Goss v. Justice of Dist. Court of Holyoke

• Decision Date: 10 January 1939
• Citation: 302 Mass. 148,18 N.E.2d 546
• Parties: GOSS v. JUSTICE OF DISTRICT COURT OF HOLYOKE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

302 Mass. 148

18 N.E.2d 546

GOSS

v.JUSTICE OF DISTRICT COURT OF HOLYOKE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Jan. 10, 1939.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Hampden County.

Petition for writ of certiorari by Joseph Goss against the Justice of the District Court of Holyoke to quash the action of the District Court affirming a decision of the Board of Public Works of the City of Holyoke reducing petitioner's working schedule from 40 to 30 hours per week. On report of a single justice.

Writ to issue.

John P. Dowling, of Holyoke, for petitioner.

P. J. Garvey, of Holyoke, for Justice of District Court of Holyoke.

LUMMUS, Justice.

The petitioner, an employee of the city of Holyoke within the classified civil service, was working forty hours a week as a laborer in the department of public works at an hourly rate of pay. On April 4, 1938, he received from the board of public works a notice that in the interest of economy the board had ordered that ‘the working schedule for the labor division in this department shall not exceed thirty hours per week,’ and that his working hours were reduced accordingly. He requested and received a public hearing in accordance with G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 31, § 43, after which the board adhered to its order. Thereupon the petitioner obtained, under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 31, § 45, a review by a district court, which affirmed the decision of the board. Upon a petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the action of the District Court, a single justice of this court ordered the writ to issue for that purpose, and reported the case.

The judge of the District Court finds that ‘the board admits that it has sufficient funds to employ the petitioner and his fellows [i. e. the senior employees of the same class] in the order of their seniority on a forty-hour per week basis, but as a matter of policy deems it fairer and more equitable to place the entire working force on a thirty-hour basis.’

The order of the board was made in good faith, to solve an economic problem not unusual in these times. The money appropriated for the board was insufficient to pay as before all the laborers of the same class as the petitioner. Civil service laws leave scope for measures of economy taken with due regard to those laws. But those laws cannot be ignored in the pursuit of the commendable end of living within the municipal means. For example, wages may be reduced, but not by the indirect method of failing to appropriate sufficient money to pay civil service employees (Barnard v. Lynn, Mass., 3 N.E.2d 264), nor by a simple vote where the law requires an ordinance. Fortin v. Chicopee, Mass., 17 N.E.2d 441.

The measure of economy adopted in the present case was technically a suspension of the petitioner and all his fellow workmen for one fourth of their working time. In Bois v. Mayor of Fall River, 257 Mass. 471, 472, 473, 154 N.E. 270, it was said, in speaking of the statutory right to notice, hearing and review under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 31, §§ 43, 45, upon the suspension of a civil service employee, ‘The word ‘suspension’ in this context means a temporary withdrawal or cessation from public work as distinguished from permanent severance from the service accomplished by removal. The facts show that there was a failure to give employment for three days each week for a considerable time; but that was none the less a suspension because it was of regular recurrence. The statute is unmistakable in its mandate that there must be notice of such suspension. If it was the policy of the department to establish such regular...