Gorby v. State
Decision Date | 11 April 2002 |
Docket Number | No. SC95153, No. SC00-405. |
Citation | 819 So.2d 664 |
Parties | Olen Clay GORBY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Olen Clay Gorby, Petitioner, v. Michael W. Moore, etc., Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Gregory C. Smith, Capital Collateral Representative, and Bret B. Strand, Assistant Capital Collateral Counsel, Northern Region, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellant/Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney General, Capital Appeals, Tallahassee, FL; and Richard B. Martell, Special Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellee/Respondent.
Olen Clay Gorby appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Gorby also has petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9) Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's order denying Gorby's motion for postconviction relief. We also deny Gorby's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
The facts of this case were presented in Gorby v. State, 630 So.2d 544, 545-46 (Fla. 1993):
The jury voted 9-3 to recommend a sentence of death. The trial court found four aggravating factors,1 and no statutory mitigating factors. The trial court also found several nonstatutory mitigating factors,2 but also determined that they did not outweigh the aggravating factors and, therefore, a sentence of death was appropriate. In October 1995, Gorby filed his first motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. In May 1997, he filed an amended 3.850 motion with a total of thirty-two claims.3 After conducting a Huff hearing,4 the trial court granted an evidentiary hearing on all or part of seven claims,5 and summarily denied the remaining claims, finding them to be either procedurally barred, insufficiently pled, or lacking a basis on which relief could be granted. After the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction judge denied relief on all seven of the claims for which evidence was presented.6
Gorby raises five broad claims,7 with numerous subclaims, in his 3.850 appeal. Several of Gorby's claims are procedurally barred or lack merit, and require little further discussion.8
Gorby contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in the penalty phase for failing to properly investigate the existence of mitigation evidence and for failing to present that mitigation evidence to the jury. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, two elements must be proven:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 219 (Fla.1998)
. Moreover, to establish prejudice:
The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Rutherford, 727 So.2d at 220. We determine that all of Gorby's assertions of ineffective assistance based on the failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence are unavailing.
Gorby contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview his father, Ernie, and for interviewing his other family members in a group instead of individually. We reject both assertions. Trial counsel conducted a phone interview with Gorby's father and determined, as a reasonable tactical decision, that the father had very little, if any, interest in assisting with his son's case. An attorney's reasoned tactical decision not to present evidence of dubious mitigating value does not constitute ineffective assistance. See Porter v. State, 478 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.1985)
. Furthermore, if Gorby's father had testified during the penalty phase, the majority of his testimony would have been cumulative to that of Dr. John Goff, Gorby's confidential mental health expert who testified during the guilt-innocence phase, as well to that of Gorby's other family members who testified during the penalty phase. Gorby also insists that his father's unique insight into Gorby's single visit to a psychiatrist when he was twelve years old would have provided significant mitigation evidence. We disagree. When testifying at the evidentiary hearing on Gorby's 3.850 motion, Dr. Goff stated that the new information provided to him by Gorby's collateral counsel served mainly to confirm his pre-trial diagnosis that Gorby suffered from organic personality syndrome and alcohol dependence. Dr. Goff testified at length concerning Gorby's mental condition during the litigation. There is no reasonable probability that had it been presented to the jury, information regarding Gorby's lone visit to a psychiatrist nearly thirty years before he committed the murder in question would have affected the outcome of the penalty phase.9
Gorby also asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for not providing Dr. Goff with evidence of Gorby's childhood drinking. He further argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling Dr. Goff to testify during the penalty phase. The record refutes these assertions. Dr. Goff testified in detail during the guiltinnocence phase concerning the effects of alcohol dependence on Gorby's behavior, the impact of an organic personality syndrome, and the implications from head trauma Gorby suffered while he was a young boy, which occurred in a collision with a moving vehicle. Dr. Goff further stated that these factors could have made Gorby act impulsively, with a "hair trigger." Equally important, during the penalty phase Gorby's trial counsel summarized for the jury Dr. Goff's testimony from the guilt-innocence phase, and argued that it should be considered as evidence of statutory mental health mitigation.10 Furthermore, the trial judge found as nonstatutory mitigation that Gorby's drinking contributed not only to his having some inability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law but also to his having suffered some level of emotional disturbance. When the above facts are juxtaposed against the four strong aggravators found in Gorby's case we determine, as did the postconviction judge, that there is no reasonable probability of a different outcome during the penalty phase. Therefore, Gorby is not entitled to relief.11
Gorby makes numerous miscellaneous contentions regarding his trial counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence. We determine that each is either wholly unsupported by evidence, was actually presented as mitigation evidence, or is related to nonstatutory mitigation found to exist by the trial judge.12 Therefore, with regard to...
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Gobby v. State
... Page 664 ... 819 So.2d 664 ... OLEN CLAY GORBY, Appellant, ... STATE of Florida, Appellee ... OLEN CLAY GORBY, Petitioner, ... Michael W. Moore, etc., Respondent ... No. SC95153 ... No. SC00-405 ... Supreme Court of Florida ... April 11, 2002 ... Rehearing Denied June 11, 2002 ... Page 665 ... COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED ... ...