Gordon v. Dickerson
| Decision Date | 29 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2020-CT-00601-SCT |
| Parties | JULIO GORDON v. CHRISTY DICKERSON |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
¶1. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Lee County Circuit Court, which had affirmed the judgment of the Lee County County Court denying Julio Gordon's motion to set aside a default judgment. Gordon v. Dickerson, No 2020-CA-00601-COA, 2021 WL 4166102, *10 (Miss. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2021). We granted Gordon's petition for certiorari to consider the trial courts' interpretation and application of Rule 13(k) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.
¶2. We find that the rule was misinterpreted and misapplied to the exclusion of Rule 15(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and that the county court erred by not setting aside the default judgment against Gordon. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court, we vacate the judgment of default, and we remand this case to the county court for further proceedings on the merits.
¶3. In August 2016 in the Lee County Justice Court, Gordon obtained an eviction order and a money judgment for back rent against his tenant Christy Dickerson. Dickerson appealed to the Lee County County Court in September 2016, providing notice to Gordon under Uniform Civil Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 5.04.
¶4. In May 2018, the county clerk sent Dickerson a notice of intent to dismiss the case as stale. In response, Dickerson filed an "Appellant's Counterclaims"[1] in June 2018, with a certificate of service indicating that a copy of the counterclaims had been sent to Gordon's mailing address. Gordon filed no response, and Dickerson applied for and received an entry of default in January 2019. Dickerson then filed a motion for default judgment and a determination of compensatory and punitive damages. The county court held a hearing on the motion. Both parties appeared at the hearing; Dickerson was represented by counsel, and Gordon appeared pro se.
¶5. The county court found that Gordon had been served properly with the counterclaims in accordance with Rule 5 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, that Rule 4 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure was inapplicable, and that Gordon had forfeited his right to challenge liability by failing to answer the counterclaims. The county court held a trial to determine if punitive damages should be awarded, after which the county court awarded Dickerson $10,800 in compensatory damages and $39,200 in punitive damages.
¶6. Gordon, through counsel, timely filed a motion to set aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, or, alternatively, for a new trial, along with a requested stay of judgment pending the post-trial motions. The county court granted the stay until a hearing could be held on the motions.
¶7. Gordon argued at the hearing that he was not required to file a written response to Dickerson's counterclaims pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-51-91 (Rev. 2019), which provides in part: "On appeal from a justice of the peace court to the circuit court the case shall be tried anew, in a summary way, without pleadings in writing ...." Gordon argued that he appeared on the date scheduled for a hearing and was prepared to try the case on the merits that day. Gordon also argued that Dickerson did not comply with Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 13(k)'s requirement that counterclaims be filed within thirty days after the perfection of her appeal from justice court.[2] And she had not been granted leave of the court to file her counterclaims as required by Rule 15.
¶8. Following the hearing, the county court denied Gordon's motions; it lifted the stay and entered its judgment. In its order, the county court said that the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure govern appeals taken from justice courts to county courts, and to the extent the rules conflict with certain procedural statutes, it is well established that the rules supersede the statutes. The court said that while Rule 13(k) states that counterclaims should be filed within thirty days of the notice of appeal from justice court, the rule also provides that the court may exercise its discretion to allow filing of counterclaims after the thirty days.
¶9. Gordon appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the county court's default judgment and damages awards. The circuit court rejected Gordon's argument that Dickerson had to file her counterclaims within thirty days of perfecting her appeal from justice court or seek leave of the court to file them out of time. The circuit court said that Gordon had read into the rule a provision that does not exist and that the rule instead provides that counterclaims may be filed "within such further time as the court may allow." The circuit court compared subdivision (k) with subdivision (f) of the rule which reads: "When a pleader fails to set up a counter-claim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counter-claim by amendment on such terms as the court deems just." M.R.C.P. 13(f). The circuit court reasoned that if this Court had intended to require leave of court to pursue counterclaims in appeals from justice court outside Rule 13(k)'s thirty-day window, "it would have so provided, as it did for non-justice court appeals in Rule 13(f)."
¶10. In a plurality opinion with two dissenting opinions, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Gordon, 2021 WL 4166102, at *10. The plurality held that the county court had discretion to allow the counterclaims under Rule 13(k). Id. at *3-4. According to the plurality, while Dickerson filed her counterclaims more than thirty days after perfecting her appeal from justice court, as provided by Rule 13(k), the county court nonetheless had discretion to allow the counterclaims under the rule, which also provides, "or within such further time as the court may allow[.]" Id. at *4 (emphasis omitted) (quoting M.R.C.P. 13(k)).
¶11. The plurality held that Dickerson was not required to seek leave of the court under Rule 15(a), which requires leave of the court or written consent of the adverse party when a party seeks to amend a pleading more than thirty days after it was served. Id. at *5 (citing M.R.C.P. 15). The plurality found Rule 15 inapplicable because Rule 13(k) governed this case, and it contains no such requirement. Id. Lastly, the plurality found that the county court did not abuse its discretion by finding Gordon in default for failure to answer the counterclaims and that it did not err by awarding punitive damages. Id. at *5-9.
¶12. Id. at *11 (Barnes, C.J., dissenting). She wrote however, that the county court erred by denying Gordon's motion to set aside the default judgment because Gordon was not required to file any responsive pleading(s) as would normally be required under Rule 12(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
¶13. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Emfinger submitted that because Dickerson did not file her counterclaims within a thirty-day period, Rule 13(k) requires leave of the court before the filing of an amended pleading containing counterclaims. Id. at *15-16 (Emfinger, J., dissenting). Judge Emfinger compared this to Rule 15(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
A party may amend a pleading as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or, if a pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within thirty days after it is served .... Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or upon written consent of the adverse party.
Id. at *15 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting M.R.C.P. 15(a)). "In every other case where the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable, an answer may be amended to assert counterclaims, without leave of the court, within thirty days after service of the answer." Id. But "any amendment after the thirty-day period requires leave of court." Id.
¶14. Judge Emfinger wrote that Rule 13(k) was added "to address the problem of moving from a court that is not subject to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure to a court that is subject to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure ...." Id. As Rule 13(a) provides "[c]ompulsory counterclaims must be set out in the answer, or the counterclaims may be barred by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel." Id. (citing M.R.C.P. 13(a)). Judge Emfinger continued, since "justice court is not subject to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and does not require the filing of an answer or other written pleading, Rule 13(k) provides a process for compulsory counterclaims to be raised in the appeal de novo and thereby avoids the procedural bar contained in Rule 13(a)." Id. Under Rule 13(k), "the defendant in justice court who was not required to file an answer and/or raise compulsory counterclaims is given thirty days after the appeal is perfected to file an amended answer and assert the compulsory counterclaims therein, without first obtaining leave of court." Id. Thereafter, according to Judge Emfinger, "interp...
To continue reading
Request your trial