Gordon v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 21 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | C.A. NO. 13-cv-30146-MAP |
| Parties | CLAYTON RICHARD GORDON; GUSTAVO RIBEIRO FERREIRA; VALBOURN SAHIDD LAWES; NHAN PHUNG VU; and CESAR CHAVARRIA RESTREPO on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs/Petitioners, v. JEH CHARLES JOHNSON, Secretary of Homeland Security; ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General; JOHN SANDWEG, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; SEAN GALLAGHER, Acting Field Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; CHRISTOPHER DONELAN Sheriff of Franklin County; MICHAEL G. BELLOTTI, Sheriff of Norfolk County; STEVEN W. TOMPKINS, Sheriff of Suffolk County; THOMAS M. HODGSON, Sheriff of Bristol County; and JOSEPH D. MCDONALD, JR., Sheriff of Plymouth County. Defendants/Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Plaintiffs represent a class of aliens who, subsequent to their release from criminal custody, were detained by Immigrations & Customs Enforcement ("ICE") under the mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That statute permits ICE to detain an alien "when [he or she] is released" from the predicate criminal custody -- a phrase this court has interpreted as limiting the class of individuals subject to mandatory detention to those taken into ICE custody promptly. Three issues warrant analysis before this case reaches its terminus.
First, on March 27, 2014, the court granted Plaintiffs' motions for class certification. Gordon v. Johnson -- F.R.D. --, 2014 WL 1274059 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2014). Though it briefly presented the reasons for its decision, the court informed the parties that a more detailed memorandum would be forthcoming.
Second, Plaintiffs have filed two identical motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 83 & 107.) Because this case presents a single question of law -- one already settled --no genuine dispute of fact exists. Accordingly, the court will allow Plaintiffs' motions and direct the clerk to enter judgment as a matter of law in their favor.
Finally, since summary judgment is appropriate, the question of the proper relief must be addressed. This analysis presents three related issues: (1) whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) bars class-wide injunctive relief; (2) if not, whether a permanent injunction is warranted; and (3), if so, what the substance of the injunctive order should be. As an injunction here would not enjoin the operation of the law but merely require Defendants to comply with it, and because Plaintiffs have established a need for equitable relief, the court will grant Plaintiffs equitable relief in the form set forth in the conclusion of this memorandum.
The court has previously provided a detailed discussion of the underlying facts and statutory framework in this case. Gordon v. Johnson, -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2013 WL 6905352 (D. Mass. Dec. 31, 2013). A brief summary is as follows.
Plaintiffs represent a class of aliens detained inMassachusetts as of March 27, 2014, who were (or will be) released from criminal confinement and, after a period of time, detained by ICE pursuant to § 1226(c). That statute requires ICE to detain specified individuals -- essentially those convicted of enumerated, relatively serious, predicate crimes -- "when the alien is released." § 1226(c)(1). Unlike a companion provision, § 1226(a)(the portion of the law that provides discretionary authority to detain aliens pending removal generally), § 1226(c) appears to bar the detained individual from petitioning for conditional release ever.1
The named Plaintiffs' cases are representative of the class. Plaintiff Richard Gordon was released from very brief criminal custody in Connecticut and was only takeninto immigration custody some five years later. Plaintiff Gustavo Ribeiro Ferreira was detained by immigration authorities three years after his release from criminal custody. Plaintiff Valbourn Sahidd Lawes was detained eight months after release, and Plaintiff Nhan Phung Vu was detained ten years after release. Plaintiff Cesar Chavarria Restrepo, the current class representative, was detained by immigration authorities nearly six years after his release from criminal custody. All of the named Plaintiffs lived openly -- that is, without any attempt at concealment -- and pursued entirely law-abiding lives following their release from criminal custody. Nevertheless, each was detained under § 1226(c). Under Defendants' construction of this statute, each Plaintiff was facing indefinite detention without any opportunity ever to seek release under bail conditions.
Plaintiff Gordon filed a petition for habeas corpus on August 8, 2013. (Dkt. No. 1.) At that time, he also filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, (Dkt. No. 2), and a Motion for Class Certification, (Dkt. No. 16). In response,Defendants moved to dismiss the case. (Dkt. No. 13.)
On September 11, 2013, the court stayed the class issue pending a resolution of Plaintiff's individual petition. (Dkt. No. 25.) After hearing argument on October 17, 2013, the court, on October 23, 2013, granted Plaintiff's habeas petition, denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and denied without prejudice Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Gordon v. Napolitano, No. 13-cv-30146, 2013 WL 5774843 (D. Mass. Oct. 23, 2013).2 The court issued a memorandum detailing the reasons for its order. Gordon v. Johnson, -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2013 WL 6905352 (D. Mass. Dec. 31, 2013). As a result of the court's ruling, Plaintiff Gordon was provided a bond hearing on November 6, 2013, and subsequently released on bail. (Dkt. No. 59 at p. 5.)
On November 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to add three additional Plaintiffs, (Dkt. No. 55), which the court allowed on December 19, 2013, (Dkt. No. 69). Defendants were then ordered to provide each of the new individuals -- Plaintiffs Ferreira, Lawes, and Vu --with individual hearings by March 28, 2014. (Dkt. No. 88.) Defendants timely complied.3 Plaintiffs Ferreira and Vu have now been released on bail conditions, and bond was also set for Plaintiff Lawes, who remains in custody.
After addressing the individual claims, the court heard an initial argument on the class certification question on December 19, 2013. Though it indicated that class treatment was likely appropriate, it concluded that the parties' position on summary judgment would aid in the resolution of the class question. Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Summary Judgment on January 24, 2014. (Dkt. No. 83.)
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs filed their second motion to amend the complaint seeking to add Plaintiff Cesar Chavarria Restrepo as a named Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 93.) Recognizing that the amendment might be necessary to avoid mootness, the court allowed that motion on March 18, 2014. (Dkt. No. 97.) On that date, the court also heard argument on the class issue and on Plaintiffs' Motion for SummaryJudgment. It then took both matters under advisement.
On March 21, 2014, the parties provided a joint submission respecting the trajectory of the case. (Dkt. No. 100.) The parties agreed that if the court provided Plaintiff Chavarria relief simultaneously with its class decision, he would remain a suitable representative of the class. (Id.) This agreement suited the convenience of all parties, by avoiding the necessity of having continually to amend the complaint and file responsive pleadings as newly added parties obtained their remedies, to avoid mootness. Each party also indicated it would (and then did) re-file their dispositive motions as applied to the entire class. (Dkt. Nos. 105 & 107.)
On March 27, 2014, the court allowed Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Certification, granted Plaintiff Chavarria's individual habeas petition, and denied Defendants' re-filed Motion to Dismiss. Gordon v. Johnson, -- F.R.D. --, 2014 WL 1274059 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2014). Plaintiff Chavarria's bond hearing occurred that same date, and he was subsequently released from custody.
As noted above, only three remaining issues requireanalysis. First, the court will detail the basis for its class certification ruling. (Dkt. No. 114.) The discussion will then turn to Plaintiffs' two identical motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 83 & 107.) The final segment of this memorandum will look at the question of the proper remedial order.
Gordon, 2014 WL 1274059 at *2. Class treatment is appropriate because Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) includes four, well-known elements: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. The burden is on the plaintiff to establish that each issatisfied, In re Eaton Vance Corp. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 38, 43 (D. Mass. 2003), and the court must ensure that each factor is met. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, -- U.S. --, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
The first Rule 23(a) requirement is that class be "so numerous that joinder of all its members is impracticable." Rule 23(a)(1). Though no specific, numerical threshold exists, a class of forty or more is generally sufficient in the First Circuit. See George v. Nat'l Water Main Cleaning Co., 286 F.R.D. 168, 173 (D. Mass. 2012). That threshold, however, is relaxed when a party seeks only declaratory or injunctive relief. McGuin v. Sec'y of Health & Human...
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