Graber v. City of Ankeny

• Decision Date: 23 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-1994.,01-1994.
• Citation: 656 N.W.2d 157
• Parties: Judith Kay GRABER, Appellant, v. CITY OF ANKENY, Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

656 N.W.2d 157

Judith Kay GRABER, Appellant, v. CITY OF ANKENY, Iowa, Appellee.

No. 01-1994.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

January 23, 2003.

John P. Roehrick of Roehrick, Hulting, Krull, & Blumberg, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

John Werner and Donna R. Miller of Grefe & Sidney, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

STREIT, Justice.

Judith Graber and Kristie Allen collided at a T-intersection in the City of Ankeny. Graber sued the city claiming it negligently timed the traffic signals at this intersection proximately causing her injuries. The city argued it is immune from liability under the discretionary function immunity statute of Iowa Code section 670.4(3) (2001). The trial court found the city is entitled to immunity and Graber appealed. Because we find the action of the city in timing the sequence of the traffic lights is not a discretionary decision based upon legitimate public policy considerations, we reverse.

I. Background and Facts

In 1996, Judith Graber approached the T-intersection at State Street and Oralabor in the City of Ankeny. The light controlling the movement of her lane of traffic turned green. Traveling to the north, Graber entered the intersection to make a left-hand turn. At the same time, an east-bound car driven by Kristie Allen entered the intersection even though she had a red light. Allen's car hit Graber's car broadside. Graber sustained serious injuries. Allen testified the stop light controlling the movement of her lane of traffic changed from green to yellow to red so quickly that she did not have time to stop.

Graber sued the city claiming it negligently set the timing of the traffic lights at the intersection. A jury found the city was not liable for Graber's injuries. Graber appealed. Because we found the trial court improperly admitted settlement evidence prejudicing Graber's substantial rights, we remanded the case for a retrial. Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 2000). The city then amended its answer claiming governmental function immunity based on Iowa Code section 670.4(3). The court granted a motion for summary judgment based upon the added defense. The district court found the timing sequence of the traffic lights is a discretionary function entitled to immunity and dismissed Graber's case. Graber appeals.

Graber contends the city is not immune for its actions in timing the sequence of traffic lights because it did not exercise discretion in simply following the mandates of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). The city claims the MUTCD is not mandatory but contains recommendations and guidelines. The city further argues it is immune from liability because it exercised discretion and made policy-based judgments in timing the sequence of the traffic lights.

II. Scope of Review

Our review of the district court's grant of the motion for summary judgment is for correction of errors at law. Doe v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 652 N.W.2d 439, 442 (Iowa 2002). Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3) (2002).

III. The Merits

Our only question on appeal is whether the city's action involved in timing the sequence of traffic lights is a discretionary function entitled to immunity from liability. Iowa Code section 670.2 (2001) provides "every municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers and employees, acting within the scope of their employment or duties." A municipality is not liable, however, for certain discretionary functions. Iowa Code section 670.4(3) contains our provision for governmental function immunity which provides a municipality is immune from

Any claim based upon an act or omission of an officer or employee of the municipality, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute, ordinance, or regulation, whether the statute, ordinance or regulation is valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the municipality or an officer or employee of a municipality, whether or not the discretion is abused.

Iowa Code § 670.4(3). Graber argues the immunity does not apply and the city is liable for her injuries. The city argues it is immune because it exercised discretion and its actions were based on numerous policy considerations.

Immunity is based upon the desire to "prevent judicial `second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort." Goodman v. City of LeClaire, 587 N.W.2d 232, 237 (Iowa 1998) (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 1959, 100 L.Ed.2d 531, 541 (1988)). In determining whether the discretionary function immunity of Iowa Code section 670.4(3) applies, we apply the test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37,108 S.Ct. at 1958-59,100 L.Ed.2d at 540-41. See Goodman, 587 N.W.2d at 238 (adopting the Berkovitz test). The first step is to determine whether there was an element of judgment or discretion involved in the city's decision. Doe, 652 N.W.2d at 443. If we find the city exercised choice in timing the traffic lights, then we must determine whether this kind of judgment is the type the discretionary function immunity was designed to shield from liability. Id. If the answer to either of these questions is negative, then the discretionary function immunity is not available as defense. Id. The general rule is that of municipal liability—immunity is the exception. Id.

A. Did the City Exercise Discretion?

Graber argues the city's action in timing the sequence of the traffic lights is not immune because it was governed by the MUTCD which leaves no room for discretion. The city argues the MUTCD is not mandatory but works merely as a guideline. The United States Department of Transportation publishes a volume entitled, "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices." Our legislature has directed the department of transportation to "adopt a manual on specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control devices consistent with the provisions of this chapter [321]...." Iowa Code §§ 321.252 (directive for state authorities), 321.255 (directive for local authorities); Iowa Admin. Code r. 761-130.1 (1996). Pursuant to a local ordinance, the city established that traffic control devices were to be placed and maintained in accordance with the MUTCD and specifications of the Iowa Department of Transportation. See Ankeny Mun.Code § 10.12.010. Based on the provisions of the MUTCD, the trial court determined the city's action was discretionary.

Graber has not presented any evidence to support the conclusion that the MUTCD's provisions prevent choices in running the city's traffic lights. There are no statutes or contractual provisions that restrict the city's timing of the sequence of traffic signals in such a way as to eliminate all aspects of discretion or judgment. The MUTCD provisions do not support a finding that the timing of traffic signals is mandatory.

Graber relies on one provision of the MUTCD to support her conclusion that the MUTCD is mandatory. In the MUTCD's prefatory provisions, it states:

Engineering Study Required

The decision to use a particular device at a particular location should be made on the basis of an engineering study of the location. Thus, while this Manual provides standards for design and application of traffic control devices, the Manual is not a substitute for engineering judgment. It is the intent that the provisions of this Manual be standards for traffic control devices installation, but not a legal requirement for installation.

Qualified engineers are needed to exercise the engineering judgment inherent in the selection of traffic control devices, just as they are needed to locate and design the roads and streets which the devices complement. Jurisdictions with responsibility for traffic control that do not have qualified engineers on their staffs, should seek assistance from the State highway department, their county, a nearby large city, or a traffic consultant.

MUTCD § 1A-4 (emphasis added). Graber argues this section imposes a duty upon the city to perform engineering studies in the operation and maintenance of traffic control devices and general regulation of traffic. However, the requirement that an engineering study be performed applies not to the operation of traffic control devices, but to the initial decision to use a particular type of traffic control device at a particular location. As to the city's original decision to use traffic lights at this intersection, the national manual functioned as an aid to guide the exercise of professional judgment in that choice. The MUTCD is not meant to function as a substitute for professional judgment in the selection of traffic control devices.

There is no other similar provision in the MUTCD imposing an engineering study requirement upon a city's operation of traffic control devices. The MUTCD addresses the timing of traffic signals in section 4B-20. This provision states, "traffic control signals shall be operated in a manner consistent with traffic requirements." Because the demands on traffic signals change with the traffic flow, pedestrian traffic, and other such variables, the MUTCD recommends engineering studies and information should be reevaluated periodically.

In most cases the installation of a highway signal will operate either to the advantage or disadvantage of the vehicles and persons controlled.... Engineering studies should be made of operating signals to determine if the type of installation and the timing program meet the current requirements of traffic.

MUTCD § 4A-2; see...