Gouge v. McInturff

• Decision Date: 17 February 1936
• Parties: GOUGE et al. v. McINTURFF, Sheriff, et al.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 753

90 S.W.2d 753

GOUGE et al. v. McINTURFF, Sheriff, et al.^*

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

February 17, 1936.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Unicoi County; S. E. Miller, Chancellor.

Bill by J. M. Gouge and others against Carl McInturff, Sheriff, and others. From the decree, complainants appeal.

Reversed.

L. H. Allred, Fred Baughman, Jas. G. Bare, and Fred D. Booth, all of Erwin, and D. A. Vines, of Johnson City, for J. M. Gouge and others.

Guinn & Mitchell, of Johnson City, and H. Dennis Erwin, of Erwin, for Carl McInturff, Sheriff, and others.

COOK, Justice.

The bill was filed by justices of the peace and a member of the county highway commission to test the validity of chapter 410, Private Acts of 1935. It was charged that the act is void because (1) the body contains provisions not germane to the caption, (2) it destroys the system of the justices of the peace in Unicoi county by illegally transferring their jurisdiction to the newly created judge's office, and it deprives justices of the peace of that county of the rights and emoluments of their office without interference with such rights elsewhere in the state.

In support of the second proposition, complainants refer to and rely upon article 1, § 8, and article 11, § 8, of the Constitution. It is sufficient to say that by article 6, § 1, of the Constitution, power is conferred upon the Legislature to ordain and establish inferior courts, and in the exercise of that power the jurisdiction of such courts may be prescribed and defined. The creation of a new court under that provision of the Constitution and transference to the newly created court of jurisdiction formerly exercised by an existing court, whether the court of a justice of the peace or otherwise, is matter of legislative discretion subject only to the constitutional limitation that legislation cannot contravene rules that forbid partial, discriminatory, and capricious laws.

While the office of the justice of the peace is recognized by the Constitution, it does not confer upon that office or the incumbents of the office exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of any litigation, nor does the Constitution vest in the incumbent of the office of justice of the peace a right to litigation fees that inure only as the result of future official service. Fees as compensation for official service did not exist by the common law, and a justice of the peace has no vested rights to fees that may perchance flow to him through some future official service in connection with the exercise of judicial powers which under article 6, § 1, may be transferred to another tribunal.

There is no merit in the contention that the act is void because it deprives justices of the peace of vested rights or of judicial power. We do not pass upon...