Gosselin v. Collins

• Decision Date: 11 April 1952
• Citation: 87 A.2d 883,147 Me. 432
• Parties: GOSSELIN et al. v. COLLINS (two cases).
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 883

87 A.2d 883

147 Me. 432

GOSSELIN et al. v. COLLINS (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

April 11, 1952.

Harris M. Isaacson, Lewiston, for plaintiffs.

Frederick P. Armstrong and Robinson, Richardson & Laddy, Portland, for defendant.

Before MURCHIE, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, MERRILL, NULTY and WILLIAMSON, JJ.

WILLIAMSON, Justice.

These tort actions are before us after jury verdicts for the plaintiffs on exceptions to the refusal of the presiding justice to direct verdicts for the defendant. The cases arise from an automobile accident in which the plaintiff, Helen Gosselin, was severely injured when she was struck by an automobile operated by the defendant while she was crossing Main Street in Lewiston on a cross walk in front of the Empire Theatre. The plaintiff, Lawrence E. Gosselin, husband of Helen, seeks to recover for medical expenses and other damage resulting from his wife's injuries. The cases were tried together and present identical issues apart from damages which the defendant does not here question. For convenience we will treat the cases as one and speak of Mrs. Grosselin as the plaintiff.

Does the evidence with the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom taken most favorably to the plaintiff, warrant findings by the jury (1) that the defendant was negligent, and (2) that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care?

'The issue is liability. It must be resolved with full recognition of the principle that the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, giving them the benefit of every justifiable inference.' Wiles v. Connor Coal & Wood Co., 143 Me. 250, at page 252, 60 A.2d 786, at page 787.

Is the evidence in support of the plaintiff's position, 'substantial, reasonable, coherent, and consistent with circumstances and probabilities'? McCully v. Bessey, 142 Me. 209, at page 212, 49 A.2d 230, at page 232.

Illustrative statements of the governing principles applied in pedestrian cases are as follows:

'Whether under any particular circumstances, whatever the speed of a motor vehicle colliding with a pedestrian on a crosswalk may be, the operator of it, or the pedestrian, is using due care are questions of fact for jury determination, except in cases where the pedestrian enters the path of the vehicle so abruptly as to give its operator no opportunity to see him and avoid hitting him. Typical exceptions are found in such cases as Milligan v. Weare, 139 Me. 199, 28 A.2d 463, and Wiles v. Connor Coal & Wood Co., 143 Me. , 60 A.2d 786. The general rule was well stated in Shaw v. Bolton, 122 Me. 232, 119 A. 801, 802, as follows: 'what ordinary care and prudence demands, and whether the conduct of the traveler conforms to such demand, are questions of fact to be left to the judgment of the jury.'

'This statement, made with reference to a pedestrian struck by an automobile while he was crossing a street, applies with equal force to the operator of a motor vehicle at a crossing for pedestrians.' Lange v. Goulet, 144 Me. 16, at page 19, 63 A.2d 859, at page 860.

'To paraphrase, (the pedestrian) did his full duty if he waited until it reasonably appeared that a prompt crossing could be safely effected if approaching automobiles were lawfully managed and controlled.

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'A jury might find that the defendant's automobile was down the street such a distance when the deceased left the curb that an ordinarily prudent man would have deemed it safe to attempt the crossing.' Sturtevant v. Ouellette, 126 Me. 558, at page 562, 140 A. 368, at page 370. See also Wetzler v. Gould, 119 Me. 276, 110 A. 686; Ross v. Russell, 142 Me. 101, 48 A.2d 403; Day v. Cunningham, 125 Me. 328, 133 A. 855, 47 A.L.R. 1229; Haskell v. Herbert, 142 Me. 133, 48 A.2d 637; 2 A Blashfield Cyc. of Automobile Law and Practice, 276, 277, Sec. 1411 'Pedestrians--Contributory Negligence'.

Main Street, in the area with which we are concerned near the Empire Theatre, is a main artery of travel running in a general easterly and westerly direction with a slight down-grade to the west. The street has a black surface and is 46 feet in width from curb to curb. White lines marked (1) the cross walk 8 feet in width, (2) the center of the street from each side of the cross walk, dividing the street into east and west-bound traffic lanes, and (3) parking spaces 7 1/2 feet in width on the north or theatre side of the street commencing 18 feet west of the cross walk. In front of the theatre extending to the parking space was a 'no parking' zone. The view to the east from the cross walk is clear and unobstructed for a distance of 250 feet to 300 feet. The weather at the time of the accident was clear and the street was dry and fully and completely lighted.

The plaintiff was struck by the front of defendant's car at the right of the center of the hood, and was thrown or pushed by the collision so that she was pinned or wedged beneath a car parked in the first space. The defendant's car was at all times in the west-bound traffic lane. It is apparent, therefore, that the plaintiff had proceeded several feet beyond the center of the street when she was struck. The defendant did not blow his horn.

There is no dispute in the record upon the facts stated above. Whether the defendant brought his car to a stop 35 feet or 85 feet west of the cross walk, a point upon which there is some doubt, is not, in our view, material for purposes of decision.

The evidence of the plaintiff in substance is as follows:

Mr. and Mrs. Gosselin, together with Mr. and Mrs. Blanchard, were on their way to the first moving picture show of the evening. The plaintiff and Mrs. Blanchard left the car in which they were passengers on the south side of Main...