Grable v. Varela
Decision Date | 07 February 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 2,CA-CIV,2 |
Citation | 564 P.2d 911,115 Ariz. 222 |
Parties | Randall J. GRABLE and Mable A. Grable, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Joseph Richard VARELA, a Minor, and Joseph Varela and Erma Varela, his parents, Appellees. 2269. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Rees, Mercaldo & Smith, P.C. by Brian E. Smith, Tucson, for appellants.
Johnson, Tucker, Jessen & Dake by James F. Bly, Jr., and Kenneth L. Tucker, Tucson, for appellees.
The issue in this case is whether the 'fireman's rule' should be accepted in Arizona. Randall Grable, a member of the Tucson Fire Department, was injured while fighting a fire at an unoccupied residence located in Tucson, Arizona. The fire was started by the appellee, Joseph Richard Varela, a minor, who, while playing with matches, started a grass fire which spread to the house.
The complaint filed by appellants was appellees moved for summary judgment. appellees moved for summary judgment. Appellants resisted the motion and moved to amend their complaint to allege that the conduct of the minor was both reckless and negligent. The trial court denied the motion to amend and granted appellees' motion for summary judgment.
The 'fireman's rule' which we here discuss negates liability to a fireman by one whose negligence causes or contributes to the fire which in turn causes the death or injury of the fireman. Other jurisdictions are almost unanimous in denying recovery by an injured fireman from one whose sole connection with the injury is that his negligence caused the fire. 1 Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 266 Cal.App.2d 355, 72 Cal.Rptr. 119 at 121 (1968). In fact, the California court in Giorgi, was able to find but one case, Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. O'Leary, 136 S.W. 601 (Tex.Civ.App.1911) which although perhaps distinguishable on its facts, arguably is to the contrary.
The basis of the fireman's rule which is a very old one is public policy. As stated by Chief Justice Weintraub in Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129, 131 (1960):
While there is little doubt that the fireman's rule originated in the land occupier cases, the rule is not limited to injuries suffered by firemen on land belonging to or occupied by the defendant. Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Electric Company, supra; Scott v. E. L. Yeager Construction Company, 12 Cal.App.3d 1190, 91 Cal.Rptr. 232 (C.A.4th Dist. 1970). Nor does it matter whether the negligence of the defendant is 'active' or 'passive'. Scott v. E. L. Yeager Construction Company, supra.
We hold that a fireman has no cause of action against one whose negligence caused the fire in which he was injured.
Appellants claim that application of the fireman's rule violates A.R.S. § 23--1023(A) which permits an employee entitled to workmen's compensation to pursue his negligence claim against a third party tortfeasor. We do not agree. A.R.S. § 23--1023(A) does not create a cause of action where none exists.
Appellants next argue that the court erred in not allowing their motion to amend the complaint to allege that the conduct of the minor was reckless and thus bring the defendants within an arsonist exception to the fireman's rule. We do not agree. The fire occurred when the appellee-minor, then fourteen, was with friends in the backyard of a vacant house near his home hunting for treasure with a metal detector. In order to use the metal detector in patches of high grass, the boys decided to burn the grass so that they could get the detectors closer to the ground. A number of spots were burned without incident. The fire which burned the house occurred when a gust of wind blew the grass fire on to some dried up vines on a trellis near the porch at the rear of the vacant house. When the boys saw the vines ignite they tried to extinguish the fire but were unable to do so.
A.R.S. § 13--231 defines arson as:
'A person who Wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned, or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of a dwelling house . . . is guilty of arson in the first degree . . ..' (Emphasis added)
Citing the case of Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 P. 165 (1927) appellants contend that the wilful and malicious intent required by the statute can be inferred from reckless conduct. In Brimhall the...
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