Gosnell, In re
| Decision Date | 05 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 203556 |
| Citation | 594 N.W.2d 90,234 Mich.App. 326 |
| Parties | In re GOSNELL. Gerald Eugene Gosnell, Leona Gosnell and Kip Reichard, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Twelfth District Court, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Lynn B. D'Orio, Ann Arbor, for the 12th District Court.
Before: WHITBECK, P.J., and MARK J. CAVANAGH and NEFF, JJ.
Defendant 12th District Court appeals as of right an opinion and order entered by the Jackson Circuit Court with regard to plaintiffs Gerald and Leona Gosnell and Kip Reichard's complaint for an order of superintending control. We reverse and remand.
This case arises out of peace bond proceedings originally handled by 12th District Court Judge James M. Justin. In the proceedings involving plaintiffs Gerald and Leona Gosnell, Louise Taylor sought the peace bond for an alleged breach of the peace occurring in September 1995. Apparently, the Gosnells and the Taylors, who lived across the street from each other, had difficulty getting along and each sought peace bonds against the other. On the basis of the problems alleged by the parties, Judge Justin concluded that a peace bond was needed. Mr. Gosnell agreed to sign the peace bond in order to prevent being sent to jail, which Judge Justin had indicated were the general options.
In early May 1996, the matter was again before Judge Justin on an alleged violation of the peace bond by Mr. Gosnell. Mr. Gosnell, proceeding in propria persona, denied the accusation and Judge Justin set the matter for a hearing the following day, during which Mr. Gosnell again proceeded in propria persona. During the hearing, Mr. Gosnell inquired whether he could discuss the case with the local newspaper. Judge Justin responded that such action would be in violation of the peace bond. Judge Justin agreed to continue the matter for several weeks so that two potential witnesses could be subpoenaed. However, at the next hearing in late May 1996, where Mr. Gosnell was represented by counsel, that counsel indicated that he was satisfied that the witnesses had nothing to offer. Counsel further requested Judge Justin to reconsider the necessity for the peace bond, arguing that the peace bond statute had not been complied with by the court. Judge Justin requested counsel to file a written motion regarding the matter, but never ruled with regard to the matter because of the complaint for an order of superintending control filed in the interim.
In the proceedings involving plaintiff Kip Reichard, Cynthia Edwards filed a complaint for a peace bond in May 1996, for an alleged breach of the peace occurring from late April 1996 to the middle of May 1996. Proceedings in the Reichard matter began in September 1996, with all parties proceeding in propria persona. This matter also apparently concerned a dispute between neighbors that arose during the Reichards' divorce proceedings. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Justin determined that Mr. Reichard's conduct required a peace bond in the amount of $100,000. 1
In late September 1996, a hearing was held with regard to a violation of Mr. Reichard's peace bond, which allegedly occurred on the same day he signed the peace bond. Mr. Reichard denied that he had violated the peace bond and the matter was set for hearing in early October 1996. However, Judge Justin never ruled with regard to the matter because plaintiffs filed a complaint for an order of superintending control.
Plaintiffs' complaint for an order of superintending control alleged that Judge Justin exceeded his authority in failing to advise plaintiffs that they had the right to a jury trial or a bench trial, in failing to advise them that they had the right to counsel and that counsel could be appointed if they were indigent, in failing to advise them of the right to call and question witnesses, in failing to advise them of the burden of proof, in failing to comply with the provisions for a violation hearing, in threatening Mr. Gosnell with jail if he refused to sign the peace bond, in acting as both prosecutor and judge, in violating Mr. Gosnell's constitutional rights by prohibiting him from discussing the matter with anyone but the police, and in setting Mr. Reichard's pretrial bond at $100,000. The complaint further alleged that the general policies of Judge Justin regarding peace bonds violated the constitution, statutes, and court rules.
On the day the complaint was filed, the circuit court issued an order to show cause and stayed all peace bond proceedings. The circuit court conducted a hearing regarding the complaint in early November 1996. Plaintiffs' counsel requested that the 12th District Court be ordered to produce all their peace bonds "because who knows what secret files are going on down there." Plaintiffs' counsel argued that none of the 12th District Court judges should be dismissed from the action because they had done nothing to prevent Judge Justin's actions, "let[ting] him run amuck." Plaintiffs' counsel further stated:
The suspension of the constitution of the civil liberties of every person driving through this county or walking through or living in this county goes on in a tiny little room on the second floor of this courthouse, and none of those other judges seem to care one bit about it. So should they be dismissed? No. They should have their feet held to the fire in the cause of justice just like Judge Justin.
Plaintiffs' counsel characterized the 12th District Court as "infested with hypocrisy like an old tree is infested with termites" and argued:
There's only one way to stop that. That's with light, and we need the continuation of your order so that Judge Justin doesn't touch a single piece [sic] bond file. We need a disclosure of every single peace bond file they've had since the last time I took them to the Court of Appeals and they had to behave like judges instead of back-alley deal makers. 2
When the circuit court expressed concern about the constitutionality of the peace bond statute to defendant's counsel, plaintiffs' counsel requested to amend plaintiffs' complaint, subsequently stating that if the court wanted the constitutional issues addressed, he would be glad to amend the complaint and brief the issues. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court entered an order taking superintending control of the case. The circuit court adjourned the matter until December 1996 for further proceedings and ordered the 12th District Court to provide plaintiffs' counsel with complete copies of all 12th District Court peace bond cases filed since September 13, 1991. The circuit court also ordered plaintiffs to file an amended complaint by November 8, 1996, and indicated that the parties should exchange briefs addressing all issues, including the question of the constitutionality of the peace bond statute, 3 by November 19, 1996. 4
The circuit court issued its opinion and order on May 7, 1997, and concluded that the peace bond statute, M.C.L. § 772.1 et seq.; MSA 28.1154 et seq., is unconstitutionally vague. The circuit court further required, in the event that an appellate court determined that the peace bond statute is constitutional, that the 12th District Court prohibit Judge Justin from being assigned to or hearing any peace bond cases.
This Court reviews the issue whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague de novo. Ray Twp. v. B & BS Gun Club, 226 Mich.App. 724, 732, 575 N.W.2d 63 (1997).
This Court reviews a decision to grant or deny an order of superintending control for an abuse of discretion. In re Goehring, 184 Mich.App. 360, 366, 457 N.W.2d 375 (1990).
This Court reviews interpretation of court rules de novo as a question of law. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n v. General Motors Corp., 217 Mich.App. 594, 598, 552 N.W.2d 523 (1996).
As has been said in another context, there is almost universal agreement that the power of the Legislature is not without limits. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803): "[T]hat those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written." And, as the Michigan Supreme Court stated in Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 666, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975): "[T]hat those limits not be exceeded, the courts are entrusted with the responsibility to review and the power to nullify legislative acts which are repugnant to the constitution." Nevertheless we are to use this authority sparingly. "[U]nder established rules of statutory construction, statutes are presumed constitutional, and courts have a duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless unconstitutionality is clearly apparent." Mahaffey v. Attorney General, 222 Mich.App. 325, 344, 564 N.W.2d 104 (1997).
A statute may be unconstitutionally vague if:
(1) it does not provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed; (2) it confers on the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed; and (3) its coverage is overly broad and impinges on First Amendment freedoms. [People v. Morey, 230 Mich.App. 152, 163, 583 N.W.2d 907 (1998).]
Accord, Ray Twp., supra at 732, 575 N.W.2d 63.
Vagueness challenges not involving First Amendment freedoms are analyzed in light of the facts of the particular case. Id. To provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed, the statute " ...
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