Gore v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY

• Decision Date: 19 December 2003
• Citation: 883 So.2d 1225
• Parties: Ray GORE v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

883 So.2d 1225

Ray GORE
v.
ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY et al

1020722.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

December 19, 2003.

883 So.2d 1226

Russell J. Watson of Ball, Koons & Watson, Bay Minette, for appellant

Jack M. Curtis, Department of Public Safety, for appellees.

SEE, Justice.

Ray Gore, the plaintiff in an action against the Alabama Department of Public Safety and one of its employees, Sgt. Charles J. Alexander (hereinafter collectively the "Department"), appeals from the judgment of the Baldwin Circuit Court dismissing his claims in part and the subsequent summary judgment in favor of the Department disposing of the remaining claims. We affirm in part; reverse in part; and remand.

On November 2, 2001, Gore was stopped by an Alabama State Trooper for speeding on I-65 near Bay Minette. During that traffic stop, the trooper discovered approximately $115,000 in United States currency in Gore's possession. Suspecting that the currency may have been the product of criminal activity, the trooper confiscated it, along with Gore's cellular telephone and various personal documents.¹ Gore was neither arrested nor taken into custody as a result of the traffic stop. The cash was subsequently transferred to the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), which instituted forfeiture proceedings.

Gore has not been charged with any crime, offense, or violation, other than a warning citation he received for speeding. He has since sought the return of the currency and personal items from the Department; however, the Department has refused to return them, stating that an investigation is ongoing and that the return of potential evidence could jeopardize that investigation. On March 21, 2002, Gore sued the Department in the Baldwin Circuit Court alleging conversion and seeking a judgment declaring that the seizure of the money and personal items was wrongful.

The Department moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Gore failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter. On May 21, 2002, the trial court granted the motion as to the currency, which was in the possession of the DEA, but denied the motion as to the personal property, over which the Department maintained control. On October 1, 2002, the Department moved for a summary judgment on Gore's remaining claims relating to the cellular telephone and the personal documents. The trial court granted that motion on December 12, 2002. Gore filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment, which the trial court denied, and on January 31, 2003, he timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

I.

Gore raises two arguments on appeal. He first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim against the Department regarding the $115,000 in currency that was seized. Second, he argues that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for the Department on his claim regarding the seizure of his cellular telephone and personal documents. Because the trial court considered materials outside the pleadings in ruling on the Department's motion to dismiss, the standard of review for both claims is the same: that

883 So.2d 1227

standard applicable to reviewing a summary judgment. Fraley v. Brown, 460 So.2d 1267, 1268 (Ala.1984). We have previously explained that standard as follows

"The standard of review applicable to a summary judgment is the same as the standard for granting the motion, that is, we must determine whether there was a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether the movant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So.2d 756, 758 (Ala.1986); Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So.2d 1381 (Ala.1986). See also Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412 (Ala.1990)."

Brewer v. Woodall, 608 So.2d 370, 372 (Ala.1992).

II.

Gore's first claim is that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims regarding the $115,000 in seized currency, because, he argues, regardless of whether the trial court had in rem jurisdiction over the currency, it had personal jurisdiction over all the parties and subject-matter jurisdiction to decide if the conduct was wrongful. The Department argues that the trial court's judgment was proper (1) because, it argues, the Department is immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and (2) because the $115,000 was in the possession of the DEA and the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to address the status of the $115,000.

The Department argues that Gore's action is barred by the principle of sovereign immunity, as expressed in § 14, Ala. Const.1901, which provides that "the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity."² As this Court has noted, "[t]he wall of immunity erected by § 14 is nearly impregnable." Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142 (Ala.2002). However, there is an exception for actions brought to compel State officials to perform ministerial acts. Id. (citing Curry v. Woodstock Slag Corp., 242 Ala. 379, 6 So.2d 479 (1942)). If the Department did not have the authority to retain Gore's property, then the return of that property could be compelled as a ministerial act. See Lightfoot v. Floyd, 667 So.2d 56, 65 (Ala.1995). However, this exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity is of no help to Gore's claim because he is not seeking the return of his currency; instead, he is seeking a judgment declaring that the seizure of the currency was wrongful and he is seeking $115,000 in damages for the conversion. The doctrine of...