Gordon v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 19 November 1987
• Citation: 70 N.Y.2d 839,523 N.Y.S.2d 445,517 N.E.2d 1331
• Parties: , 517 N.E.2d 1331 Martin GORDON, Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 445

523 N.Y.S.2d 445

70 N.Y.2d 839, 517 N.E.2d 1331

Martin GORDON, Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 19, 1987.

[517 N.E.2d 1332] Alan C. Rassner, New York City, for appellant

Peter L. Zimroth, Corp. Counsel (Pamela Seider Dolgow and Leonard Koerner, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

The central question on this appeal is whether the City satisfied its duty of care to plaintiff, while in custody, to protect him from self-inflicted harm. Both parties acknowledge that a duty of care is owed by prison authorities with respect to the health and safety of their charges (see, e.g., O'Grady v. City of Fulton, 4 N.Y.2d 717, 171 N.Y.S.2d 108, 148 N.E.2d 317, affg. 4 A.D.2d 743, 164 N.Y.S.2d 985). When prison authorities know or should know that a prisoner has suicidal tendencies or that a prisoner might physically harm himself, a duty arises to provide reasonable care to assure that such harm does not occur. Neither the requisite knowledge nor the lack of proper supervision was shown here. Although plaintiff exhibited boisterous, irrational and delusional behavior--and consequently was placed alone in a bare cell, without belt or shoelaces, with a correction officer seated directly outside his cell monitoring him--neither the City's information nor the plaintiff's actions prior to the moment he suddenly scaled the bars of his cell and plunged headfirst into the toilet bowl gave notice to the City that he might harm himself in any such fashion.

Whether a breach of duty has occurred depends upon whether the resulting harm was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's acts or omissions (Danielenko v. Kinney Rent A Car, 57 N.Y.2d 198, 204, 455 N.Y.S.2d 555, 441 N.E.2d 1073). If no inquiry could have been reasonably foreseen, or if defendant's conduct was reasonable in light of what could have been anticipated, there is no breach of duty, no negligence and no liability (Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 43 at 280 [5th ed.] ). "Whether hindsight reveals that greater precautions could have been taken to avoid the harm that eventuated is irrelevant if the injury could not reasonably have been foreseen at the moment the defendant engaged in the activity which later proves harmful". (Danielenko v. Kinney Rent A Car, supra, at 204, 455 N.Y.S.2d 555, 441 N.E.2d 1073.) Plaintiff failed to establish that the injury could have been reasonably foreseen, or that the City's conduct was not reasonable in light of what could have been anticipated, and he therefore failed to make out a prima facie case of negligence against the City.

We have no quarrel with the statement of applicable law set forth by the dissent, but reach the opposite conclusion when that law is applied in this case. We agree with the Appellate Division that, as a matter of law, the actions taken with regard to plaintiff were reasonable under the circumstances and that every possible precaution had been taken to guard against what was reasonably foreseeable. The dissent concludes that the jury could reasonably have found that, in the moments in which the relevant events unfolded, this plaintiff should have been physically immobilized or restrained until he received medical attention. However, the undisputed evidence that boisterous, irrational behavior (including climbing the bars of the cell) is not uncommon in holding pens and would not itself warrant medical attention, together with the other undisputed evidence--for example, plaintiff's stated intention to feign insanity, his apparent normality shortly before the incident, the absence of any knowledge on the part of the City of a suicidal history, the routine removal of belts and shoelaces, the confinement of plaintiff alone in a bare cell monitored by a correction officer--lead us to affirm the conclusion below that there was no prima facie case of negligence against the City.

Finally, we address the additional argument made by the City. The City notes the unfortunate reality that many persons in custody may exhibit bizarre behavior, rendering it difficult for prison authorities to guard them from each other as well as to protect them from harm to themselves. As we wrote in another connection in Hirsh v. State of New York, 8 N.Y.2d 125, 127, 202 N.Y.S.2d 296, 168 N.E.2d 372: "If institutions for the mentally ill are required to take all of the precautions contended for in this case, and are to be held liable for such delicate mistakes in judgment, patients would be kept in strait jackets or some other form of strict confinement which would hardly be conducive to recovery * * * Reasonable care is required to protect such patients against themselves * * * but no evidence of lack of it has been shown in his case." The use of restraints and medications to immobilize inmates obviously engenders other problems and points up the dilemma faced by the City, which may well be confronted by major damages litigation whatever course it chooses. In the present case, no more is required of the City than the exercise of reasonable care in the light of what might reasonably have been anticipated; no evidence of the lack of it has been shown here.

ALEXANDER, Judge (dissenting).

This is a negligence action to recover damages for self-inflicted injuries sustained by plaintiff on October 21, 1977 while in the custody of the New York City Department of Corrections. Defendant, the City of New York, is charged with failing to take proper precautions to ensure plaintiff's safety and in failing to obtain medical treatment for him during the 36 hours he remained incarcerated awaiting arraignment. A jury trial resulted in a judgment for plaintiff. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and dismissed the complaint, holding that plaintiff had failed to set forth a prima facie case. A majority of this court affirms that order. Because I believe that the evidence at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as we are bound to do, supports a prima facie case, I respectfully dissent.

On October 19, 1977, plaintiff, then age 19, was arrested and charged with attempted grand larceny and criminal possession of burglar's tools, having been observed by police officers attempting to break into an automobile. At trial it was established that at the time of his arrest, plaintiff had a two-year history of severe psychiatric problems; he had been diagnosed variously as "acute psychotic episode catalytic" and "schizophrenia paranoid type", and had been institutionalized on more than one occasion. One episode resulted in his commitment to Brooklyn State Hospital, where he stayed for over two weeks and was released on November 16, 1976 with prescriptions for several medications, including thorazine. About a month after his discharge, the supply was exhausted and plaintiff stopped taking the medication.

Plaintiff's mother testified that in the two months preceding his arrest, plaintiff had again become "very loud and aggressive", acting "crazy" and "hard to handle". On the night he was arrested, the police confined him to a holding pen in Kings County Criminal Court pending arraignment and telephoned his mother to notify her of her son's arrest. Calling her attention to the noise in the background, they asked: "Is he always this noisy and crazy? Does he have any mental problems?". She responded: "Yes, he has been in Kings County Psychiatric Hospital".

For reasons not apparent from the record, defendant was not arraigned the next day, but was moved to the basement pens of the courthouse and held for a second night. The following morning, when Correction Officer Moore came on duty, plaintiff had been segregated from the other inmates and placed in a separation pen--a 10-foot square, 15-foot high cell, with bars on three sides and a steel wall comprising the fourth side, containing a toilet bowl, a sink, a steel bench and a ceiling light--because he had been "rejected by the other prisoners" in the main holding pen. The record reveals that plaintiff was loud, acting irrationally, hallucinating and continuously yelling out "I am God", "Jesus Christ Superstar", and that he would like to fly. Correction Officer Moore was advised by the officer he relieved "that is the psycho * * * [t]his guy is a nut, watch out for him". Plaintiff's shoelaces and belt had been taken away from him when he was moved to the separation pen, because, as Moore testified, "when we think that the individual is a psycho, as we call [it] in our terms, we take the shoelaces and belts from him * * * because it's a possible suicide". Testimony established that it is not the usual practice to confine prisoners to a separation pen.

Correction Officer Moore was assigned, as was the custom, to a station where he could monitor the three holding pens in the area simultaneously--including plaintiff's separation pen. Officer Moore testified that when he came on duty, plaintiff was making loud noises, pacing about, repeatedly flushing the toilet and pushing the button on the sink and hallucinating--as he had been doing earlier--about being "Jesus Christ Superstar" and how he would like to fly. Officer Moore testified that plaintiff was irrational, "just wasn't coherent", and that he considered him a "psycho". Some 15 minutes later, plaintiff started climbing the bars of his cell, ignoring orders from Correction Officer Moore to get down. Moore began climbing the bars after plaintiff and called for assistance shouting "I got a possible hang up" (suicide attempt). Before assistance could arrive, plaintiff either fell or dove head first in the direction of the toilet bowl and hit his head. Moore testified that he had seen prisoners climb the bars of the pens numerous times in the past.

Plaintiff's theory at trial was that defendant was negligent in failing to take proper precautions to...