Gottlieb v. Hofheinz
Decision Date | 20 February 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 16419,16419 |
Citation | 523 S.W.2d 7 |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Parties | Dick GOTTLIEB, Appellant, v. Fred HOFHEINZ, Appellee. (1st Dist.) |
David H. Berg, Houston, for appellant.
Frank J. Knapp, Steven C. Oaks, Roger T. Baker, Houston (Butler, Binion, Rice, Cook & Knapp, Houston, of counsel), F. Russell Kendall, Jarrell D. McDaniel, Travis C. Broesche, Houston (Vinson, Elkins, Searls, Connally & Smith, Houston, of counsel), for appellee .
Election contest. In the runoff election for the office of mayor of the City of Houston held on December 4, 1973, Mr. Fred Hofheinz was certified to have received 2,806 more votes than Mr. Dick Gottlieb.
This is an appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the contestee, Mr. Hofheinz. The judgment stated that the contestant's pleadings failed to raise a genuine issue as to any material fact that would entitle the Contestant to any relief under the Texas Election Code.
The first two points of error of the Contestant, Mr. Gottlieb, are that his petition raises genuine issues of material fact 1) under Art. 9.14, Texas Election Code, V.A.T.S., and 2) under Art. 9.15, Texas Election Code; his other two points are that 3) the provisions of Art. 8.08, Subd. 3, of the Texas Election Code are mandatory and 4) summary judgment may not properly be granted in an election contest.
Article 9.14 of the Texas Election Code provides:
'If any vote or votes are found upon the trial of any contested election to be illegal or fraudulent, the trial court shall subtract such vote or votes from the poll of the candidate who received the same, and after a full and fair investigation of the evidence shall decide to which of the contesting parties the office belongs.'
Article 9.15 of the Election Code states:
'If it appears on the trial of any contest provided for in Section 134 (art. 9.06) that it is impossible to ascertain the true result of the election as to the office about which the contest is made, either from the returns of the election or from any evidence within reach or from the returns considered in connection with other evidence, or should it appear from the evidence that such a number of legal voters were, by the officers or managers of the election, denied the privilege of voting as, had they been allowed to vote, would have materially changed the result, the court shall adjudge such election void, and direct the proper officers to order another election to fill said office; which election shall be ordered and held and returns thereof made in all respects as required by the general election laws of the State.'
The Contestee-appellee contends that the Contestant's petition seeks to disqualify numerous votes for failure to comply with provisions of the Texas Election Code which are merely directory, not mandatory; that if these challenges are disregarded only 2289 votes remain under attack and Hofheinz's plurality was 2806, so the 2289 that are challenged can't change the outcome. Further, that an additional 1,206 of the 2289 are votes challenged on legally insufficient grounds, and appellant's pleadings raise no issue as to their validity.
The record reflects that on the ninth day after the filing of the Contestant's original petition, the Contestee filed special exceptions. Contestant filed an amended petition thirteen days later and Contestee again promptly filed special exceptions. They were heard by the trial court within two weeks (Feb. 25), and the Contestant filed his second amended original petition on March 11. Contestee moved for summary judgment on April 25, 1974 and on the next day the Contestant filed his third amended original petition. Contestee again moved for summary judgment on May 23, 1974. It was heard on June 3 and signed on June 11.
No summary judgment proof was offered in support of the motion or in opposition to it.
Situations in which a defendant's motion for summary judgment on the pleadings can be sustained are very limited. Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.1972). In that case the trial court apparently had granted summary judgment on the theory that the plaintiff's factual allegations were inadequate. Our Supreme Court held that since it was not a case in which the facts alleged by a plaintiff established either the absence of a right of action or an insuperable barrier to a right of recovery, a take-nothing summary judgment on the pleadings could not stand. Rules 90 and 91, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were cited. 4 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice (1971 rev.) 152, § 17.26.8.
One of the basic disputes in this case is over several provisions of the Election Code; are they mandatory or merely directory?
We turn to the Contestant's current pleading. He alleged in paragraph CX that 14,984 votes cast in some 24 precincts were illegal because those casting them had failed or refused to sign the signature roster as required by Article 8.08 of Vernon's Texas Election Code. He argues that such requirement is mandatory, and that if the 14,984 votes are declared invalid the outcome of the election would be changed because 9,724 of them were cast for the Contestee and 5,260 were cast for the Contestant. That if these votes were subtracted, the Contestant would have a matority of 1,658 votes.
Article 8.08 of the Election Code contains these provisions for use of a signature roster:
We find no provision in the Texas Constitution requiring voters to sign a signature roster, and we find nothing in the provisions of Art. 8.08 which by express language or by any reasonable implication evidence an intention on the part of the legislature that a qualified voter shall not vote or that his vote shall not be counted if he fails or refuses to sign the signature roster. We conclude that the legislature intended to make the signature roster provisions of Art. 8.08 directory, not mandatory.
Having decided that the provisions in question are not mandatory we still must consider the well-established Texas rule that at the trial stage of election contest proceedings, proof of violations of merely directory provisions of the Election Code may cause the disqualification of votes if it is established that such noncompliance was the result of fraud or serious misconduct and that it changed the result of the election. In deciding our case we apply this rule of law and the cited holding in Swilley v. Hughes, supra, to the allegations in the Contestant's current petition.
Although the thrust of the allegations in paragraph CX is that the signature roster provisions are mandatory, not that the failure or refusal of the 14,984 voters to sign the roster was done fraudulently or was caused to be done fraudulently, there are allegations of fraud in the petition which, liberally construed (as they must be), relate to this paragraph. For example, in the opening portion of this petition the Contestant stated: '. . . this court is requested to set aside the results of that election because of the irregularities and fraud that permeated the conduct of the mayoral race and changed the outcome, for the following reasons: . . .'
We hold that the Contestant's allegations as to the 14,984 votes do not establish the absence of his right of action or an insuperable barrier to his right of recovery, so summary judgment was not properly granted as to those allegations. Swilley v. Hughes, supra. Allegations of fact must be made to support the label of fraud if special exceptions are to be withstood, but we hold that summary judgment will not take the place of exceptions under these circumstances.
We look to other allegations in the Contestant's current pleading.
He alleged in paragraphs, I, III, IV and CVII that the votes cast by 2,493 voters (by our count) should be disqualified because their precinct judges did not acknowledge the affidavit pages they signed stating that their voter registration certificates were missing or lost.
Absent any allegation and proof that these votes were fraudulently induced...
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