Goyal v. Hora

• Decision Date: 27 May 2021
• Docket Number: NO. 03-19-00868-CV,03-19-00868-CV
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ryan Goyal, Appellant v. Henna Hora, Appellee

Ryan Goyal, Appellant v. Henna Hora, Appellee

NO. 03-19-00868-CV

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

May 27, 2021

FROM THE 345TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. D-1-FM-18-006215, THE HONORABLE JAN SOIFER, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ryan Goyal appeals from a final decree of divorce from Henna Hora rendered after a bench trial. In two issues, Goyal complains of the district court's child-support order and characterization of the marital estate. We will affirm the district court's final decree of divorce.

BACKGROUND

Goyal and Hora were married on October 23, 2016. They have one child, born November 1, 2017, who was one-and-a-half years old at the time of trial. Goyal is a licensed certified public accountant and was employed during the marriage as an auditor for Novogradac making over $11,000 monthly. Hora was not employed outside the home during the marriage. In April 2017, Goyal and Hora bought the house where they lived and raised their child until their separation in October 2018. Hora filed for divorce in a Travis County district court later that month.

Before trial, the parties reached an agreement as to possession and access of the child. The primary disputes during trial concerned the amount of child support that Goyal should pay, Goyal's separate-property claims, and his claim for reimbursement. Both parties presented testimony from certified public accountants about the proper methodology for determining such claims. After the trial concluded on June 11, 2019, the district court granted the divorce subject to the division of the marital property in the final decree. On August 29, 2019, the district court signed a final decree of divorce dividing the marital estate and ordering Goyal to pay guideline child support on the first $8,550 of Goyal's monthly net resources plus an additional amount for the child's daycare, after-school care, extracurricular activities, and camp, the total amount of which was capped at $1,000.

The district court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, including that "Goyal failed to carry his burden of proof regarding any separate property claim." Goyal filed objections to those findings and conclusions and requested additional or amended findings. As to its overall division of the marital property, the district court found that Goyal had greater earning capacity than Hora, that Hora would have benefited financially from the continuation of the marriage, that Goyal had business and trading opportunities not available to Hora, that Goyal had a more extensive educational background than Hora, that Goyal was at fault for the breakup of the marriage, and that Goyal had caused the expenditure of excessive attorneys' fees. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Goyal complains of the district court's child-support order and its characterization of the marital estate. We review both these challenges to the final decree under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Tex. 1993) (addressing child support); Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981) (addressing property division). A trial court abuses its discretion only if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard to guiding legal principles, or without supporting evidence. Gonzales v. Maggio, 500 S.W.3d 656, 667 n.36 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.); Coburn v. Moreland, 433 S.W.3d 809, 823 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.).

Here, as in other family law cases, the abuse-of-discretion standard and traditional sufficiency standards of review overlap. See Sink v. Sink, 364 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). In these cases, legal and factual insufficiency are not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Coburn, 433 S.W.3d at 823; Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). Thus, in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider whether the court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion, and if so, whether it erred in the application of that discretion. Coburn, 433 S.W.3d at 823; Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 588.

Evidence is legally sufficient if it would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011). Evidence is legally insufficient when: (1) there is a complete absence of a vital fact; (2) rules of law or evidence preclude giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; or(4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005); Steele v. Steele, No. 03-07-00011-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6519, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 19, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). When determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's exercise of discretion, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings if a reasonable factfinder could, and disregard evidence to the contrary unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 827; Steele, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6519, at *9. When determining whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court's exercise of discretion, we consider and weigh all the evidence presented and set aside the trial court's findings only if they are so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence such that they are clearly wrong and unjust. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 826. We review a trial court's findings of fact for legal and factual sufficiency under these same standards. Robbins v. Robbins, 550 S.W.3d 846, 854 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.). When the record contains some evidence of a substantive and probative character supporting the trial court's decision, there is no abuse of discretion. Tran v. Nguyen, 480 S.W.3d 119, 128 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.); Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).

Child Support

In his first issue, Goyal complains of the district court's order of child support "for a total of $2710.00, which includes guideline child support of $1710.00 and 'up to an additional $1000.00' more for daycare, after school care, extra-curricular activities and camp." Section 154.126 of the Family Code states that when an obligor's net monthly resources exceed$8,550¹ a trial court may order additional amounts of child support to the presumptive-guideline amount:

(a) If the obligor's net resources exceed the amount provided by Section 154.125(a) [$8,550], the court shall presumptively apply the percentage guidelines to the portion of the obligor's net resources that does not exceed that amount. Without further reference to the percentage recommended by these guidelines, the court may order additional amounts of child support as appropriate, depending on the income of the parties and the proven needs of the child.

(b) The proper calculation of a child support order that exceeds the presumptive amount established for the portion of the obligor's net resources provided by Section 154.125(a) requires that the entire amount of the presumptive award be subtracted from the proven total needs of the child. After the presumptive award is subtracted, the court shall allocate between the parties the responsibility to meet the additional needs of the child according to the circumstances of the parties. However, in no event may the obligor be required to pay more child support than the greater of the presumptive amount or the amount equal to 100 percent of the proven needs of the child.

Tex. Fam. Code § 154.126. A child-support award exceeding the presumptive award must be based only on the child's unmet needs. Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d at 417-18. A child's needs are not limited to "the bare necessities of life." Id. at 417 n.3. Rather, the trial court must determine, in its discretion, what the child's needs are on a case-by-case basis by following the "paramount guiding principle: the best interest of the child." Id. (emphasis in original); see Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d at 417 n.3). A trial court sitting as the trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight assigned theirtestimony, and the court may accept or reject all or any part of the testimony of each witness. In re Marriage of Skarda, 345 S.W.3d 665, 672 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).

Here, the child-support order in the final divorce decree states that Goyal's net resources per month "are in excess of $8,550," that Hora's net resources are $0, and that the percentage applied to the first $8,550 of Goyal's net resources for child support is 20 percent. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 154.125(b) (providing chart of child-support guidelines setting support for one child at twenty percent of obligor's net resources); .126(a) (directing trial court to "presumptively apply the percentage guidelines to the portion of the obligor's net resources that does not exceed that amount"); .130 (governing findings in child support order). Thus, the district court correctly determined that the presumptive guideline amount—twenty percent of Goyal's $8,550 net monthly income—is $1,710. Additionally, the decree ordered Goyal to pay, up to a maximum of $1,000 per month, the cost of the child's daycare, after-school care, camp, and/or other extracurricular activities.

Goyal contends that the district court abused its discretion by ordering child support exceeding the presumptive guideline amount because there was legally or factually insufficient evidence of net resources and the proven needs of the child to support that award. A party who challenges the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it did not have the burden of proof must demonstrate that there is no evidence to...