Gossman v. Gossman, A13–1095.

• Decision Date: 02 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. A13–1095.,A13–1095.
• Citation: 847 N.W.2d 718
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Melissa Lynn GOSSMAN, petitioner, Respondent, v. Jonathan Douglas GOSSMAN, Appellant.

847 N.W.2d 718

In re the MARRIAGE OF Melissa Lynn GOSSMAN, petitioner, Respondent,

v.Jonathan Douglas GOSSMAN, Appellant.

No. A13–1095.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

June 2, 2014.

Syllabus by the Court

If a dissolution judgment and decree includes a valid Karon waiver that divests the district court of jurisdiction to modify spousal maintenance, any subsequent order that purports to modify spousal maintenance is void and unenforceable.

Linda S.S. de Beer, de Beer & Associates, P.A., Lake Elmo, MN, for respondent.

Kevin S. Sandstrom, Mark J. Vierling, Eckberg, Lammers, Briggs, Wolff & Vierling, PLLP, Stillwater, MN, for appellant.

Considered and decided by RODENBERG, Presiding Judge; JOHNSON, Judge; and RANDALL, Judge.

OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge.

Upon the dissolution of their marriage, Jonathan Douglas Gossman and Melissa Lynn Gossman agreed that he would pay her $5,000 per month in spousal maintenance for a period of five years and that the district court would be divested of jurisdiction to modify the maintenance award. Their agreement was incorporated into a final judgment and decree. But the parties subsequently agreed to modify the maintenance award and twice induced the district court to issue orders that purported to modify the maintenance award. Ms. Gossman later moved to vacate the modification orders and to enforce the original maintenance award. The district court granted her motion to vacate the modification orders but denied her motion to enforce the original maintenance award. We conclude that the district court did not err by determining that the modification orders are void and by vacating the modification orders. We conclude, however, that the district court erred by not fully enforcing the original maintenance award. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

Mr. Gossman and Ms. Gossman divorced in 2010 after approximately ten years of marriage. At the time, Mr. Gossman was 33 years old, and Ms. Gossman was 31 years old.

In May 2010, Mr. and Ms. Gossman entered into a marital-termination agreement in which Mr. Gossman agreed to pay Ms. Gossman $5,000 per month in temporary spousal maintenance for five years, from June 2010 until June 2015. Ms. Gossman was represented by an attorney; Mr. Gossman was unrepresented. The marital-termination agreement includes the following provision, which is commonly known as a Karon waiver:

Except as provided above, neither party is awarded spousal maintenance (alimony) from the other either past, present or future, and that the same is hereby forever waived. The Court is divested of jurisdiction to modify the maintenance provisions herein.

In July 2010, the district court accepted the agreement and incorporated it into a final judgment and decree. With respect to the Karon waiver, the district court made the following findings:

The written Agreement fully discloses the financial situation of the parties and adequately describes the consideration, including property settlement and waiver of spousal maintenance. The Agreement is fair and equitable and supported by adequate consideration and is specifically adopted by the Court.

Notwithstanding their agreement to finally resolve the issue of spousal maintenance, the parties subsequently entered into three agreements to modify the maintenance award. First, in December 2010, only five months after the dissolution and decree, the parties agreed to reduce Mr. Gossman's maintenance obligation to $3,400 per month. The parties personally executed a document captioned “Stipulation and Order Amending Judgment and Decree,” which a district court judge signed and filed. The operative language states, “Paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law contained in the Judgment and Decree dated July 23, 2010 is hereby amended to provide that effective November 1, 2010, [Mr. Gossman] shall pay to [Ms. Gossman] the sum of $3,400 per month as and for temporary spousal maintenance for the term set forth in the original paragraph.” The stipulated order appears to have been prepared by a legal professional, though it states that neither party is represented by counsel.

Second, in August 2011, the parties agreed to further reduce Mr. Gossman's monthly spousal-maintenance obligation to $2,400 per month. This agreement was reduced to writing in a stipulated order, but the stipulated order never was submitted to the district court, apparently due to inadvertence.

Third, in December 2011, the parties again agreed to further reduce Mr. Gossman's monthly spousal maintenance obligation to $1,360 per month for the months of December 2011 to June 2012, and to $1,160 per month for the remainder of the five-year term. The parties again personally executed a document captioned “Stipulation and Order Amending Judgment and Decree,” and a district court judge again signed and filed the order. This stipulated order is similar in appearance and format to the first stipulated order.

In July 2012, Ms. Gossman moved to vacate the 2010 and 2011 orders on the ground that they are void because the original judgment and decree contained a valid Karon waiver, which deprived the district court of jurisdiction to modify the original maintenance award. SeeMinn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2(4) (2012). She asked the district court to reinstate the original maintenance award of $5,000 per month and to order Mr. Gossman to pay $59,170 in unpaid maintenance, which reflected the difference between the monthly payments required by the original maintenanceaward and the payments he actually had made.

In October 2012, the district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The district court reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction to enter the two orders modifying spousal maintenance because the original judgment and decree contained a valid Karon waiver. Accordingly, the district court vacated the 2010 and 2011 modification orders on the ground that the orders are “null and void” and reinstated the original maintenance award of $5,000 per month, effective June 26, 2012. But the district court did not order Mr. Gossman to pay $59,170 in unpaid spousal maintenance, for the following reasons:

Both parties had believed in good faith that they had changed the amount of spousal maintenance with the stipulations submitted and signed by the Court. The evidence indicates that the parties relied upon the stipulations. Therefore, the Court finds that an order requiring Respondent to pay the $59,179.00 sought by Petitioner for unpaid spousal maintenance would not be fair or equitable. The amount of spousal maintenance laid out in the Judgment and Decree of $5,000.00 per month shall resume on [June] 26, 2012.

Ms. Gossman later moved to amend the district court's findings with respect to her request for an order requiring Mr. Gossman to pay the arrearages, but the district court denied the motion.

Notwithstanding the district court's October 2012 order, Mr. Gossman continued to pay Ms. Gossman reduced amounts of maintenance, consistent with the terms of the 2011 modification order. In January 2013, Ms. Gossman moved to enforce the October 2012 order by requesting a judgment for the difference between the amounts required by the original maintenance award and the amounts Mr. Gossman actually had paid between June 2012 and January 2013, plus interest. In April 2013, the district court granted this motion.

Mr. Gossman filed a notice of appeal, and Ms. Gossman filed a notice of related appeal. Mr. Gossman challenges the district court's vacatur of the 2010 and 2011 modification orders. Ms. Gossman challenges the district court's denial of her motion to enforce the original maintenance award for the period of time between December 2010 and June 2012.

ISSUES

I. If a district court order purports to modify an award of spousal maintenance, notwithstanding a valid Karon waiver that deprived the district court of jurisdiction to modify the maintenance award, is the district court order void?

II. If a district court order that purports to modify an award of spousal maintenance is void because a valid Karon waiver deprived the district court of jurisdiction to modify the maintenance award, must the district court enforce the original maintenance award?

ANALYSIS

As a general rule, this court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court's ruling concerning spousal maintenance. Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn.1984). But we apply a de novo standard of review to issues of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation, which are questions of law. Grachek v. Grachek, 750 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn.App.2008), review denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2008). In this case, the parties' arguments raise questions of law that are subject to a de novo standard of review. See id.

I.

Mr. Gossman argues that the district court erred by vacating the 2010 and 2011 modification orders.

A.

If a district court awards spousal maintenance in a dissolution proceeding, either party generally has a right to seek a modification of the spousal maintenance award at a later date:

After an order under this chapter or chapter 518 for maintenance or support money, temporary or permanent, ... the court may from time to time, on motion of either of the parties, ... modify the order respecting the amount of maintenance or support money, and the payment of it ... and may make an order respecting these matters which it might have made in the original proceeding, except as herein otherwise provided.

Minn.Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 1 (2012). Notwithstanding the right to seek a modification of a maintenance award, parties to a dissolution proceeding may, at the time of the initial decree, agree to waive or limit their rights to seek a modification of a maintenance award. Butt v. Schmidt, 747 N.W.2d 566, 573 (Minn.2008); Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 744–45 (Minn.1994); Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Minn.1989), superseded in part by statute, 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 248, § 7, at 838 (codified at ...