Gopher Media LLC v. Media
| Decision Date | 20 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3:22-CV-00131 TWR (DDL) |
| Parties | GOPHER MEDIA LLC dba DOCTOR MULTIMEDIA, a Nevada limited liability corporation, Plaintiff, v. MODERN DOC MEDIA, a California business entity; THE MODERN MEDIA GROUP LLC, a California limited liability company; ANDREW HOFFMAN, an individual; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE, (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, AND (3) DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS RE: SEALING INFORMATION IN CONNECTION WITH ANTI-SLAPP MOTION AND REPLY (ECF Nos. 16, 17 32)
Presently before the Court is the Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) and Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16; ECF No. 16-1 “Mem.”) filed by Defendants Modern Doc Media, The Modern Media Group LLC, and Andrew Hoffman, as well as Plaintiff Gopher Media LLC's Response in Opposition (ECF No. 30, “Opp'n”) and Defendants' Reply in Support of the Motions (ECF No. 31, “Reply”). Also before the Court are Defendants' Motions re: Sealing of Information in Connection with Anti- SLAPP Motion and Reply (ECF Nos. 17, 32). The Court held a hearing on these motions on November 17, 2022. (See ECF No. 37.) Having carefully considered Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 13, “FAC”), the Parties' arguments, and the relevant law, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' Special Motion to Strike and Partial Motion to Dismiss and DENIES Defendants' requests not to seal documents relating to the anti-SLAPP Motion and Reply as requests for an advisory opinion.
Plaintiff Gopher Media LLC, doing business as Doctor Multimedia, is a digital marketing agency that provides marketing and social media services to a variety of medical professionals including doctors, dentists, and veterinarians. (FAC ¶¶ 1, 21.) The organization works to help these professionals grow their businesses online through Pay Per Click campaigns, search engine optimization efforts, and building an online presence. (Id. ¶ 22.) As part of its business, Plaintiff has generated confidential and proprietary information including pricing information, website design strategies, sales presentation information, sales and marketing strategies, client lists, event lists, and information relating to confidential business discussions between Plaintiff and potential or actual clients. (Id. ¶ 23.) None of this information was intended to be disclosed to anyone outside of Doctor Multimedia. (Id. ¶ 26.)
Defendant Andrew Hoffman previously worked for Plaintiff but was allegedly terminated for poor job performance. (Id. ¶ 27.) Defendant Hoffman later filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 28.) That lawsuit eventually settled, and Plaintiff and Defendant Hoffman subsequently entered into two settlement agreements in which they agreed not to actively solicit the other's customers or disparage one another. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 33-34.) Defendant Hoffman is now the CEO of a different company-The Modern Media Group LLC, doing business as Modern Doc Media[1]-that competes directly with Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 31, 37.) Modern Doc Media also does business within the online healthcare and website services market. (Id. ¶ 37.) Defendant Modern Doc Media conducts business through its website https://moderndocmedia.com, while Plaintiff conducts business through its website https://doctormultimedia.com. (Id. ¶ 49.)
In its First Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleges ten causes of action against Defendants Hoffman and Modern Doc Media: (1) misappropriation of trade secrets under federal law; (2) misappropriation of trade secrets under California law; (3) unfair business practices; (4) false advertising under the Lanham Act; (5) trade libel; (6) trademark infringement; (7) unfair competition; (8) fraud; (9) breach of contract; and (10) cybersquatting. (FAC ¶¶ 65-228.) In response, Defendants filed a Special Motion to Strike and Partial Motion to Dismiss, as well as two motions requesting that the Court not seal any of the documents associated with the Parties' prior settlement agreements. (See generally ECF Nos. 16, 16-1, 17, 32.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff's fraud claim and parts of its breach of contract claim should be stricken pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute) because they target prior litigation conduct that is protected under the statute. (Mem. at 8-9, 12-13.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to state claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, false advertising, trade libel, and cybersquatting. (Id. at 9-10, 17-25.)
California has a special statute known as an “anti-SLAPP statute,”[2] which provides that “[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1); see Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003); Hilton, 599 F.3d at 899 n.1. “Anti-SLAPP statutes are designed to allow the early dismissal of meritless lawsuits aimed at chilling expression through costly, time-consuming litigation.” Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2009). A defendant in federal court may bring an anti-SLAPP motion with respect to California state law claims, but the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to claims asserted under federal law. DC Comics v. Pac. Pictures Corp., 706 F.3d 1009, 1013 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013); Hilton, 599 F.3d at 901.
“The analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion proceeds in two steps.” Barry v. State Bar of Cal., 2 Cal. 5th 318, 321 (2017). At step one, “the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one ‘arising from protected activity.'” Id. (quoting Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal.4th 811, 819 (2011)). “[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.” Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 (2002). The “critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity.” Id. Only if the Court determines that relief is sought based on protected activity does it reach the second step. See Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal. 5th 376, 396 (2016).
At step two, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits, which requires Plaintiff to show that “each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.” Id.; Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53, 63 (2002); see Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 8 F.4th 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2021). The Court “will review anti-SLAPP motions to strike under different standards depending on the motion's basis.” Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir.), amended, 897 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2018). When an anti-SLAPP motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a claim, “a district court should apply the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard and consider whether a claim is properly stated.”[3] Id. at 834. If the plaintiff ultimately fails to meet its burden at the second step, the claim based on protected activity is stricken and “[a]llegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” Baral, 1 Cal. 5th at 396.
“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.'” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). “A district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.'” Id. at 1242 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable...
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