Goto v. Whelan Sec. of Cal., Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-01114-HSG |
| Parties | MICHAEL ANTHONY GOTO, Plaintiff, v. WHELAN SECURITY OF CALIFORNIA, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Anthony Goto's motion to remand. See Dkt. Nos. 17 ("Mot."), 18 ("Opp."), 19 ("Reply"). After carefully considering the parties' arguments, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion.
On January 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed this proposed class action in San Francisco County Superior Court against Defendant Whelan Security of California Inc. and DOES 1 through 10. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. Plaintiff subsequently filed his first amended class action complaint ("FAC") on February 7, 2020. Id. at 29.
The operative complaint alleges that Plaintiff worked for Defendant in California from approximately April 2012 to October 2019, specifically as a non-exempt supervisor from about 2015 until October 2019. See FAC at ¶ 4. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of "all other similarly situated current and former non-exempt and exempt supervisory and office employees of [Defendant] who worked in California and all individuals who were subjected to a background check by [Defendant]." Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff further seeks to represent the following classes and/or subclasses: (1) overtime wage class; (2) minimum and regular wage class; (3) vacation pay class; (4) rest period class; (5) wage statement class; (6) waiting time class; (7) unreimbursed expenses class; and (8) background check class. Id.
In total, Plaintiff alleges twenty causes of action on behalf of himself and the putative class against Defendant for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") and various California state law claims, including violations of labor laws, the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act ("ICRAA"), and Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"). See id. at ¶¶ 1-2.
Defendant timely filed a notice of removal on February 12, 2020, asserting federal question and supplemental jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 7-9. Defendant identified two bases for federal question jurisdiction. First, Plaintiff's FCRA cause of action arises under federal law. Id. at ¶ 8. Second, a substantial portion of the alleged events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred on a federal enclave. Id.; see also Dkt. No. 3 at 2 ().1 Finally, Defendant asserted that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining alleged events, even those that did not occur in the Presidio. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 26.
A defendant may remove any civil action to federal court where the district court would have original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441; see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). To do so, a party seeking removal must file a notice of removal within 30 days of receiving the initial pleading or within 30 days of receiving "an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), (b)(3). The notice must contain a "short and plain statement of the grounds for removal." Id. § 1446(a); see also Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015).
The removing party bears the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction. Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 683-85; see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (). A plaintiff may seek to remand a case to the state court from which it was removed if the district court lacks jurisdiction or if there was a defect in the removal procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). "[F]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.
Plaintiff argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action because he alleges only a "bare procedural violation" of the FCRA, such that he lacks standing, and he has not alleged that any claims occurred or arose on a federal enclave. See Mot. at 8-15. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the Court should decline to extend supplemental jurisdiction where it lacks original jurisdiction. See id. at 15. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
Plaintiff argues that the Court lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction over the FCRA claim because Plaintiff does not have Article III standing. See Mot. at 12-15. Article III of the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to "cases and controversies." See Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Standing is an essential element for a court to have federal subject matter jurisdiction over a Id. A plaintiff must have: (1) suffered an injury in fact; (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant; and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id. at 560-61. To establish "injury in fact," a plaintiff must show that they suffered an injury or invasion of a legally protected right that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent (not hypothetical or conjectural). Id. at 560. Even for a statutory violation, as alleged here, plaintiff must establish a concrete injury. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). Generally, a plaintiff cannot satisfy the injury in fact requirement with a bare allegation of a procedural violation of the FCRA. See id. at 1549-50.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the FCRA by failing to provide a summary of rights notice, in violation of §§ 1681d(a)(1) and 1681g(c), and by failing to provide a disclosure in a "clear and conspicuous" manner that appears only "in a document that consists solely of the disclosure" as required by § 1681b(b)(2)(A). FAC at ¶¶ 66-80. Plaintiff does not specificallyallege that he was confused, misled, or otherwise harmed by these alleged violations, but instead recites the FCRA requirements and states that Defendant failed to adhere to these requirements. See id. at ¶¶ 67-69, 73, 74. Accordingly, the Court agrees that Plaintiff alleges only procedural violations of §§ 1681d(a)(1) and 1681g(c). See Alvarez v. Transitamerica Services, Inc., Case No. 18-cv-03106-EJD, 2019 WL 4644909, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2019) (); Mansapit v. Deluxe Corp., Case No. 19-cv-00790-HSG, 2019 WL 2423423 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2019) (); Benton v. Clarity Services, Inc., Case No. 16-cv-06583-MMC, 2017 WL 345583, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017) ().2
Similarly, Plaintiff alleges only a procedural violation of § 1681b(b)(2)(A)'s stand-alone disclosure document requirement. See FAC at ¶¶ 68-73. Plaintiff alleges that the disclosure contained extraneous information, including "disclosures and information regarding state laws other than the states where the individuals signed the disclosure and background check authorization forms," as well as the following language: (1) "I understand that nothing herein shall be construed as an offer of employment or contract for services;" (2) "I also certify the information I provided on an [sic] in connection with this form is true, accurate and complete;" (3)"a summary of your right under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, as well as certain state-specific notices, are also being provided to you;" and (4) "I agree that this form in original, faxed, photocopied or electronic (including electronically signed) form, will be valid for any background reports that may be requested by or on behalf of the Company." Id. at ¶ 70.
In Syed v. M-I, LLC, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had standing to bring a § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) claim where the plaintiff alleged that defendant violated the same FCRA requirement by including a liability waiver in the disclosure and authorization form. 853 F.3d 492, 499-500 (9th Cir. 2017). Importantly, the Syed plaintiff alleged the following:
[Plaintiff] discovered Defendant['s] violation(s) within the last two years when he obtained and reviewed his personnel file from Defendant[] and discovered that Defendant[] had procured and/or caused to be procured a 'consumer report' regarding him for employment purposes based on the illegal disclosure and authorization form.
See id. at 499. Due to the plaintiff's allegedly belated discovery, the Syed court inferred he "was confused by the inclusion of the liability waiver with the disclosure and would not have signed it had it contained a sufficiently clear disclosure." Id.
Plaintiff makes no similar allegations in this case. Instead, he parrots the language of the statute and contends that Defendant "obtained consumer reports and investigative consumer reports multiple times after the application process and during the employment of P[laintiff] and other Class members." FAC at ¶ 71. Plaintiff does not allege belated discovery of these reports or plead anything about his state of mind at all, and the Court thus cannot infer that Plaintiff is claiming that he was confused by the inclusion of the "extraneous language." Id. at ¶¶ 70-71. Because Plaintiff has pled no more than a bare procedural violation of the FCRA (which appears to have been an intentional choice), he does...
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