Gorman v. City of Phoenix, CV

• Decision Date: 09 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. CV,CV
• Citation: 731 P.2d 74,152 Ariz. 179
• Parties: Dorothy GORMAN; Walter Leffler, and Helen Leffler, his wife, Plaintiffs- Appellants, v. CITY OF PHOENIX, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellee. 86 0102-PR.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 74

731 P.2d 74

152 Ariz. 179

Dorothy GORMAN; Walter Leffler, and Helen Leffler, his wife, Plaintiffs- Appellants, v. CITY OF PHOENIX, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. CV 86 0102-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

Jan. 9, 1987.

Randall R. Douglas, P.C. by Randall R. Douglas, Mark Stachon, Phoenix, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Jones, Skelton & Hochuli by William R. Jones, Jr., Michael W. Foster, Georgia A. Staton, Phoenix, for defendant-appellee.

FELDMAN, Vice Chief Justice.

Plaintiff Dorothy Gorman's (Gorman) suit against the City of Phoenix (Phoenix) was dismissed for failure to comply with Uniform Rule V(e), Ariz.Unif.R.P.Super.Ct., 17A A.R.S. ¹ The trial court denied Gorman's motion to set aside the dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(c)(6), Ariz.R.Civ.P., 16 A.R.S. ² The court of appeals affirmed the trial court under both Rule 60(c)(1) and (c)(6). Gorman v. City of Phoenix, No. 1 CA-CIV 8237 (Ariz.Ct.App. Jan. 16, 1986) (memorandum decision). Both courts based their decisions on our recent opinion in Bickerstaff v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 141 Ariz. 629, 688 P.2d 637 (1984). We granted review to clarify Bickerstaff and to examine the propriety of relief under Rule 60 for failure to comply fully with the "fast track" provisions of Uniform Rule V. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3) and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

FACTS

Gorman owned two houses next door to each other on West Lynwood Drive in Phoenix. Gorman lived in one home and rented the other to her brother, Walter Leffler. In spring 1980, a Phoenix water line behind Gorman's property broke. Water from the line flowed onto Gorman's properties for three days, destroying both homes. On September 30, 1982, Gorman sued Phoenix for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On September 7, 1983, after Phoenix had filed an answer and interrogatories, the trial court placed Gorman's case on the inactive calendar pursuant to Uniform Rule V(e). ³ According to the judge's minute entry, the case was to be dismissed on November 7, 1983, unless Gorman filed a motion to set and certificate of readiness before that date. On September 19, Gorman filed a motion to amend her complaint and a proposed amended complaint; she sent interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production to Phoenix on October 7.

The case was not dismissed on November 7, although Gorman had not complied with Uniform Rule V(e). Instead, both parties continued discovery. Gorman and her brother were deposed on November 9, and Phoenix partially answered Gorman's interrogatories and requests for admissions on November 22. Phoenix was unable to answer many of the interrogatories and requests for admissions because it had not finished searching its records. Phoenix told Gorman that it would supplement its answers at a later date. On December 5, Gorman sent Phoenix a settlement letter.

In early December 1983, Gorman's attorney contacted the Superior Court Administrator's office to inquire about the status of the case. He was told the case was "open" because the file was checked out to the judge. He also was told that the case would not be dismissed during the next week, and that a motion to continue on the inactive calendar would not be necessary.

On December 8, 1983, Gorman filed a list of witnesses and exhibits and supplemented her previous answers to Phoenix's interrogatories. Phoenix filed its list of witnesses and exhibits, as required by Uniform Rule V(a), on December 29, 1983. Gorman then filed a motion to set and certificate of readiness on January 5, 1984. See Uniform Rule V(b). Phoenix filed a controverting certificate on January 16, contending that discovery was incomplete, that the parties had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to complete discovery, and that several motions pertaining to Gorman's motion to amend her complaint were still pending before the court. See Uniform Rule V(c).

The trial court agreed with Phoenix's contentions and struck Gorman's motion to set. The court ordered the case continued on the inactive calendar until May 18, 1984. If Gorman had not filed an amended motion to set before May 18, the case was to be dismissed.

Discovery continued from January through November 1984. The parties supplemented their interrogatory answers, Gorman filed a motion to compel, and Phoenix filed a motion for summary judgment. In addition, the court eventually granted Gorman's earlier motion to amend her complaint. The May 18, 1984 dismissal deadline passed virtually unnoticed; Gorman's counsel filed neither an amended motion to set nor a motion to continue on the inactive calendar.

The court heard oral arguments on Gorman's motion to compel and Phoenix's motion for summary judgment on July 26, 1984. On September 17, the court ordered Phoenix to produce certain documents and denied Phoenix's summary judgment motion. Gorman filed a request for clarification of the court's order regarding her motion to compel on October 18.

On November 7, 1984, without any additional warning, the court issued the following form minute entry:

x no new Certificate of Readiness having been filed,

x no Judgment having been entered or filed,

x this cause not having been continued further on the inactive calendar, and said time having expired,

IT IS ORDERED dismissing this cause without prejudice.

Because the statute of limitations governing Gorman's claim had expired, the court's dismissal without prejudice was, in reality, a dismissal with prejudice.

On November 27, 1984, after dismissing the case, the court issued a minute entry granting Gorman's request for clarification and directing Phoenix to answer certain interrogatories and to produce certain documents. The court vacated this minute entry on December 4, 1984. Gorman's subsequent motion to set aside the dismissal under Rule 60(c)(6) was denied. The trial court's only explanation for denying Gorman's motion was that "[t]he record does not reflect factors sufficient to satisfy Rule 60(c), A.R.C.P. Bickerstaff v. Denny's Restaurant, , 688 P.2d 637 (1984)." The court of appeals upheld the dismissal, reasoning that Gorman had failed to produce evidence sufficient to warrant relief under either Rule 60(c)(1) or (c)(6).

DISCUSSION

A. Uniform Rule V(e)

Under Uniform Rule V(e), the Clerk of the Superior Court places cases on the inactive calendar after nine months if a motion to set and certificate of readiness has not been filed. Cases remaining on the inactive calendar for two months may ⁴ be dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution, unless "(1) [a] proper Motion to Set and Certificate of Readiness is filed[ ] or (2) [t]he court, on motion for good cause shown, orders the case to be continued on the Inactive Calendar for a specified period of time without dismissal." Uniform Rule V(e).

Gorman's attorney does not contend that he was unaware of Uniform Rule V(e) or that he complied with its requirements. Instead, he argues that the unique circumstances of this case justify relief under Rule 60(c)(1) or (c)(6). We address only the propriety of relief under Rule 60(c)(6). ⁵

B. Rule 60(c)(6)

1. General Principles

Courts are authorized to "relieve a party ... from a final judgment" for any of five specified reasons set out in clauses (1) through (5) of Rule 60(c). ⁶ Under clause (6), courts may set aside a judgment or order for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Thus, to obtain relief under Rule 60(c)(6), Gorman must show "extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice," other than or in addition to those circumstances set out in clauses (1) through (5). Davis v. Davis, 143 Ariz. 54, 57, 691 P.2d 1082, 1085 (1985); accord Bickerstaff, 141 Ariz. at 632, 688 P.2d at 640; Webb v. Erickson, 134 Ariz. 182, 186, 655 P.2d 6, 10 (1982).

We consistently have refused to "set out any specific set of circumstances that ... qualify as 'extraordinary,' 'unique' or 'compelling' " under Rule 60(c)(6). Park v. Strick, 137 Ariz. 100, 105, 669 P.2d 78, 83 (1983); accord Davis, 143 Ariz. at 59, 691 P.2d at 1087. ⁷ We have left this determination to the sound discretion of our trial courts to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. Davis, 143 Ariz. at 59, 691 P.2d at 1087; Bickerstaff, 141 Ariz. at 633, 688 P.2d at 641. Trial court discretion, however, is not unlimited. The trial court may not "misapply law or legal principle[s]," act "arbitrarily or inequitably, nor ... make decisions unsupported by facts or sound legal policy." City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328-29, 697 P.2d 1073, 1078-79 (1985). Thus, when "uncontroverted facts in the record reveal circumstances that we believe warrant relief," Davis, 143 Ariz. at 57, 691 P.2d at 1085, "this court can and will overturn the trial court's discretionary ruling." Geyler, 144 Ariz. at 330, 697 P.2d at 1080. Although we are extremely reluctant to disturb the trial court's factual findings, we will not hesitate to correct legal error. Cf. State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 381, 728 P.2d 248, 251 (1986).

2. Bickerstaff v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc.

In the present case, the trial court found insufficient facts to justify relief under Rule 60(c)(6). The judge did not explain why the facts were insufficient; instead, he cited our opinion in Bickerstaff, which upheld a dismissal for failure to comply with Uniform Rule V(e) against a Rule 60(c)(6) challenge. In Bickerstaff, the plaintiff asserted three grounds for relief under Rule 60(c)(6). First, plaintiff argued that she would suffer extreme hardship if she were forced to pay her own medical bills. Second, plaintiff asserted that because there were ongoing settlement negotiations the case should not have been dismissed for lack of prosecution. Third, plaintiff argued that she was barred from refiling the action because the statute of limitations had run prior to dismissal. 141 Ariz. at 632, 688 P.2d at 640. The trial court...