Gore v. Bethlehem Area School Dist.

• Decision Date: 11 February 1988
• Citation: 113 Pa.Cmwlth. 394,537 A.2d 913
• Parties: , 45 Ed. Law Rep. 182 Ruth GORE, as Parent and Natural Guardian of James Smith, a Minor, and Ruth Gore, Individually, Appellants, v. BETHLEHEM AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 913

537 A.2d 913

113 Pa.Cmwlth. 394, 45 Ed. Law Rep. 182

Ruth GORE, as Parent and Natural Guardian of James Smith, a Minor, and Ruth Gore, Individually, Appellants, v. BETHLEHEM AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 14, 1987.

Decided Feb. 11, 1988.

David S. Smith, Law Offices of George A. Hahalis, Edward J. McKarski, Bethlehem, for appellants.

Matthew Sorrentino, Frank G. Procyk, Bethlehem, for appellee.

Before MacPHAIL and PALLADINO, JJ., and NARICK, Senior Judge.

NARICK, Senior Judge.

Appellants, Ruth Gore as parent and natural guardian of James Smith, a minor, and Ruth Gore, individually, appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, 43 Pa.D. & C.3d 197, which granted summary judgment in favor of the Bethlehem Area School District (BASD) and dismissed Appellants' cause of action in trespass against BASD on the grounds of governmental immunity as provided in 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

The facts surrounding the civil action commenced by Appellants against BASD involves an attempt by Appellants to recover compensatory damages as a result of injuries and losses sustained by the minor Appellant, James Smith, on October 30, 1984 at the Marvine Elementary School, located in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. On October 30, 1984, James Smith was engaged in recreational activities in the gymnasium area of the school, and, while attempting to hang on a chin-up bar located in the arch of a doorway leading to a storage room, sustained seriously bodily injuries to the face and mouth when the chin-up bar became dislodged from its position and fell striking James Smith. This storage room was located outside the gymnasium area and was used to store athletic equipment.

On appeal, Appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the placement of the chin-up bar did not fall within the exception to governmental immunity under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(3) because Appellants were denied an opportunity to establish that the intent on the part of BASD was for the chin-up bar to become a permanent fixture. BASD counters that the chin-up bar was a chattel item which was movable property and not a fixture or real property permanently placed on the school premises.

It is provided in Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035 that a trial court may grant a summary judgment only in those situations where "the pleadings, depositions, answers, interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law". In determining whether to grant a summary judgment, a trial court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. McCloskey v. Abington School District, 101 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 110, 515 A.2d 642 (1986).

Immunity will be denied a local agency such as a school district only when there is negligence which makes government-owned property unsafe for the activities for which it is regularly used, for which it is intended to be used, or for which it may be reasonably foreseen to be used. Vann v. Board of Education, School District of Philadelphia, 76 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 604, 464 A.2d 684 (1983). Further, immunity will lie when injury occurs due to faulty supervision and inadequate instruction. McCloskey. However, Appellants herein do not allege that the injuries sustained by the minor Appellant, James Smith, were the result of faulty supervision or inadequate instruction. Rather, Appellants argue that 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(3) imposes liability on BASD because the chin-up bar was affixed to school property so as to become an integral part of the structural foundation of the school building. Section 8542(b)(3) relevantly provides as follows:

(b) Acts which may impose liability.--The following acts by a local agency or any of its employees may result in the imposition of liability on a local agency: ....

(3) Real property.--The care, custody or control of real property in the possession of the local agency, except that the local agency shall not be liable for damages on account of any injury sustained by a person intentionally trespassing on real property in the possession of the local agency....

Thus, we must determine whether the chin-up bar can be considered a fixture that has become part and parcel of the realty and therefore could render BASD liable for negligence in the care, custody or control of real property which is in its possession.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has designated three classes which chattels connected with realty may fall into:

First, those which are manifestly furniture, as distinguished from improvements, and not peculiarly fitted to the property with which they are used; these always remain personalty. (Citations omitted.) Second, those which are so annexed to the property, that they cannot be removed without material injury to the real estate or to themselves; these are realty, ... (Citations omitted.) Third, those which, although physically connected with the real estate are so affixed as to be removable without destroying or materially injuring the chattels themselves, or the property to which they are annexed; these become part of the realty or remain personalty depending upon the intention of the parties at the time of annexation; in this class fall such chattels as boilers and machinery affixed for the use of an owner or tenant but readily removable. (Citations omitted.)

Clayton v. Lienhard, 312 Pa. 433, 436-37, 167 A. 321, 322 (1933). Therefore, a determination of whether or not a chattel or article of property has become realty involves factual considerations--how was the chattel annexed to the property; and at the time of annexation what was the intent of the parties. Beardell v. Western Wayne School District, 91 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 348, 354, 496 A.2d 1373, 1376 (1985).

A fixture is an article in the nature of personal property which has been so annexed to the realty that it is regarded as part and parcel of the land. Black's Law Dictionary 574 (5th Ed.1979). The considerations to be made in determining whether or not a chattel becomes a fixture include (1) the manner in which it is physically attached or installed, (2) the extent to which it is essential to the permanent use of the building or other improvement, and (3) the intention of the parties who attached or installed it, McCloskey, 101 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 112, 515 A.2d at 644 citing Clothier, The Law of Fixtures in Pennsylvania, 32 Pa.B.Q. 66, 66-67 (1960-61). ¹

In the case at hand, the undisputed evidence of record establishes that (1) the chin-up bar was located in a doorway to a storage room (the storage room was not part of the gymnasium area) for a period of six or seven years and (2) the chin-up bar operated much like a curtain rod; at each end of the bar was a rubber suction cup which would allow the end of the chin-up bar to adhere to the wall or inside portion of the doorway; an internal screw mechanism operated so as to lengthen or shorten the bar as required; the chin-up bar was easily removable and would not cause material damage upon removal. Additionally, it is clear that the chin-up bar was not essential to the permanent use of the building.

We believe the case herein is similar to the situation which existed in Brown v. Quaker Valley School District, 86 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 496, 486 A.2d 526 (1984). In Brown, a student suffered injuries to her right knee...