Goss v. Board of Education, City of Knoxville, Tenn., Civ. A. No. 3984.

Decision Date08 March 1972
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 3984.
PartiesJosephine GOSS et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, CITY OF KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

Avon N. Williams, Jr., Nashville, Tenn., Carl A. Cowan, Knoxville, Tenn., Jack Greenberg, New York City, for plaintiffs.

S. Frank Fowler, Sam F. Fowler, Jr., W. P. Boone Dougherty, Knoxville, Tenn., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

ROBERT L. TAYLOR, District Judge.

This lawsuit commenced December 11, 1959, over twelve years ago. While a detailed account of its early history is set out at D.C., 270 F.Supp. 903, 904-912 (1967), a brief recitation of that history will place the issues in proper perspective.

Judicial History

On April 8, 1960, the defendant submitted a grade-a-year desegregation plan effective September, 1960. This plan was approved after an extended evidentiary hearing. D.C., 186 F.Supp. 559. That decision was modified by the Court of Appeals to require acceleration of the grade-a-year schedule. However, the Court of Appeals expressly approved the neighborhood pupil assignment system. 6th Cir., 301 F.2d 164, 168-169. The defendant amended the plan on June 25, 1962, and March 14, 1963, to accelerate the schedule.

On May 11, 1964, defendant adopted a plan for complete desegregation effective September, 1964. Each child was to be assigned to the school "designated for the district in which he or she legally resides," and that "districting was to be based on the location and capacity (size) of school buildings and the latest enrollment studies." In order to preserve continuity of education, children whose assignment was altered by the plan were permitted to complete the grade sequence where they were before transferring to a new school. This was called the "grade-requirement" transfer.

On May 8, 1967, plaintiffs filed a motion requesting the defendant to provide an equitable distribution of all racial and socio-economic elements in the population within each school in the system. After a full evidentiary hearing, the Knoxville school system was found to be fully desegregated under the plan in effect since the school year 1963-64. D.C., 270 F.Supp. 903, 918. In that opinion, we expressed the view that:

"... there is no constitutional duty on the part of the school board to bus Negro or white children out of their neighborhoods or to transfer classes for the sole purpose of alleviating racial imbalance which it did not cause, nor is there a duty to select new school sites solely in furtherance of such purpose ..." 270 F.Supp. 903, at 916-917.

Believing our responsibility to be discharged, we struck the case from the docket. This decision was affirmed in all respects except that we were instructed to keep the case on the docket to insure future compliance with Brown I. 6th Cir., 406 F.2d 1183, 1191 (1969).

On November 17, 1969, plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate relief based on Alexander v. Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 90 S.Ct. 29, 24 L.Ed.2d 19 (1969). At the pretrial conference, proof was limited to alleged discriminatory developments since the decision of June 7, 1967. After the evidentiary hearing, we found that the building program was consistent with the neighborhood school system approved in 1967, and that the defendant was operating a unitary system within the meaning of Alexander. D.C., 320 F.Supp. 549, 561-562 (1970).

This decision was on appeal when Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971), and its companion cases were filed. Without reviewing our decision, the Court of Appeals remanded the case on June 22, 1971 "for further proceedings consistent with Swann ... and the other relevant Supreme Court opinions announced on April 20, 1971." (Emphasis added) 6th Cir., 444 F.2d 632, 640.

Immediately thereafter, plaintiffs presented to Mr. Justice Stewart a motion for immediate relief. He denied the motion because we had not had an opportunity since the remand order "to inquire whether respondents have failed to maintain a unitary school system as defined in Swann ... and prior cases." (Emphasis added) His order states that if it is found that defendant has not "maintained a unitary school system, it must `terminate dual school systems at once,'" citing Alexander, supra. (Emphasis added)

On August 16, 1971, a pre-trial conference was held and an order entered defining the issue as whether defendant had maintained a unitary system within the meaning of Swann. Defendant agreed to construct a pupil locator map as suggested by the Court of Appeals. 444 F.2d 632, at 639, n. 1. The evidentiary hearing was set for September 7, 1971.

Difficulties in completing the pupil locator map caused a continuance to October 21, 1971. Plaintiffs' expert witness' inability to complete his preparation caused a continuance to December 1, 1971. Then, after three full days of testimony, plaintiffs moved for the joinder of the Mayor and City Council of Knoxville as co-defendants. The motion was granted and the hearing was recessed to permit service on the proposed new defendants. On December 15, 1971, these parties appeared by attorney, agreed to their joinder, but requested a continuance to study the record already accumulated and otherwise prepare their case. Their request was granted and the hearing resumed January 31, 1972. Completion of the hearing was delayed until February 3, because of the inability of plaintiffs' chief witness to be present before that date.

The history of this case, unlike that in Swann, reveals that the Court has had the full cooperation of the defendant Board of Education in the effort to satisfy the constitutional mandate of Brown I and subsequent Supreme Court cases.

Pupil Locator System

The pupil locator system has the capability of locating the residence of each pupil within 1000 feet of the address on his enrollment card and identifying him by race and grade level. The data used came from the initial enrollment in September, 1971. It contains the normal mistakes made in initial enrollments and does not show 2700 to 2800 pupils who live in Knox County but attend school in the City. Consequently, it is 3000 to 4000 pupils below actual enrollment. The computer print-outs used in making the maps show the number of pupils of each race, at each grade level, living within each 1000 foot square. It also shows totals and percentages for each square.

Two pupil locator maps were created from the information contained in the print-outs. For both maps a grid was superimposed on a map of Knoxville and each square given a number corresponding to one on the print-out. One map shows the total number of white pupils and the total number of black pupils living in each square and attending a City school. The other is a color schematic map that reveals the degree of racial concentration by residence within each square. In addition, three transparent overlays were prepared which show the school zone boundaries at the elementary, junior high and senior high level, as well as the percentage of blacks attending each school.

Topography

Knoxville's central business district is located at the approximate center of the City on the north shore of the Tennessee River. At that point two bridges connect South Knoxville to the business district. Apart from these bridges, South Knoxville is separated from the rest of the City by the river.

The business district is a grid of streets nine city blocks in from the river and six city blocks parallel to it. East of the business district is a basin and hill of largely uninhabited land. This land is undergoing redevelopment as the Mountain View Urban Renewal Project. At the top of the hill is the now isolated Green Elementary School. North of the district is the Southern Railway Depot and to its north is an east-west (actually southwest to northeast) four lane, divided, interstate highway (I-40). At the northwest corner of the business district is a complex rail and highway interchange. A basin containing the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (L & N) freight yards is on the west side of the business district.

The east-west interstate highway cuts the City north of the river into northern and southern sections. West of the business district this highway also carries north-south interstate traffic as I-75. At the northwest corner of the business district these highways separate. I-75 travels northwest paralleling to its east a Southern Railway track. I-40 East travels northeast paralleling another Southern Railway track to its north.

At the southwest corner of the business district the river makes a "U" shaped bend. Most of the land in this bend is owned or utilized by The University of Tennessee. A bridge crosses the river into the County at the western end of this bend. It carries the four-lane divided Alcoa Highway which is an off-shoot of the interstate. The L & N Railroad track parallels Alcoa Highway at this point west of the University. The land bordered by Alcoa Highway and the L & N on the west, the interstate on the north, the business district on the east and the river on the south is known as the Ft. Sanders-UT area.

In addition to the interstates there are six major traffic arteries emanating from the business district to the outlying suburbs. These are: Chapman Highway (S), Kingston Pike (SW), Western Avenue (W), Central Avenue (NW), Broadway (N), and Magnolia Avenue (NE). These streets have substantially greater traffic capacity than the other streets of the City. In order to get from one outlying section to another noncontiguous section, it is usually necessary to travel to the center of the City on one of these streets, or one of the interstates, then back out on another artery. This street pattern creates intense traffic congestion in the inner city and on the main arteries.

Except for the central business district, the Mountain View project, the UT-Ft. Sanders area, and along the main...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Price v. Denison Independent School Dist., s. 81-2264
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • December 8, 1982
    ...1044 (6th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171, 94 S.Ct. 933, 39 L.Ed.2d 120 (1974), which sustained a district court determination (340 F.Supp. 711; E.D.Tenn.1972) that the formerly "de jure" segregated Knoxville, Tennessee schools had become "unitary" despite seven-eights of such school......
  • Higgins v. Board of Ed. of City of Grand Rapids
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • December 6, 1974
    ...Grand Rapids, there are 19 such schools in a system of 66 as well as 10 completely integrated special schools. See Goss v. Board of Education, 340 F.Supp. 711 (E.D.Tenn.1972). It is clear, therefore, that affirmative and voluntary action by the GRSD has effectively eliminated a not insubsta......
  • Wheeler v. Durham City Board of Education
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
    • July 30, 1974
    ...supra at 1259. See also Bradley v. Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, supra 462 F.2d at 1064; Goss v. Board of Education, City of Knoxville, Tenn., 340 F.Supp. 711 (E.D.Tenn.1972). The U. S. Supreme Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 ......
  • Goss v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF KNOXVILLE, TENN., 72-1766
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • July 18, 1973
    ...which has now been in litigation for more than thirteen years, may be found in the District Court's opinion. See Goss v. Board of Education, 340 F.Supp. 711 (E.D. Tenn.1972). When it was last before this Court, the case was remanded "for further proceedings consistent with Swann v. Charlott......
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT