Gordon v. Busbee

Decision Date04 January 2012
Docket NumberNo. 4880.,4880.
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesCharles E. GORDON and Barbara Gordon, as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Clara Gordon Burch, Appellants, v. Jacqueline F. BUSBEE, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of George E. Burch; Dennis E. Burch; and Laurie E. Burch, Respondents.In the Matter of The Estate of Clara Gordon Burch.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Adele J. Pope, of Columbia, and Thomas H. Pope, of Newberry, for Appellants.

B. Michael Brackett, of Columbia, for Respondent Jacqueline F. Busbee, as Personal Representative of the Estate of George E. Burch; Warren C. Powell, Jr., and William D. Britt, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent Jacqueline F. Busbee, individually; and Carlos W. Gibbons, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondents, Dennis E. Burch and Laurie E. Burch.

KONDUROS, J.

Charles and Barbara Gordon appeal the circuit court's denial of their motions for directed verdict and the grant of directed verdict to the defendants on various causes of action. They further appeal various matters related to jury instructions as well as the circuit court's refusal to grant equitable relief. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

FACTS

Clara Gordon Burch and her fourth husband, George E. Burch, were married in 1984. Clara was 75 at the time of their marriage and George was almost 70. Clara had no children, while George had two, Dennis E. Burch and Laurie E. Burch. Clara's will, executed in 1985, left a life estate in her home to George, but ceded her remaining assets to her Gordon family members, including her nephew, Charles, and other nieces and nephews. In October 1994, Clara entered a nursing home and was experiencing “cognitive defects.” She had amassed a sizable estate composed primarily of bonds, certificates of deposit, and other funds received incident to her previous marriages. In February of 1995, Clara executed a power of attorney (POA) in George's favor. The POA did not contain a gifting provision. George's attorney, Jacqueline Busbee, prepared the POA, although she did not meet or confer with Clara before doing so. Thereafter, George removed funds in CDs or accounts owned by Clara or from their joint account totaling approximately $400,000. Clara passed away in April of 2000, and, per the provisions in her will, George was named personal representative (PR) of her estate. Busbee began advising George in his capacity as PR. George died on January 18, 2003, and, per the provisions of his will, Busbee was named PR of his estate. Charles was appointed successor PR of Clara's estate on February 27, 2003. Charles filed this lawsuit in April 2005.1

At trial before the circuit court, Charles's wife, Barbara, and George's daughter, Laurie, testified George mentioned an arrangement between Clara and him to handle their estate finances. Laurie also testified George gave her a loan in the amount of $170,000 that was to be considered an advance against her inheritance if it was not repaid at the time of his death.

The Gordons presented expert accounting evidence through Agnes Asman, a certified public accountant. She testified she had examined all the records available to her and created a chart that represented transfers made from Clara's funds into accounts or CDs held solely in George's name or in their joint account that had been used to pay for Clara's nursing home care. In her estimation, George had misappropriated approximately $450,000 exclusive of interest. On cross-examination, Asman conceded the examination she had conducted was not a forensic accounting that would demonstrate the source of the funds into the accounts and specifically trace the funds to their final destination. She further admitted she had not examined the signature cards for the various accounts but had relied on the Internal Revenue Service form 1099s to determine who had ownership of various accounts and assets. In at least one instance when Asman's chart showed ownership of an account by Clara, George was also a signator on the account. Additionally, Asman testified she had not considered George's contribution to the parties' joint bank account when determining that he had withdrawn money that belonged to Clara.

With respect to Busbee, the Gordons alleged she had operated as George's attorney in his capacity as PR and as attorney for Clara's estate. They claimed Busbee failed to check the status of Clara's estate at the time of her death by failing to inventory Clara's safety deposit box and by neglecting to obtain Clara's last bank statements prior to the death. They also argued Busbee's filing of the inventory of assets in Clara's and George's estates was inaccurate and/or fraudulent. They contended Dennis and Laurie knew of George's transfer of funds from Clara's accounts and estate and received the benefit of those transfers either directly or as his devisees.

At the close of the Gordons' case, the circuit court granted Dennis Burch's directed verdict motion as to all claims against him. With respect to Laurie, the court granted a directed verdict in her favor as to all claims with the caveat that she may be called upon to repay the loans from George to his estate. The circuit court granted a directed verdict in favor of Busbee on all claims against her individually with the exception of the causes of action for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. It also allowed the conversion claim against her as PR of the estate to remain but only insofar as she was the representative of George's estate in the action, not based on her actions in converting any assets.

At the close of all evidence, the Gordons moved for directed verdict against George's estate, arguing the money transferred by George should be returned to Clara's estate because he had transferred the funds without Clara's permission. That motion was denied, apparently based on the argument that George and Clara had made an oral contractual arrangement for the execution of these transfers.

After closing arguments, court was dismissed for the day. The following morning, the Gordons submitted additional jury charge requests relating to the proportional ownership of joint bank accounts with right of survivorship and other matters. The circuit court refused the charges, determining the request was untimely pursuant to Rule 51, SCRCP. After the jury was charged, the Gordons took exception to the charge on conversion. They argued the circuit court had placed the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff when the burden should have been shifted to the defendant to prove the transfers were valid in the absence of authorization to make them. The circuit court stood by its original charge.

The jury found in favor of Busbee and George's estate on the remaining causes of action. The Gordons then sought equitable relief from the circuit court including (1) the removal of Busbee as PR of George's estate; (2) a declaration that the bank accounts and loan to Laurie were receivable assets of Clara's estate; (3) the appointment of a special administrator to account to Clara's estate; and (4) the imposition of a constructive trust on all liquid assets of George's estate to the extent of the transfers with interest. The circuit court denied this motion and all post-trial motions. This appeal followed.

LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Denial of Directed Verdict (George's Estate)

The Gordons contend the circuit court erred in failing to direct a verdict in their favor concerning the transfers George made after Clara's undisputed incompetence in the summer of 1995. We agree in part.2

In reviewing the denial of a directed verdict motion, this court employs the same standard as the trial courtwe view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 299–300, 536 S.E.2d 408, 418 (Ct.App.2000).

At the close of evidence, the Gordons moved for a directed verdict “as to all transfers of the assets of Clara Burch by George Burch from and after June 30 of [1995].” On appeal, George's estate argues this motion was not sufficiently specific as required by Rule 50(a), SCRCP, which states [a] motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor.” We disagree.

The Gordons relied upon Fender v. Fender, 285 S.C. 260, 329 S.E.2d 430 (1985), in making their motion. In Fender, the attorney in fact for the decedent transferred to himself 37.4 acres of land, a car, and the proceeds of two bank accounts prior to the decedent's death. Id. at 262, 329 S.E.2d at 431. The POA did not contain a gift-giving provision and the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted a bright-line rule in this area. Id. [I]n order to avoid fraud and abuse, we adopt a rule barring a gift by an attorney in fact to himself or a third party absent clear intent to the contrary evidenced in writing. Id. (emphasis added). Fender's mandate is designed to protect the vulnerable from improper conduct by those in whom they place the greatest trust. Accordingly, the Gordons' directed verdict motion to disallow the transfers under Fender was sufficiently specific to operate as a directed verdict motion for breach of fiduciary duty.

In this case, no one disputes Clara's POA did not contain a gift-giving provision and the record contains no written evidence of her authorization for George to make the transfers he did. The circuit court based its decision on the existence of evidence, however slight, showing an arrangement between Clara and George to allow him to make transfers to avoid estate taxes. However, under Fender, the existence of such an oral agreement is insufficient to authorize the transfers. Any transactions involving George taking funds that were undisputedly Clara's and transferring them into a fund solely owned by him would fit within the construct of Fender. Therefore, the circuit court erred in failing to...

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