Blue Lagoon was the supplier.

Plaintiff went to the Jefferson Beach Marina, a Michigan corporation located in Michigan, on July 11, 1986, in an effort to purchase a 1986 Wellcraft boat for delivery within one week. After the Jefferson Beach Marina informed plaintiff that it could not procure that specific model boat on such short notice, plaintiff told the marina that he had seen the boat at a boat show and that it could be obtained from the Blue Lagoon business located in Florida. Jefferson Beach Marina telephoned Blue Lagoon and made the purchase. Blue Lagoon shipped the boat to Jefferson Beach Marina, which then delivered it to plaintiff.

On August 10, 1986, plaintiff commenced a breach of warranty action against the Jefferson Beach Marina, alleging various product defects and missing equipment. Jefferson Beach Marina responded by filing a third-party complaint against Blue Lagoon, while Blue Lagoon moved for dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion was supported by the affidavit of Rusty Bohrer, the president of Blue Lagoon. The affidavit indicated that the boat transaction was an isolated incident and that the "excessive majority" of Blue Lagoon's business was localized in Florida. Bohrer averred that Blue Lagoon did not advertise or otherwise transact business in Michigan. Bohrer further averred that the watercraft in question never appeared at any boat show in Michigan and that the only reason the sale took place was because he was contacted with respect to the availability of a specific watercraft, which Blue Lagoon just happened to have in stock.

In opposition to the motion, Jefferson Beach Marina submitted an affidavit setting forth representations allegedly made by Blue Lagoon pertaining to the condition of the boat. No factual dispute was shown as to the jurisdictional facts averred by Bohrer. Jefferson Beach Marina primarily contended that jurisdiction was proper under the long-arm statute, M.C.L. Sec. 600.715; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.715, while Blue Lagoon primarily contended that jurisdiction was lacking under the Due Process Clause of US Const., Am. XIV. The trial court found that jurisdiction was proper under the long-arm statute, citing Blue Lagoon's agreement to sell the boat to a Michigan customer, Blue Lagoon's arrangement to ship the boat to Michigan, and the lack of dispute on representations made by Blue Lagoon on the condition of the boat, as circumstances justifying the exercise of limited personal jurisdiction.

We hold that an exercise of limited personal jurisdiction under the facts of this case would violate the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const., Am. XIV, and, hence, find it unnecessary to consider the trial court's conclusion that the statutory requirements for exercising limited personal jurisdiction were satisfied.

In Witbeck v. Bill Cody's Ranch Inn, 428 Mich. 659, 666, 411 N.W.2d 439 (1987), our Supreme Court declined to consider issues pertaining to Michigan's long-arm statute where the exercise of jurisdiction would violate U.S. Const., Am. XIV. The due process analysis applied was described as follows:

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or a corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." Int'l Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 319; 66 SCt 154 ; 90 LEd 95; 161 ALR 1057 (1945). The "constitutional touchstone" is whether the defendant purposefully established "minimum contacts" in the forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Id., 316 . Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 474; 105 SCt 2174 [2183]; 85 LEd2d 528 (1985).

The foreseeability of causing injury in another state is not a "sufficient benchmark" for exercising personal...