Gould v. Crow

• Decision Date: 31 July 1874
• Citation: 57 Mo. 200
• Parties: HELEN E. GOULD, et al., Repondents, v. J. T. CROW, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

57 Mo. 200

HELEN E. GOULD, et al., Repondents,

v.J. T. CROW, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July Term, 1874.

Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court.

Jeffries & Crow, for Appellant.

I. The judgment if conclusive--as undoubtedly it was--in Indiana, was conclusive everywhere else in this country. (2 Bish. Mar. & Div., p. 706.)

II. The divorce puts an end to all rights depending on the marriage and not actually vested as dower in the wife. (Dobson vs. Butler, 17 Mo., 87; Chenowith vs. Chenowith, 14 Ind., 2.)

A. J. Seay, for Respondents.

I. The Indiana divorce is a foreign judgment, and is subject to the law regulating foreign judgments. (Bouv. Law Dic. Vol. I, p. 536.)

It is indispensable that the court which rendered the judgment had “a lawful jurisdiction over the cause, over the thing and over the parties. If the jurisdiction fails as to either, it is treated as a mere nullity, having no obligation and entitled to no respect beyond the domestic tribunals. And this is equally true, whether the proceedings be in rem or in personam, or in rem and also in personam.” (Sto. Confl. Laws, § 586, and cases cited; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 450.)

“And if the jurisdiction over the res be well founded, but not over the person except as to the res, the judgment will not be either conclusive or binding upon the party in personam, although it may be in rem.” (Sto. Confl. Laws, § 592; Rose vs. Hunely, 4 Cr., p. 268-9; Reel vs. Elder, 62 Penn. St., 308; 9 Wall., 121.)

It is a universal principle of the common law, that any title or interest in the land can only be acquired or lost according to the law of the place where the same is situated. (Sto. Confl. Laws, §§ 186-7, and 365 and cases cited; also §§ 539-43; Waddle vs. Watts, 6 Pet., 387; 7 Cr. U. S., 115; 6 Wheat., 577; 9 Wheat., 465; 10 Wheat., 192; Mansfield vs. McIntyre, 10 Ohio St., 27; Colvin vs. Reed, 55 Penn. St., 375.)ADAMS, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action for dower in a lot in the town of Union, in Franklin county, held by the defendant as purchaser from Robt. L. Jeffries, deceased.

Robt. L. Jeffries was the first husband of the plaintiff Helen E. Gould. He was married to her in Missouri. Afterwards, in 1864, he obtained a divorce from her in the court of common pleas, in Vigo county, in the State of Indiana. She did not join in the conveyance under which the defendant holds the lot.

The defendant set up as a defense to this suit, the Indiana divorce, and the plaintiffs allege that the divorce was obtained by fraud, etc.

When the record of the Indiana divorce suit was offered as evidence by the defendant, the court excluded it and the defendant excepted. There was no evidence offered to impeach the Indiana judgment, and the only material question presented by this appeal is, whether the court erred in excluding it. On its face the record seems to be regular. The petition for the divorce alleges that the applicant, Jeffries, was a bona fide resident of Vigo county, in Indiana, at the time he applied for a divorce. It does not allege how long he had resided in that State. It alleges that the said Helen deserted him after he went to Indiana, and does not allege how long the desertion had existed. It also alleges other matters for the divorce.

There was no service of summons on the defendant, but there was an order of publication duly published, and the record of the decree states that the defendant, Helen, appeared by three attorneys, whose names are set forth in the decree. The record shows that the case was heard, and proof given, and upon the proof a decree for a divorce, in due form, was rendered. No plea or answer was put in for the defendant.

It is urged here that the Indiana act of the legislature confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Circuit Court in divorce suits. But the language of the act is not exclusive. The presumption is, as the common pleas court is a court of record. and took jurisdiction of the case, that it had the right under the laws of Indiana to hear and determine the case.

There is nothing to show that the attorneys who appeared for the wife had any authority to do so. They did nothing but appear, and I shall consider the case as though the decree had been rendered without any appearance on her part, and simply on order of publication. The formality of such appearance may be required by the Indiana laws, and that may be the reason why the attorneys appeared for her.

As the case stands before us, the judgment being unimpeached, we must consider it as valid under the laws of Indiana. For although the petition does not allege the length of time the plaintiff had been domiciled, nor for how long a time his wife had deserted him, the presumption is that all these matters appeared in proof, and that the court was justified on the evidence in the cause to grant the divorce.

Of course, if Jeffries went to Indiana expressly to obtain the divorce, that would render it fraudulent and void as to his wife, but that question is not before us. Considering that the divorce was regularly obtained on a regular order of publication, did it operate as a divorce in Missouri so as to prevent the wife from claiming dower in the lands of Jeffries in Missouri? That is the question presented by this record for us to determine.

A divorce suit is a proceeding in rem. The status of husband and wife is the res to be acted on and dissolved by the decree. It is not simply a contract of marriage which is dealt with by a decree of divorce; but it is one of the chief domestic relations--the relation of husband and wife--deriving its rights and duties from a source higher than any contract, and uncontrollable by the parties themselves. The duties and rights derived from this...