Gov't of The V.I. v. Mills

• Decision Date: 09 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–1542.,10–1542.
• Citation: 634 F.3d 746
• Parties: GOVERNMENT OF the VIRGIN ISLANDSv.Aswa MILLS, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

634 F.3d 746

GOVERNMENT OF the VIRGIN ISLANDS

v.Aswa MILLS, Appellant.

No. 10–1542.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued Dec. 16, 2010.Filed: Feb. 9, 2011.

Ashlee M. Gray (argued), St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, for Appellant.Matthew Phelan (argued), Department of Justice, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, for Appellee.

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Under the rules governing appellate procedure, a notice of appeal must “designate the judgment” from which the appeal is being taken. This case presents the question whether a pro se notice of appeal satisfies the judgment-designation requirement when, although it correctly identifies the parties to the appeal, the nature of the case, and the court to which the appeal is being taken, it erroneously references the docket number and trial date of an earlier case involving the same parties. We hold that where, as here, the surrounding circumstances make clear which judgment the appellant intends to appeal and the appellee is not prejudiced by the errors contained in the notice, the errors are not fatal to the appeal.

I. Background

On April 6, 2000, the appellant Aswa Mills was tried and convicted of assault and battery in the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands. We will refer to this case as “the assault case.” Mills was sentenced to 30 days in custody, which he served. He filed an appeal almost a year later, but quickly moved to withdraw it, perhaps concluding that the appeal was either too late or pointless. On July 2, 2001, the motion to withdraw was granted by the Appellate Division of the District Court for the Virgin Islands (“Appellate Division”), the court to which direct appeals from judgments entered by the Territorial Court were taken until the establishment of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court. See 48 U.S.C. § 1613a.

The assault case was not Mills' only run-in with the criminal justice system in 2000. In early 2000, Mills was charged in the Territorial Court with (among other offenses) first-degree murder. We will refer to this case as “the murder case.” A jury convicted Mills on February 22, 2002, and, on March 19, 2002, Mills filed a pro se notice of appeal.¹ It is undisputed that the notice was an attempt to appeal the not-yet-entered judgment in the murder case. The handwritten notice reads as follows:

United States District Court for the Appeals

United States District for the Appeals

District of U.S. Virgin Islands

File number 525/1999 re: 525–1999 [the case number for the assault case]

Government of the Virgin Islands

v.

Aswa Mills

Notice is hereby given that the Virgin Islands v. Aswa Mills hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from the final judgment from an order of conviction entered on April 6, 2000. Notice is hereby given the Virgin Islands v. Aswa A. Mills is in pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. complete Annotation review 3504(a)2, 18 U.S.C.A. 3731, and 18, 3500. Notice is hereby stating order of U.S.C.A. 18, 2248 a return of [illegible].

In April 2002, the Territorial Court sentenced Mills to life without parole, and judgment was formally entered on June 28, 2002.

The Clerk of the Territorial Court determined that Mills' notice of appeal pertained to the murder case and, on September 12, 2002, transmitted the record to the Appellate Division, which created a docket for the appeal. The dockets of both the Territorial Court and Appellate Division indicated that the appeal related to the murder case, not the assault case.

On September 17, 2002, the Clerk of the Appellate Division sent Mills' attorney a letter, a copy of which was mailed to the government. The letter referenced the case number for the murder case, and warned that Mills' appeal would be dismissed if he did not pay the required docketing fee and submit a transcript purchase order. Mills paid the fee and submitted a transcript order in early October 2002.

On April 3, 2003, the Clerk issued a briefing schedule. The schedule, which also referenced the murder case number and was sent to both sides, stated that Mills' opening brief was due by May 13, 2003. Mills' attorney requested and was granted leave to file the brief as late as January 15, 2004. Still, Mills' brief was not filed until May 14, 2004. Although it was filed late, the brief clearly indicated that Mills was challenging the murder conviction, not the old assault conviction.

In June 2004, the government moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Mills' notice of appeal was fatally defective. In 2006, over two years after the motion had been filed, Mills' attorney finally filed a response. Not long thereafter, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court disbarred Mills' attorney, and a new attorney was appointed to represent Mills.

After Mills' new attorney had appeared, the Appellate Division held a status conference and requested supplemental briefing on the motion to dismiss, which the parties dutifully provided. On February 5, 2010, the Appellate Division granted the motion to dismiss. It concluded that it could not entertain Mills' appeal because his notice of appeal failed to comply with Virgin Islands Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(c), under which a notice must “designate the judgment ... appealed from.” The notice was insufficient, the Court opined, because it listed the case number for, and the date of the trial in, the assault case, and did not reference the murder case. The court so held even though the government had never represented that it was actually prejudiced or misled by the defects in the notice.²

Mills filed the instant appeal (this time using a flawless notice of appeal).

II. Jurisdiction

The Appellate Division had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a). This Court has jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c).

III. Standard of Review

The Appellate Division's decision rests on an interpretation of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Rules were adopted by the Appellate Division and have the status of local rules. See Guam Sasaki Corp. v. Diana's Inc., 881 F.2d 713, 715 (9th Cir.1989). The law of this Circuit is not clear as to the standard of review that applies to a court's interpretation of its own local rules. We take this opportunity to offer clarification.

When we first addressed the issue, we held that an appellate court generally owes deference to a district court's interpretation of its local rules. United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1200–01 (3d Cir.1980) (citing Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140, 143–44 (1st Cir.1976); Lance, Inc. v. Dewco Servs., Inc., 422 F.2d 778, 783–84 (9th Cir.1970)); see also United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 258–59 (3d Cir.1984) (noting in passing that “the interpretation of the local rules of a district court by one of its judges is entitled to deference”). Miller recognizes that the court that promulgates a rule is usually the best arbiter of its meaning.

More recent cases from this Circuit, however, seem to treat a court's interpretation of one of its local rules as a garden-variety legal issue, and state that a plenary standard of review applies. D'Iorio v. Majestic Lanes, Inc., 370 F.3d 354, 356 n. 1 (3d Cir.2004) (“We ... exercise plenary review over the District Court's interpretation of the local rules at issue.”); Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 171, 175–76 (3d Cir.1990) (“The issue presented by the district court's application and interpretation of [one of its own local rules] is ... one over which we exercise plenary review.” (citing Dent v. Cunningham, 786 F.2d 173, 175 (3d Cir.1986) (appellate review is plenary where the “issues involve the selection, interpretation, and application of legal precepts”))).

Our more recent decisions must be disregarded to the extent they are at odds with Miller. See Holland v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 246 F.3d 267, 278 n. 8 (3d Cir.2001) (“[T]o the extent that [a case within this Circuit] is read to be inconsistent with earlier case law, the earlier case law ... controls.” (citing O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 354 (3d Cir.1981))). This brings the law of this Circuit into harmony with the law of our sister circuits on the issue. See Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir.2009) (appellate court owes deference to a district court's interpretation of its local rules); Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 361 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir.2004) (same); Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 270–71 (2d Cir.2001) (same); Smith v. Vill. of Maywood, 970 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir.1992) (“Generally speaking, we prefer to defer to the district courts when interpreting their local rules.”); Guam Sasaki, 881 F.2d at 715 (same); 12 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3153 (2d ed.1997) (collecting cases).

Notwithstanding Miller's general rule that deference is owed to a court's interpretation of its local rules, we believe that a plenary standard of review is appropriate in this case. Although the Appellate Division's decision was technically based on an interpretation of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court noted that the Virgin Islands Rules are identical in relevant respects to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, it relied exclusively on cases applying the Federal Rules to justify dismissal of the appeal. As a practical matter, then, the Appellate Division's decision rests on an interpretation of the Federal Rules, which requires us to conduct plenary review. See L–3 Commc'ns Corp. v. OSI Sys., Inc., 607 F.3d 24, 27–28 (2d Cir.2010) (plenary standard of review applies to “a district court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure”); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 459 (3d Cir.2000) (same, regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Miller, 624 F.2d at 1200–02 (exercising plenary review over a district court's...