Gould v. Bank of Independence
| Decision Date | 26 May 1936 |
| Citation | 264 Ky. 511 |
| Parties | Gould v. Bank of Independence. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
1. Limitation of Actions. — As respects limitations, time loan deposit certificates are governed by same rule applicable to promissory notes.
2. Limitation of Actions. — Note payable on demand is treated as "due note," and statute of limitations begins to run at date of note.
3. Limitation of Actions. — Note in which date of maturity is fixed at specified future time is not due until such date and statute of limitations does not begin to run until after such date.
4. Limitation of Actions. — "Time loan deposit certificate" due and payable on definite date held "promissory note" against which statute of limitations began running on due date thereof, as regards question whether suit by depositor's administratrix to collect proceeds of certificate was barred.
5. Bills and Notes. — When date of maturity is definitely fixed in note and payor fails to discharge his obligation, payee's right of action thereupon accrues and payee need not make further demand before instituting action thereon.
6. Bills and Notes. — Where maturity date of time loan deposit certificate was definitely fixed and bank failed to discharge its obligation on due date thereof, depositor's failure to demand payment after maturity did not preclude suit by depositor's administratrix for proceeds of certificate.
7. Limitation of Actions. — Where time loan deposit certificate was due and payable on March 12, 1910, statute of limitations began to run on due date thereof, and hence suit by depositor's administratrix brought on May 16, 1934, was barred by fifteen-year statute, although depositor was adjudged insane in 1923 since running of statute, having started, continued notwithstanding the subsequent insanity (Ky. Stats., sec. 2514).
Appeal from Kenton Circuit Court.
HANLON & KENKEL for appellant.
JOHN H. KLETTE and JOHN L. VEST for appellee.
Affirming.
On September 12, 1909, Anna Beers, a resident of Covington, Kenton county, Ky., deposited the sum of $2,100 in the bank of Independence of Kenton county, and, as evidence of the deposit, the bank issued to her a certificate in the following form:
It appears that the deposit was made for Mrs. Beers by C.E. Quick, vice president of the bank, who was acting or purporting to act as the agent of Mrs. Beers. At the end of the six-month period, March 12, 1910, C.E. Quick entered an indorsement across the back of the certificate as follows: "Anna Beers by C. E. Quick," and issued to her a new certificate similar to the one above, for the same amount.
In April, 1923, Anna Beers was adjudged insane and sent to Lakeland, Ky., where she remained until her death which occurred in March, 1934. Soon thereafter appellant was appointed and duly qualified as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Beers, and demanded of the appellee payment of the sum of money represented by the above certificate and upon refusal of the bank to pay same, on May 16, 1934, appellant filed this suit in the Kenton circuit court to recover of the bank for the estate of her decedent the sum of money represented by the original certificate date of September 12, 1909.
Appellee filed its answer denying certain allegations of the petition, and in paragraph 2 it further pleaded that the deposit made by Mrs. Beers in September, 1909, as represented by certificate No. 56, was made by C.E. Quick, the brother-in-law of the decedent, who had managed and looked after her business transactions and acted as her agent in such matters, and when the certificate of deposit was due March 12, 1910, C.E. Quick, as agent of decedent, surrendered said certificate to the bank and same was settled in full with the decedent. Later by amended answer it further pleaded settlement in full and set out the series of transactions had from the time the original deposit was made to November 2, 1919, at which time, it alleged, there remained in its hands $400 of the principal sum originally deposited and on that date the decedent drew that sum from the bank and settled with it in full. It further pleaded the fifteen-year statute of limitations (Ky. Stats., sec. 2514), alleging that certificate No. 56 sued on by appellant matured March 12, 1910, and that more than fifteen years had elapsed between the date of maturity of the certificate and the filing of this action.
The court sustained a demurrer to the plea of limitations, but overruled it as to the plea of settlement. A trial was had before a jury and resulted in a verdict for plaintiff for the sum of $1,300.
Appellee filed its motion and grounds for a new trial insisting, among other things, that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to its plea of the statute of limitations. Upon consideration of the motion and grounds for a new trial, the court sustained same and granted defendant a new trial and dismissed plaintiff's petition. Hence this appeal.
It appears that the court rendered a memorandum opinion setting out its reasons for granting a new trial and dismissing the petition, but that opinion does not appear in the record, except counsel quote in their respective briefs certain parts of the opinion, and it is conceded that the court granted the new trial and dismissed the petition upon the ground that plaintiff's claim had been barred by the statute of limitations.
Counsel cites no Kentucky case, and we know of none, passing upon the question as to when the statute of limitations begins to run against a time loan deposit certificate in form or...
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