Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau
| Decision Date | 24 September 1973 |
| Docket Number | Crim. No. 97-1972 |
| Citation | 10 V.I. 169 |
| Parties | GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, Plaintiff v. BEAUMONT GEREAU, ISHMAEL LA BEET, WARREN BALLENTINE, MERAL SMITH, RAPHAEL JOSEPH, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
Motion for new trial, alleging jury tampering. After reference to a master for a hearing, the District Court, Young, J., which had been unable to hear the motion itself due to absence of one judge and pressing business of the other, ruled it proper, though unprecedented, to refer the hearing to a master, and held that the statements of any juror seeking to impeach his verdict after pressures and solicitations to do so must be subjected to severe suspicion, and that where, after returning guilty verdicts in murder trial, a campaign of fear, ruthless coercion and pressure began against the jurors from the time they left the courtroom and had not yet ceased, and certain persons solicited and received several jurors' affidavits impeaching their verdicts, the court would not allow impeachment of the verdict by jurors' statements that the jury had been tampered with prior to verdict.
[COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED]
[COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED]
[COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED]
JULIO BRADY, ESQ., United States Attorney, Christiansted, St. Croix, V.I., for plaintiff
MARIO N. DECHABERT, ESQ., Christiansted, St. Croix, V.I., for defendant Gereau
WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER, ESQ., New York, N.Y., for defendant Gereau
RONALD T. MITCHELL, ESQ., St. Thomas, V.I., for defendant La Beet
CHAUNCEY ESKRIDGE, ESQ., Chicago, Illinois, for defendant La Beet
LEROY MERCER, ESQ., Christiansted, St. Croix, V.I., for defendant Ballentine
MARGARET L. RATNER, ESQ, New York, N.Y., for defendant Ballentine
LEROY MERCER, ESQ., Christiansted, St. Croix, V.I., for defendant Smith
RONALD T. MITCHELL, ESQ., St. Thomas, V.I., for defendant Joseph
By motion dated August 15, 1973, defendants moved for a "prompt" evidentiary hearing into certain allegations of jury tampering, and for a new trial. This motion was supported by the affidavits of two of the jurors in this case and by sundry other allegations of misconduct which hadcome to the attention of the defense attorneys. At the time of this motion I was off island and unavailable. Chief Judge Almeric L. Christian appointed Municipal Judge John D. Marsh as a Master to hold a full evidentiary hearing into the various allegations. I now have before me Judge Marsh's findings of fact and recommendation dated September 21, 1973. On the basis of his findings, I conclude, for reasons to be discussed below, that the defendants are not entitled to a new trial. Therefore the motion for a new trial is DENIED. Before discussing my reasons for this determination, there are three preliminary matters I must dispose of.
First, I have before me a motion filed September 6, 1973, in which defendants La Beet and Ballentine, through their attorneys William Kunstler and Margaret Ratner (but not the other defendants), have for the third time during this proceeding moved the Court to recuse itself, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. All defendants previously moved for recusal by written motion of June 12, 1973, and orally on July 9, 1973. I denied the first motion by Order of June 12, 1973, and denied the second motion from the bench on July 9, 1973.
[1-3] In their latest motion defendants correctly point out that 28 U.S.C. § 144 permits only one recusal motion in any single proceeding. I believe, however, that defendants' motion has a more fatal flaw. As I explained to the defense attorneys in my previous Order of June 12, 1973, 28 U.S.C. § 144 is not applicable in the Virgin Islands. Callwood v. Callwood, 127 F.Supp. 179 (D.C.V.I. 1954). Therefore, the defendants' motion must be DENIED. Moreover, even if the defendants had moved under the applicable local statute, 4 V.I.C. § 284, the motion would properly be denied for three reasons. First, I believe that the policy embodied in § 144 against harassing trial judges with multiple recusal motions is a sound one and shouldbe read into § 284. Secondly, I believe that the reasons I gave for denial of the previous motion to recuse in my Order of June 12, 1973, are of undiminished persuasiveness. Third, the only additional reason for recusal advanced by the defendants in their latest motion has no merit. Defendants allege that a letter, which appeared in The St. Croix Avis from Judge Charles D. Harris to myself shows bias on my part. I emphatically here state that the publication of this letter took place without my consent or knowledge, and that its contents in no way reflect any opinions which I may have as to the defense attorneys or defendants.
[4] In the second place, there may be some question as to this Court's jurisdiction to decide this motion, since the defense attorneys gave oral notice of appeal before moving for a new trial. While there is some authority to the contrary, I believe this Court has jurisdiction under Rule 33 to entertain and deny a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence without the necessity of a remand. United States v. Frame, 454 F.2d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1972); Richardson v. United States, 360 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1966); Rakes v. United States, 163 F.2d 771, 772 (4th Cir. 1947). It is only after a trial judge has heard a motion for a new trial and decided to grant it that he must seek remand. In effect, then, a post-appeal motion for a new trial is deemed to be a motion to seek remand from the appellate court. The purpose of this fiction is to expedite proceedings and avoid the delay of an unnecessary request for remand. See Rakes v. United States, supra at 772. Since I have decided that defendants' motion must be denied, my jurisdiction is therefore clear despite the pending appeal.
[5] A third preliminary matter is the somewhat novel procedure used in this case in obtaining a "prompt" evidentiary hearing. A more conventional evidentiary hear-ing could not have been promptly held. Chief Judge Christian was, at the time, impaneling a jury for the Brauhaus murder case involving seven defendants. I had already left St. Croix on personal business and could not return promptly. The appointment of a Master to conduct the post-verdict questioning of the jurors was the only available solution. A prompt hearing (as defense counsel requested) was essential under the circumstances. The procedure devised and used by Chief Judge Christian was not inappropriate nor illegal and it preserved all of the defendants' rights. The motion for a new trial alleged many outside coercive influences against jurors. It was essential that an immediate evidentiary hearing into these allegations be had before any further possible coercion or intimidation of the jurors could occur. As I was absent from the district and unable to preside at this hearing, Chief Judge Christian properly assumed my duties under Rule 25 (b):
"[i]f by reason of absence . . . the judge before whom the defendant has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be performed by the Court after verdict or finding of guilt, any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the Court may perform those duties."
Because Chief Judge Christian, the only other District Court judge in the Virgin Islands, was engaged in a very important ongoing trial, he chose to appoint Judge Marsh to conduct the hearings. I believe that this appointment, while without direct precedent, was entirely proper under Rule 57(b):
"If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the Court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any applicable statute."
I am unaware of any inconsistent rule or statute.
Judge Marsh conducted a comprehensive hearing into all the allegations, carefully preserving the defendants'right to cross-examination. See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 230 (1954); United States v. Guthrie, 387 F.2d 569 (4th Cir. 1967). He has assessed the demeanor of the witnesses and made findings of fact. It would, I think, be mere surplusage for me to repeat this hearing. I do believe, however, that the defendants are entitled to a review of the findings of fact, and to conclusions of law, by the trial judge himself, who was closest to the case and best equipped to assess the fairness of the proceedings. Therefore, I have given the transcripts of the hearings and Judge Marsh's findings of fact and recommendation the most careful scrutiny.
Before dealing in detail with the issues of jury misconduct raised by this case, it will be useful to begin with an overview of the legal problems the case presents. One must recognize, first of all, that the jury trial in the Virgin Islands is a unique institution. We are a small island and a closely interrelated community. In addition, we are a community which in recent years has been troubled by growing social pressures. It is not possible in such a community, with regard to any major case, to select a completely unin-volved and dispassionate jury, nor is it realistic to believe that jurors can deliberate with no thought of the problems that may face them on their return to the community. The transcript of the post-conviction examination before the Master of the jurors in this case, given the broad parameters of his inquiry, presents a provocative study of the efficacy of the jury system as it is presently constituted.
[6] Secondly, I think it is important to realize that the mere fact that the integrity of the jury deliberations was in some way breached does not by itself necessitate a new trial. The sheer number of cases in which jury misconduct has been alleged shows how frequent and unavoidable arethe imperfections in the jury system. See Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 554. The great majority of cases reflect a strong presumption against looking too scrupulously into the ways in which juries work. E.g., Richardson v. United States, 376...
To continue reading
Request your trial